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ABSTRACT

The principal concern of this study is to assess the influence of
military and civilian regimes on public policy in sub-Saharan Africa.
The key question underlying this research is:

Does it make any

difference for a country to be governed by a military or civilian
government?

Some research indicate that regime type does have policy

implications? while others suggest that it does not.

To determine the

linkage <if any) between regime type and public policy four general
hypothesis concerning regime effect on public policy are articulated.
These are:
H, :

Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where the
military controls the policy-making institutions than in
those where they do not.

Hg :

Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables
indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social
sectors? whereas civilian rule will have the opposite
effect.

1+j :

Within any given African country? changes in regime type
should be associated with shifts in the pattern of spending
priorities exhibited by that country.

:

Socioeconomic development in the emerging nations of subSaharan Africa is more likely to occur under military led
regimes that are predisposed to modernization than under
regimes headed by civilians who are similarly predisposed.

Three quantitative methods of analysis— the Multiple Interrupted Time
Series (MITS) design? a "pooled" analysis of differences of means and
"simple country" analysis— are utilized to evaluate regime performance
in several sub-Saharan African countries.
More detailed analysis of the impact of regime type on public policy
is provided with case studies of regime performances in Ghana? Liberia

and Nigeria.

The Ghana case study deals with the linkage between regime

type and agricultural productivity.

In Liberia, government policies as

they relate to foreign affairs is examined.

The case study of Nigeria

deals with the impact of regime type on industrial development.
The picture that emerges from this analysis suggests that most
military and civilian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are
indistinguishable in terms of economic policy outputs and outcomes.
However, there is one category of public expenditure in which there is a
clear distinction between the two regime types— defense spending.

INTRODUCTION

Both civilian and military-led regimes can be found in contemporary
sub-Saharan Africa.

However, direct military intervention aimed at

supplanting of civilian authority in a sub-Saharan African country can
be traced back to November,

1958, when officers led by Gen. Ibrahim

Abboud seized control of the Sudanese government.

This was followed by

a period of stability which lasted until the mid-1960s when, in rapid
succession, the governments of Congo-Kinshasa (November, 1965), Dahomey
(December,
(January,

1965), Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria
1966) and Ghana (February,

1966) all fell victim to coups,

thus, making the military coup the most popular method of effecting
leadership change in sub-Saharan Africa.
Prior to the mid-1960s there was relatively little scholarly research
on the role of the military in African countries.

With the increasing

incidence of military coups on the continent, a few students of African
politics recognized the military as a critical group in shaping the
course of nation-building.

Thus, the African military became a relevant

subject of political inquiry.

However, the major emphasis in early

4

research was on describing the political context which precipitates
military intervention in national politics.

The greater part of the

literature was concerned more with coups, countercoups and the collapse
of civilian regimes than with the actual functioning of military
governments.

In time, a few scholars took the significant next step

beyond explaining coups.

They sought not only to explain military

interventions (Nordlinger 1970; Feit 1973; Welch 1974), but also to
evaluate the performance of the military as a ruling group (McKinlay and

Cohan 1975; Jackman 1976; Bienen 1987; Joseph 1987).

This dissertation

is in keeping with this later trend.
When Margaret Thatcher was asked before her first electoral victory
what her access to power would change in Britain, she answered in one
word:

"everything"

(von Beyme 1984, 5).

It is often with this

expectation that things will change, and hopefully for the better, that
citizens vote in new leaders to manage the affairs of a country.

A

military coup in Africa, like an election victory in a Western
democracy, installs a new government into office.

As is the case with

the installation of a new governing party in a Western democracy, direct
military intervention in a Third World country is associated with
expectations of new policy initiatives.
Some scholars have attempted to discern the impact of party
alternation on policy outputs and outcomes in Western societies (Winters
1976; Jennings 1979; Rose 1980; Bunce 1981; Garand 1985).

Valerie Bunce

has examined the effect of executive succession on public policy in some
socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

However, no detailed study has

attempted to examine the policy implications of military/civilian
alternation in power in sub-Saharan African polities.

This dissertation

is at once an attempt to remedy this situation, and to compare and/or
contrast public policy under African civilian and military regimes.

Goals of this Study
The principal concern of this study is to assess the influence of
military and civilian regimes on public policy in sub-Saharan Africa.
The key question underlying this research is:

Does it make any

difference for a country to be governed by a military or civilian

xi

government?

Given that military intervention in politics is often

precipitated by a need to fulfil some specified objectives or solve
certain critical problems? how will the policy process be affected by
regime change?

Does regime change necessarily yield policy change7

Are

military and civilian regimes associated with different policy
priorities, or is the African political and economic environment such
that policy outputs and outcomes are not sensitive to regime type.

Some

observers maintain that regime type does have policy implications, while
others suggest that it does not matter.

It is the goal of this study to

offer some illumination on the issue, as it relates to sub-Saharan
Africa.
Another aim of this study is to learn if and why some regime types
seem to fare better than others at coping with similar problems (such
as, declining productivity,

inflation and unemployment).

By comparing

regime response to similar problems, important lessons may be learned.
Some of these lessons may provide guidelines to future leaders on what
policy choices to make and which not to make.

Organization of the Study
In the first chapter, the literature on military intervention in
Africa is examined in an attempt to explain why military intervention
has become the single most popular instrument for bringing about
leadership change in Africa.

The literature seems to suggest that

economic considerations are the most common and perhaps the most
important causes of military coup d'etats.

Also reviewed in Chapter One

are the works of some of the more prominent scholars who have studied
regime performance in Third World settings.

x ii

A preliminary review of the

literature on this subject indicates that considerable disagreement
exists among scholars, for example, concerning the policy consequences
of civilian vis-^-vis military rule.
In Chapter Two, the hypotheses by which this study will be guided are
explicitly stated.

Three general hypotheses concerning regime effect on

public policy are articulated:
Hj :

Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where the
military controls the policy-making institutions than in
those where they do not.

Since exceptionally high percentages of defense spending can lead to
decreases in the proportion of total public expenditure which is
allocated to social and economic sectors,
Hi :

it is also hypothesized that.

Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables
indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social
sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the opposite
effect.

From the foregoing hypotheses a general hypothesis regarding regime
effect on public policy is articulated, as follows:
Hc. :

Within any given African country, changes in regime type
should be associated with shifts in the pattern of spending
priorities exhibited by that country.

Also in this chapter, the two methodologies— quantitative and case
study— to be employed to evaluate regime effect on public policies are
laid out.

Both methodologies are being employed because each makes a

distinctive and valuable contribution to this study.

For example, the

case study approach often does not allow for generalizations, but
facilitates detailed analysis of specific subjects.

On the other hand,

by allowing researchers to study more than a handful of countries at a
time, the quantitative approach allows for generalizations, but does not
reveal the underlying and particular factors which make for specific
xi i i

policy outputs and outcomes.

Both approaches are employed with the

expectation that one approach would check the biases of the other.
In Chapter Three* the quantitative methods of analysis to be employed
are specified.
design.

They include the Multiple Interrupted Time Series (MITS)

The MITS design is employed to evaluate regime performance in

the six countries for which sufficient longitudinal data are available.
In order to evaluate regime performance in all the countries (including
those which did not have sufficient data to allow for the use of the
MITS design), two additional methods of analysis will be employed.
These are "pooled" analysis of differences of means and "simple country"
analysis.
Following brief explanations of the methods of analysis and the
operationalization of relevant concepts, the quantitative results
relating to the impact of regime type on budgetary allocations and
regime performance is presented in terms of outcomes in six policy areas
(economic growth, agricultural production,

industrial production,

defense, education and health expenditures).

Particular attention is

paid to budgetary allocations for defense, education and health, and the
contribution of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to the GDP.
More detailed analysis of the impact of regime type on public policy
begins in Chapter Four with a case study detailing the performances of
alternating civilian and military regimes in Ghana.

In order to discern

clearly the impact of regime type in 6hana, the performance of
successive regimes as it relates to a major sector of the country’s
economy is evaluated.

Since agriculture has always been the principal

sector of Ghana’s economy, this chapter focuses on agricultural policy

under alternating civilian and military regimes from Nkrumah
<1957-1966), to Rawlings (1981-1985).
In Chapter Five an attempt is made to determine whether there is any
correlation between regime type and foreign policy behavior.
end, the following hypothesis is tested:

To this

Regime change is more likely

to bring about variation in foreign policy than continuous leadership
(Rosenau 1971, 111-17; Sang-Seek Park 1980, 138-43).

Liberia, a country

that underwent a violent regime change in 1980 is chosen to provide the
case study to evaluate the impact of regime type and foreign policy
behavior.

Among other things, the volume and direction of trade, and

Liberia’s unique relation with the United States, are examined.
The case studies conclude in Chapter Six with an examination of the
accomplishments of alternating Nigerian regimes as they relate to the
development of the manufacturing industry.

Following the approach of

earlier case studies, an attempt is made to determine whether it makes a
significant difference for a nation to be governed by civilian or
military leaders.
In the final chapter, an attempt is made to draw together the
findings of the preceding four chapters as they relate to regime
performance.

Using the four hypothesis which were specified in Chapter

Two as guide, the nature of the impact of regime type on public policy
is analyzed.

More importantly, an attempt is made to provide some

explanations for the sensitivity or insensitivity of policy outputs and
outcomes to regime type.

In the process the impact of environmental

constraints (including domestic institutions such as the civil service)
on the formulation and implementation of public policies is evaluated.

xv

Among the important constraining characteristics of the civil service in
sub-Saharan Africa are the following:

routinization, functional

specialization, and organizational hierarchy.
Another important constraint which is addressed in Chapter Four is
the impact of the international environment on public policy.

Thus, the

part of the advanced industrial nations, the international marketplace,
the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions as
they effect the ability of the governments in sub-Saharan African
countries to promulgate and implement public policy is examined.

xvi

Chapter One
MILITARY COUPS AND REGIME CHANGE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Introduction;

Independent Africa

In the late 1950s, the African possessions of Britain, France and
Belgium, beginning with the Sudan in 1956, Ghana in 1957 and Guinea in
1958, began to gain their independence.

In 1960, no less than sixteen

former colonies became independent (see Table 1.1).

As colonial rule

came to an end, the independence of African countries was proclaimed
amid much jubilation and optimism.

Expert observers predicted a bright

and stable future for the new states on the continent.
African politics as potentially democratic.

They portrayed

Even the military coup in

the Sudan in 1958, the attempted overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia in 1960, and the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio of
Togo in 1963 did little to dampen the optimistic predictions and
expectations.
At no time or place during the euphoric days of independence were
the members of the armed forces portrayed as important players in the
political future of Africa.

Even James S. Coleman, one of the most

respected commentators on African politics, asserted that "except for
the Sudan, none of the sub-Saharan African states has an army capable of
exerting a political role...."

(Coleman 1966, 313-1**).

This observation

was based on some startling facts about the African military of early
1960s.

For example, of all the countries in sub-Saharan Africa only the

Sudan, where the British had provided military training since 1918, had
at the time of independence, a significant proportion of African
officers.

With its relatively large educated elite, Ghana had only ten
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Table 1.1
Dates of Independence of Sub-Saharan African States in
Chronological Order of Independence

Sudan
Ghana (formerly Gold Coast)
Gui nea
Cameroon
Togo
Mai i
Senegal
Madagascar
Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo)
Somalia
Benin (formerly Dahomey)
Niger
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta)
Cote d ’Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast)
Chad
Central African Republic
The Congo (People’s Republic)
Gabon
Nigeria
Mauritania
Sierra Leone
Tanzania (as Tanganyika)
Rwanda
Burundi
Uganda
Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania)
Kenya
Malawi
Zambi a
The Gambia
Botswana
Lesotho
Maur itius
Swazi land
Equatorial Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Mozambique
Cape Verde
The Comoros
Sao Tome and Principe
Angola
Djibouti
Seychelles
Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia)
Source: Africa South of the Sahara? 1988, p. 79.
*Date of unilateral declaration of independence.

1 January
6 March
2 October
1 January
27 April
20 June
20 June
26 June
30 June
1 July
1 August
3 August
5 August
7 August
11 August
13 August
15 August
17 August
1 October
28 November
27 April
9 December
1 July
1 July
9 October
10 December
12 December
6 July
24 October
18 February
30 September
4 October
12 March
6 September
12 October
10 September
25 June
5 July
*6 July
12 July
11 November
25 June
27 June
IB April

1956
1957
1958
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
3960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1961
3961
1962
1962
1962
1963
1963
1964
1964
1965
1966
1966
1968
1968
1968
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1977
1977
1980

percent of its officer corps Africanized in 1957, when it became
independent.

In July 3960, the Force Publioue in the Belgium Congo

(later called Zaire), did not have a single African officer in a force
totalling more than 2^,000 men (Gutteridge 1975, 6-7).
While they did not indigenize the officer corps of the African
militaries, the British and the French did, make in contrast, some
effort to provide their colonies with functioning political
before independence.

institutions

They converted governors' advisory councils into

parliaments, manned by duly elected representatives.

They also

established western-style legal systems with their safeguards for civil
rights (Kotecha and Adams 1981, 52).

To be sure, the British did much

more in this respect than the French.
Consequently, upon achieving their independence, most former
British and French colonies inherited or adopted a parliamentary form of
government.

Heading the governments of these new states were prime

ministers responsible to duly-elected parliamentary majorities.
Provisions were also made for independent judiciaries, protection of
individual rights and other democratic institutions and practices.
The new leaders of Africa were generally anxious to get on with
the job of "nation building."

Their immediate concern was with the

construction of much needed infrastructures, such as roads and railways,
along with the provision of essential amenities,
dispensaries, running water and electricity.
paid very little attention to the military.

including schools,

The new political

leaders

After all, the military had

played no positive role in the process of decolonization and the
achievement of independence.

Indeed, in some quarters, they were

perceived as agents of the colonial powers* since* during the colonial
era African soldiers had often participated in the suppression of
nationalist sentiments.

As Gutteridge (1975* 6) observed:

There had been a legacy of fear and distrust of
soldiers in many African countries.
Nationalist politicians
saw them as agents of imperial rule suppressing political
demonstrations and protecting European property.
Though
they had won glory by serving overseas in the two world
wars, their imperial activities caused them to be regarded
in some quarters as armies of occupation or at best as
mercenaries in the service of foreign powers.
These sentiments were reinforced by the presence of a high
proportion of European officers in most post-colonial armies (Guinea in
1958 being a notable exception).

Partly because of the low esteem in

which the military was held, and partly because former colonial powers
continued to provide external military support for some of their
colonies (e.g., Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Senegal), military matters had a
low priority in the agenda of the new rulers of Africa.

In fact, some

African leaders, including Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe
of Nigeria, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania
(formerly Tanganyika), advocated a policy of "non-militarization" for
their countries.

However, only Dawda Jawara of the Gambia went beyond

such rhetoric and dispensed with a national army altogether.

He chose

to provide for paramilitary duties by means of an expanded national
police force (Liebenow 1986, 242).

The Hi 1itary Intervenes
The first few years following the achievement of independence were
relatively peaceful.

Unconstitutional actions by the military were

viewed as aberrations that did not reflect the future of Africa.

Furthermore* many of the newly-independent countries achieved some
modest economic gains.

Some— including Cameroon, the Ivory Coast (now

Cote d ’Ivoire), Gabon, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria— had high economic
growth rates.

But beginning in the mid-1960s, conditions took a turn

for the worse, as economic and constitutional order began to break
down.

Within the space of one four-month period in the mid 1960s, the

governments of the Congo (November 25, 1965), Dahomey (December 22,
1965), Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria (January 1966)
and Ghana (February 24, 1966) all fell victims to military coups.

By

the end of the decade, there were ten more coups, bringing the total
number of military interventions up to twenty-two in twelve African
states.

In the 1970s, this trend continued (see Table 1.2).

In time,

throughout Africa stable civilian oligarchies began to disappear.
Today, parliamentary systems survive in only a handful of subSaharan African countries:

Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius and Zimbabwe.

The remainder are either one-party states or are governed by military
juntas.

Of the states that gained independence in the 1960s, less than

a third have had civilian regimes continuously since independence
(Kotecha and Adams 1981, 64).

Since 1960, there have been only nine

examples of regular constitutional succession in all of sub-Saharan
Africa:
Senegal

Gabon (1967), Liberia (1971), Kenya (1978), Botswana (1980),
(1980), Cameroon and Mauritius (1982), Tanzania (1985) and

Sierra Leone (1985).

Four of these examples occurred at the death of a

ruler and another four followed voluntary resignations.
For the majority of African countries, the military coup has
become so frequent as to constitute a routine and anticipated means of
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Table 1.8
Successful Military Coups in Sub-Saharan African States, 1958-1985

Country

Coup Date

Coup Leader

Benin

Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Oct.

1963
1965
1965
1966
1969
1978

Col. Christophe Soglo
Col. Christophe Soglo
Maj. Kouandete
Lt. Col. Kouandete
Maj. Matthieu Kerekou

Burkina Faso

Jan.
Feb.
Nov.
Nov.
Aug.

1966
1974
1980
1988
1983

Lt.Col. Sangoule Lamizana
Gen. Sangoule Lamizana
Col. Saye Zerbo
Maj. Jean-Baptist Quedraogo
Cpt. Thomas Sankara

Burundi

N o v . 1976

Lt.Col. Jean-Baptist Bagaza

Central African Republic

Jan. 1966
Sept. 1979
Sept. 19B1

Col. Jean-Bedel Bokassa
Gen. Andre Kolingba

Chad

April 1975
Apr i 1 1981

The Congo

A u g . 1968
Sept. 1968

Cpt. Marien Ngouabi
Cpt. Marien Ngouabi

Equatorial Guinea

A u g . 1979

Lt. Col. Teodoro Mbasogo

Ethiopia

Sept. 1974

Lt. Gen. Aman Michael Anoom

Ghana

Feb.
Jan.
July
June
Dec.

1966
1978
1978
1979
1981

Guinea

Apr i 1 1984

Guinea-Bissau

Nov.

Liberia

Apr i 1 1980

Madagascar

May 1978
Jan. 1975

Mali

Nov. 1968

Col. Ignatius K. Acheampong
Fit. Lt. Jerry Rawlings
Fit. Lt. Jerry Rawlings
Col. Lansana Conte

1980
Sgt. Samuel K. Doe

Lt. Moussa Traore
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Table l.B Cont’d.

Country

Coup Date

Coup Leader

Maur itania

July 1978
Jan. 1980
Dec. 1984

Col. Mustapha Salek
Lt. Col. Mohamed Haidalla
Col. Quid S i d ’Ahmed Taya

Niger

April

Lt. Col. Seyni Kountche

Nigeria

Jan.
July
July
Dec.
Aug,

1974
1966
1966
1975
1983
1985

Maj. Gen. Mohammed Buhari
Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida

Rwanda

July 1973

Maj. Gen. J. Habyarimana

Sierra Leone

March 1967

Brig. David Lansana

Somalia

Oct. 1969

Sudan

Nov. 1958
May 1969
April 1985

Gen. Ibrahim Abboud
Col. Gaafar Nimeiry
Lt. Gen. Swar ad-Dahab

Togo

Jan. 1967

Lt. Col. Etienne Eyadema

Uganda

Jan. 1971
May 1980
July 1985

Maj. Gen. Idi Amin

Seychelles

June 1977

Zaire

Sept. 1960
Nov. 1965

Source:

Gen. Basilio Okello

C o l . Mobutu
Col. Mobutu

Africa South of the Sahara, 1988.
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changing top political leadership.

Coups in Africa have affected regime

change much more frequently than have elections and other forms of
constitutionally sanctioned methods of change.
Nigeria,

Thus, referring to

its former president Shehu Shagari proclaimed:

"In this

country there are, in the end, only two parties, the civilians and the
soldiers"

(cited in Johnson, Slater and McGowan 19BA, 628-AO).

At one time or another, over three-quarters of independent African
states have experienced attempted or successful military coups.

By

1985, only six African states had not witnessed some form of extra-legal
armed involvement in national politics by military elites since
achieving independence.

These states are Botswana, Cape Verde,

Djibouti, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Lesothd

(McGowan and Johnson 19BA,

633-66).
Although the primary concern of this study is to evaluate
regime performance,

it will perhaps be appropriate initially to identify

some of the factors facilitating military interventions.

As Bienen

(1978, 4) observed:
When we understand the reasons for specific military
interventions and we explore the links between the military
and other political institutions and groups, we can better
assess the future evolution of armed forces in society and
can better judge the militaries’ capacities to deal with
specific problems.
The factors that explain military
intervention also help to reveal the limits of the
militaries’ political capacities and the constraints on
transition from military rule.
Even if we have no general
theory to explain military intervention, a dissection of the
specific components of an intervention may reveal the
potentialities of the kind of rule that the intervening
military will exert.

Explaining Military Interventions
Many arguments have been put forth to explain the high incidence
of military coups in Africa.

These arguments indicate that military

coups are the result of a complex mix of factors.

Among these are

political? economic? military? cultural and ethnic differentiation?
personal? and foreign influences.

Political Factors Affecting Military Intervention
An examination of the literature on military-led coups in Africa
reveals that political factors are strong determinants of them.

Among

the forces which have been identified as facilitating military
intervention in politics are failed civi1ian ,leadership? inadequacy and
weakness of existing political institutions? and the inability of
incumbent existing regime to gain legitimacy.

Failed Civilian Leadership
A number of coups seem to have been undertaken for the express
purpose of correcting the failures of the civilian leadership.

Where

the military establishment perceives the performance of the existing
civilian government as inconsistent with the process of nation-building?
it may intervene in order to implement what it deems to be necessary
changes.

For example? when soldiers assumed power in Somalia in 1969,

they did so in order to implement basic political changes.

And, after

they seized power? to a far greater extent than the previous civilian
administration, they pursued? a policy of mass-mobi1ization (Wiking
1983, 30).
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Welch (1970) also argued that a regime’s performance failures are
an important factor in explaining the timing of an intervention.
According to Welch <1970, VIII),

"Opportunities to intervene occurred in

many forms— widespread strikes or demonstrations against the government,
severe economic difficulties, the undesired dependence of the government
upon the armed forces to maintain control over a rapidly deteriorating
situation."

Similarly, Liebenow <1986, 247-48) argued that the civilian

leadership’s use of the military to cope with political situations
(riots, strikes), only served to intensify the political role of the
military at the expense of civilian authority.

Extensive dependence on

the military to maintain control not only revealed the weakness of
civilian authority but also encouraged the military to believe that its
intervention was indispensable for political stability.

Coups in a

number of African countries— Dahomey (1963), Zaire (1965), Nigeria
(1966), Upper Volta (1966)— appear to meet these general criteria.

Inadequacy and Weakness of Existing Political Institutions
Huntington (1968, 4) perceived military intervention as the result
of the inability of existing political institutions to keep pace with
the rapid mobili 2 ation of new groups into politics.

When existing

political institutions become strained due to the demands placed upon
them by newly-mobilized members of the society, the result is often
increased political violence.

Where normal political channels cannot

accommodate citizens’ demands, they will express their demands by other
means, such as demonstrations, strikes, and as far as the military is
concerned, coups.
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The Ethiopian coup of 197^* provides an excellent example of how
inadequate political

institutions can encourage a military coup.

The

failure of the attempted land reform in 1967-69 made it clear to
civilians and military officers who wanted change that this could not be
brought about through the existing institutional structures (Schwab
1979, 125-35).

Then, in the early 1970s, when drought struck northern

Ethiopia, the demands for reform grew stronger.

The drought affected

the food and water supplies of the armed forces, which were already
unhappy over the dangers of the Eritrean campaign (Ethiopian forces had
long been involved in a struggle to suppress the Eritrean nationalist
movement and to ensure the continued dominion of Ethiopia over Eritrea).
The failure of the existing governmental structures to adequately
address the problems associated with the drought and to accommodate the
grievances of the military brought matters to head.
On January 12, 197^, soldiers in a small garrison in southeast
Ethiopia rebelled against their officers over poor food and a shortage
of drinking water.
reprimanded.

The Emperor did nothing, the soldiers were not

News of the Emperor’s response, or lack of it, quickly

reached other regions in the country.

Soon enlisted men and NCDs of the

Second Division at Asmara began broadcasting their complaints over a
radio station.

The Emperor hastily changed prime ministers and promised

to make the prime minister responsible to parliament.
responded by forming a secret coordinating committee,

The military
later to be known

as the Dergue, and military leaders announced that the armed forces
would no longer automatically obey the prime minister.
proclaimed their loyalty to the Emperor,

While they

leaders of the coup began to

IP
systematically arrest all those around him.

On September IE, with all

his close associates already jailed, the Emperor was placed under house
arrest, although the Dergue did not formally proclaim the end of the
monarchy until March 1975 (Cartwright 1983, E71-7P; Ottaway 1978).
For Liebenow (1986), the inherent weakness of African political
parties also fosters a climate in which military interventions can
occur.

With a few notable exceptions, such as National Council of

Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), formerly the National Council of Nigeria and
Cameroon and the Action Group (AG) in Nigeria, political parties in
postcolonial Africa have lacked organizational strength.

Due, in part,

to the obstructionist policies and practices of colonial administrators,
African civilian politicians failed to acquire the organizational skills
needed to create and manage viable political parties (Liebenow 1986,
EA0-A1 ) .
Furthermore, even where strong and potentially viable parties did
exist, they tended to be oriented to a specific region or cluster of
ethnic groups.

In Nigeria, for example, the NCNC was essentially an

eastern and Ibo party mechanism, while the AG was of western and Yoruba
orientation.

Except for a handful of countries, there were no truly

national parties in Africa.

And as Liebenow (1986, E91) pointed out,

civilian leadership has endured only in those few countries (Tanzania,
Cameroon, Malawi and Zambia) where broad, cross-cultural political
parties have been successfully created.
In the Cameroon, for example, the only national party, the
Reassemblement Democratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC) [established in
1966 as Union Nationale Camerounaise ( U N O 3, was the result of a merger
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of the governing parties of each of the country’s two states (East
Cameroon and West Cameroon), and four opposition parties.

Consequently,

RDPC had representatives from all major groups in Cameroon.
true of Chama Cha Mapinduzi

The same is

(CCM— the revolutionary party of Tanzania)

which was the result of a merger between the Tanganyika African National
Union (TANU) and the Zanzibar-based Afro-Shirazi party.

The CCM has

many affiliate organizations from diverse groups in Tanzania (Africa
South of the Sahara 1972, 840;

1985, 1004).

In Malawi, membership of

the country’s only political party, the Malawi Congress Party (MPC), is
compulsory for all adults.

Aside from these countries, there are a few

others, which although they lack broad-based political parties, have
nonetheless been able tD maintain durable civilian regimes.
include Mozambique, Zimbabwe,

They

Ivory Coast, Senegal and Gabon.

The durability of civilian regimes in Mozambique and Zimbabwe is
for the most part due to the fact that the parties assumed a military
posture during the anticolonial struggles.

But, upon achieving

independence, FRELIMO in Mozambique and the Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU) in Zimbabwe took steps to isolate the military wings of
their organizations from political affairs.

The militaries in these

countries have not had occasion to step into the political arena to
settle disputes between competing political elites.
civilian political

Furthermore,

leaders in Mozambique and Zimbabwe have relied on

their regular police rather than soldiers to maintain internal order.
By contrast, civilian rule has prevailed in the Ivory Coast,
Senegal and Gabon because of the presence of external military support.
The stationing of French troops in these countries has permitted
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civilian leaders to remain in control of the state,

irrespective of

whether the party was broad-based or organizationally strong (Liebenow
1986, 841-42).

Inability of Existing Regime to Gain Legitimacy
Welch and Smith (1974, 26-30), argued that, "the ease

withwhich

the armed forces assume political power varies inversely with the
legitimacy enjoyed by the existing civilian government."

The loss of

0
legitimacy- has been used by military elites in several African
countries to justify their intervention in politics.
For example, the ouster of President Shehu Shagari

of Nigeria in

December of 1983 was encouraged by the regime’s loss of legitimacy.

The

last three years of Shagari’s administration had witnessed a rapid
deterioration of economic conditions in Nigeria.

But the military took

no action until it became obvious that the administration no longer
enjoyed the same level of public support as it did prior to the
presumably "rigged" elections of 1983.

The elections had been marred by

violence and allegations of electoral malpractice.
The electoral victory of Shagari’s National Party of Nigeria (NPN)
and the legitimacy of his newly-formed government were called into
question in the face of what Chief Awolowo,

leader of the Unity Party of

Nigeria (UPN), who described the process as "vote-rigging of a scale
q
unprecedented in African history. "■

Based on the Nigerian case, the

ease with which the military assumed power just four months after the
elections seems to lend credence to the proposition that the military is
more likely to intervene in politics where the existing regime lacks
legitimacy.
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Economic Factors Affecting Military Intervention
Of all the factors which encourage military intervention? perhaps
none is more significant than the nation’s economic condition.

Economic

difficulties create the opportunity for soldiers to intervene in
political system.

Most African countries have been and remain

economically depressed.

In 1983? the U.S. State Department noted that

"Africa is the only area in the world where national growth rates are
often negative and where per capita food production is declining"
(Bureau of Public Affairs 1983, 1).

It is therefore not surprising that

in nearly all of the countries in which coups have occurred in Africa
over the past three decades, coup leaders have pointed to economic
problems, such as those cited by the State Department, to justify their
decision to intervene.
There is consensus among scholars that the state of a nation’s
economy affects the probability of a coup occurring within it.

In her

study of coups in Africa, Nelkin (1967, 231), concluded that "the issues
which best account for the ease of military access to power, relate to
economic circumstances and their social consequences."

Nordlinger

(1977, 89), and Welch (1970, IB), have also cited economic decline as a
factor that encourages military intervention.
A typical example of a country where economic decline has
encouraged military intervention is Benin (which has experienced six
coups since achieving independence in 1960).

Successive coup leaders in

this former French colony of Dahomey have invariably pointed to
deteriorating economic conditions to justify their actions.

The

importance of economic conditions is also reflected in at least two of
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the five military coups in Ghana— the first ousted President Nkrumah in
1966 and the second saw the overthrow of Dr. Busia in 1972.

Economic

considerations were also the primary factors that prompted military
interventions in Mali

(1968), Congo-Brazavi1le (August 1968) and Nigeria

(July 1975 and December 1983).
The relationship between economic performance and military
intervention was empirically evaluated by Staffan Wiking (197A, 7A-77).
He showed that income, in terms of per capita GNP, in African countries
varied significantly with the incidence of coups in these countries. Of
the "poorest" fifteen “Couintries on the continent, all but two had had
military coups.

On the other hand, only six of the "richest" fifteen

had experienced military intervention (Wiking 1983, 37).

Military Factors Affecting Military Intervention
Some scholars have argued that factors internal to the African
military establishment can encourage or inhibit military coups.

The

African soldier is particularly sensitive to actions that are not
consistent with the military's collective corporate interests.

In this

regard, reductions in the budgetary allocations to the military, or
attempts to limit the military’s autonomy, are of particular
significance.

As several scholars have observed, the likelihood of

military intervention increases when the existing government fails to
provide adequate funding for the military or interferes excessively in
the military’s affairs (Nordlinger 1977, 6A-76; Liebenow 1986, 2A0-50;
Welch and Smith 197A).

For example, the ouster of the Ghanaian prime

minister, Dr. Busia in 1972, was, in part, due to the declining living
standard of the country's armed forces.

Also, the coups in Uganda
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(1971) and Liberia (1980), were partly justified on the grounds that the
existing government had neglected the material requirements of the
military (Wiking 1983, 786-98).
Military coups are also the result of excessive involvement in
military affairs by civilian leadership.

Once again the Ghana coups of

3966 and 1972 provide excellent examples of the consequences of
excessive interference in military affairs by an existing civilian
government.

These coups may not have occurred or at least may have been

delayed, if the civilian regimes of Nkrumah and Busia had not introduced
political considerations into matters which were essentially military.
According to Robert Price (1971, 399-430), the military’s resentment of
Nkrumah’s removal of the very popular General Ankrah from his position
as commander of the army was one of the major factors that precipitated
the 1966 coup.

The leaders of the 1972 coup not only charged Prime

Minister Busia with lowering the living standards of the Army personnel,
but also with manipulating promotions within the military (Wiking
1983, 86-87).

Uganda, where the personal conflict between Milton Obote

and Idi Amin culminated in the ouster of the former in January 1971,
provides another instance of military intervention resulting from
civilians moving against military personalities (Decalo 1976, 173-230).
Perhaps nothing is more challenging to the military’s corporate
interest than the creation of independent military or paramilitary
organizations.

Some African leaders have incurred the wrath of their

regular army by creating armies of foreign-trained and well-equipped
personal body guards. According to Liebenow (1986, 249), the "creation
by Nkrumah of a President’s Own Guard Regiment— recruited, trained and
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equipped independently of the regular army— was the second professional
irritant (the first was the dismissal of General Ankrah) contributing to
the 1966 coup in Ghana."

Similarly, the attempt to recruit mercenaries

from abroad was used by the military to justify the 1966 overthrow of
King Ntare V of Burundi.

Military Coups and Cultural Pluralism
Ethnic and regional differentiation constitutes another important
reason for military intervention in African politics.
Smith <197^, 26-30) propose that:

Thus Welch and

"The likelihood of military

intervention rises as the intensification of conflicts arising from
ethnic or class cleavages threatens the status and power of the dominant
group or class."

While it is often difficult to identify specific

instances of military intervention as being prompted solely by ethnic or
regional factors, nevertheless, such factors have certainly played a
role in quite a few coups.

The first short-lived coup in Sierra Leone

in March 1967, for instance, was a direct result of reluctance by the
Mende tribe to relinquish to another tribe the control

it had exercised

over the country since independence (de Villiers 3976, 60).
Although soldiers rarely justify their intervention in politics on
ethnic or regional grounds,

it has been the most important consideration

on more than one occasion.

In the coups in Somalia (1969), Uganda

(1971), and Chad (1975), the coup-makers accused the previous regimes of
having pursued a policy of "tribalism," but it was only in Uganda that
this accusation was specifically used to justify military intervention
(Wiking 1983, 119).

Dissatisfaction with the way in which the civilian

leadership was handling the regional problems in the Sudan was,

in part,
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responsible for at least one of the coups in that country.

Colonel

Gaafar Nimeri and Babaka Awadallah, the two leaders of the 1969 coup in
the Sudan* blamed Prime Minister Muhammed Mahgoub and his fellow
politicians for their inability to resolve the traditional problem with
the southern areas of the country.

Ethnic and or regional problems also

lay behind the coups in Nigeria (1966)* Togo <1967), Dahomey <1972),
Rwanda (1973) and Mauretania (1978) (Wiking 1983, 93-119).

Personal Factors Affecting Military Intervention
Although coup leaders often emphasize other factors (economic,
organizational, cultural) as the reasons influencing their decision to
intervene, the striving for status and the desire to hold and exercise
power cannot be ruled out in assessing the motives behind some coups in
Africa (Decalo 1976, .15-22, 173-230; de Villiers 1976, 54-66).
According to Decalo (1976), the most important reason for the 1965
coup in the Central African Republic was the personal ambitions of the
army chief of staff, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa.

Bokassa had manifested

his desire to exercise power on numerous previous occasions, including
once when he unilaterally assumed the position of minister of war
(Decalo 1976, 17).
The personal element in African military coups was perhaps most
clearly manifested in the 1971 coup in Uganda.

Although Idi Amin cited

some of the aforementioned factors as motivations for his decision to
intervene, more cogent reasons were Amin’s personal fears.

As Decalo

(1976) pointed out, Amin’s decision to intervene preempted President
Qbote’s call for his removal from his position as commander of the army.
According to one report, a few hours before the coup, Obote had called
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from the Singapore Commonwealth Meeting to have Amin arrested (Decalo
1976» 18).

Furthermore? in October of 1970? Amin’s powers had already

been reduced by the creation of two command positions equal to his own;
and he was also the target of at least two inquiries (one into the death
of a top army officer and the other into the misuse of defense funds).
Finally, there was the personal conflict between Amin and Obote (Decalo
1976, 18-19).

All of these considerations coalesced to provide a strong

motive for Amin to intervene.

Foreign Factors Affecting Military Intervention
A significant omission in most of the literature on coups is the
importance of foreign influence on the military’s propensity to
intervene in African politics.

In the light of available evidence this

would appear to be an unjustifiable omission.

Although there are

difficulties involved in proving foreign influence, there are instances
where such influences seem clearly to have been at work.

The

International Monetary Fund (IMF), and its sister organization the World
Bank, provide excellent examples of how foreign institutions can
influence political affairs in African and other countries.

One such

example is the Sudan, where in 1985, President Nimeri was persuaded to
acquiesce to the wishes of the IMF in the removal of food subsidies and
the devaluation of the currency.

The subsequent increases in the price

of food and fuel sparked a general strike by professionals such as
lawyers and doctors and demonstrations by students.

Public discontent

with the regime culminated in the ouster of Nimeri on April 6, 1985
(Clark 1985; Africa South of the Sahara 1988, 9A9).

Another important foreign factor is reflected in the so-called
cases of "contagion" or "demonstration" effect of coups.

This idea

holds that the threshold of tolerance by the military for an existing
regime is drastically lowered when there is an increase in the frequency
of successful military coups elsewhere on the continent.
effectj breed coups!

Coups,

in

When the continent is viewed as an interacting

system it becomes evident that a process of feedback is at work.
this regard, the wave of coups in 1965 and 1966 is very striking.

In
It is

perhaps not easy to demonstrate that there were direct connections
between events in Algeria (June 1965), and the seven other countries in
which coups occurred between October 1965, and February 1966.

However,

there is no doubt that, by the mid-1960s, African politicians as well
military officials were much more in touch with one another and with
political

life on the continent as a whole, through frequent meetings

within the framework of international organizations inside and outside
Africa as well as in informal international activities.
For West Africa,
makers can be traced.

in particular, more direct links between coupColonel Lamizana of Upper Volta (now known as

Burkina Faso), Colonel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, General
Soglo of Dahomey (now Benin), knew one another since they served
together in Indochina and, according to Aristide Zolberg (196B, 86), it
is likely that the presence of one of them at the helm of his country
creates new status aspirations among the others.

Helen Kitchen (1963)

cites the case of Colonel David Thompson, commanding officer of
Liberia’s National Guard, who was arrested on suspicion of plotting a
coup and is alleged to have said three weeks after the assassination of
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President Olympio of Togo:

"If only 250 Togolese soldiers could

overthrow their government a Liberian army of five thousand could seize
power easily" <1963? 9).

Another aspect of the phenomenon of contagion

is suggested by General Soglo? who explained that his takeover in
Dahomey was prompted by the fear that the elections scheduled for early
1966 might crystallize the north-south cleavage and result in disorder
similar to that which prevailed among the Yoruba of neighboring Western
Nigeria during and after the electoral campaign of October 1965? and
about which Dahomians? many of whom are also Yoruba? were well

informed

(Zolberg 1968? 86).
Conversely? Soglo’s successful takeover probably affirmed the
resolution of Nigerian officers to topple the civilian regime of Prime
Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

Their success?

in turn? may have

inspired their Ghanaian counterparts? with whom they shared not only
British professional traditions but also an exposure to the disastrous
consequences of political disorder gained while serving with the ONIJC in
the Congo.

Furthermore? Zolberg <1969? 179) has argued that? "the

phenomenon of contagion contributed to the normalization of military
rule as well:

its establishment in one country enhanced both the

opportunities available to other groups and the legitimacy of stepping
in to save the situation.

In the light of their shared experiences?

military leaders became even less hesitant to establish military rule
from the outset."
The most important aspect of contagion is related to the strength
of the regime in power.

As Welch and Smith <197<A) and Feit <1973)

observe? coups seem to have occurred mainly in countries whose regimes
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are obviously weak.

According to Zolberg (1968, 87), "the revelation of

this prevalent weakness made even the more firmly established regimes
much less formidable.

It is as if a spell had been broken..." and

"...the army has now seen that the Emperor stands naked."

Although it

is reasonable to expect "the more firmly established regimes” to be able
to resist coup attempts successfully, this has not been the case in
Africa.

For example, the two most enduring regimes in Africa, the

imperial regime in Ethiopia and the one-party dominant civilian regime
in Liberia, fell victims of military-led coups in 197^ and 1980
respectively.
No matter what the prevailing conditions may be, the military’s
ability to topple the government of a country is, to a significant
degree, dependent on the acquiescence of the general public.

Ultimately

the people must first manifest their displeasure over the performance of
the existing regime before the military can intervene.

Regime Type and Public Policy:

State of the Literature

As the foregoing clearly indicates, a general body of knowledge
exists explaining military interventions.
however,

What tends to be neglected,

is the issue of the performance of soldiers after they have

assumed control of the government.

Do military rulers perform any

better or worse than the civilian leaders whom they replace?

Or as

Claude Welch (1971, 213) puts it, "Can a military-based government cope
more successfully with the difficulties civilian regimes encountered?"
Are some of the nation’s problems susceptible to solution by means
congenial to the governing military junta, in ways that escaped the
preceding civilian regime?

Sk

Social and political conditions prevailing in contemporary Africa
almost preclude any rigorous analysis of this question.

For example,

available statistics are very uneven, and there are many variables which
ideally ought to be investigated in any attempt to answer such
questions.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, some studies have

examined and tried to explain the performance of different regime types
in Third World settings.

Some scholars have argued that military

regimes are more "progressive" than civilian ones; others have contended
that military rulers are essentially conservative; and still a third
group has maintained that there is little or no difference between
military and civilian regimes.

The remainder of this chapter will

review and analyze these contending perspectives on military regime
performance in the Third World.

The Military as a Progressive Force
Some scholars have suggested that the likely consequences of
military rule are:

economic growth; the modernization of economic and

social structures; and more equitable distribution of scarce economic
values and opportunities (Pye 1962; Daadler 1962; Johnson 1962).

As

sponsors of this kind of change, military governments are depicted as
positive forces, whose politization is to be commended.

According to

the leading exponent of this school of thought, Lucian Pye, the
continuing modernization of the military's organization and weaponry has
instilled in the officers the belief that their society ought also to be
modernized.

Said Pye:

Above all else the revolution in military technology
has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries
to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their
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countries are economically and technologically
underdeveloped.
Called upon to perform roles basic to
advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers
can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial
changes in their own societies (1962? 280).
Thus the pursuit of social and economic change arises from an
awareness of backwardness brought about by improving military
technology.

Pye cites the overseas experience of the military officers?

and "their distance from civilian societies?

including attitudes and

judgments? that are remote if not completely apart from those of
civilian life?" as factors that cause the military to "focus more on the
standards common to the more industrialized world"

(1962? 281).

The

progressive consequences of military rule? it is further argued? stems
from the fact that alternative organizations are weak? and that the
military? as a major avenue for social mobility? attracts the most
talented and confers on its members substantial experience with rational
organization and sophisticated modern technology.
Recent studies of regime performance in Latin America (Cohen 1985?

Sloan and Tedin 1967), argue that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are
more efficient than other regime types at promoting economic
development.

Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are essentially

military regimes governing with the tacit approval and collaboration of
technocrats and domestic bourgeoisie (O’Donnell 1973).

Although the

bureaucratic-authoritarian model is a South American phenomenon? these
studies can still be instructive in the inquiry into regime performance
in Africa.

After all? the National Liberation Council in Ghana (1966-

69), and the Mohammed-Obansanjo regime in Nigeria (1975-79)? exhibited
some characteristics of bureaucratic-authoritarianism [i.e.? the rule of

26
the military in conjunction with technocrats]

(Cammack, Pool and Tordoff

1988, 123).
Using interrupted time-series analysis, Cohen compared the
performance of democratic and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in
Brazil, Colombia and Argentina.

He observed that such regimes have an

advantage over democratic ones in effectively implementing the type nf
policies necessary to facilitate economic growth.

However, he noted

that economic gains were often made at enormous political costs (e.g.,
suspension of constitutional rights, censorship of the media, arrests,
exiles, and executions).
In their study, Sloan and Tedin (1987) employed a multivariate
model and year-by-year data from 1960 to 1980 in twenty Latin American
countries to analyze the relationship between regime type, regime age,
and public policy.

They employed two independent variables (regime type

and number of years a specific regime has been in control of government)
in an attempt tD explain variations in policy outputs.
five regime types.
(BA), communist,

They identified

These were democratic, bureaucratic-authoritarian

"traditional authoritarian"

(TA) and "transitional."

According to Sloan and Tedin (1987, 104), TA regimes were either
personal dictatorships or "oligarchic democracies."

The label

transitional regime was used to account for any year in which a country
experienced a change in regime control of government.
Having identified the various regime types, Sloan and Tedin then
proceeded to evaluate regime effect on five separate policy areas.
were:

They

domestic economic performance, agricultural production, military

spending, external debt and domestic social performance.

Like Cohen
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(1985) they found that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes were the most
effective in achieving economic growth.

However? they compiled poor

records when it came to controlling inflation and avoiding external
debts.

On the other hand? democratic regimes performed adequately and

had the second-best record in all five policy areas.

The Military as a Conservative Force
A second view of military regime performance? that of the military
as a conservative force? was advanced and gained wide acceptance from
the late 1960s onward.

A number of scholars have argued that? because

military officers belong to the most "organized" institution in
developing countries? once they assume power they will be primarily
concerned with the attainment and preservation of order.

According to

advocates of this view? even where social and economic factors are
proclaimed as justification for a coup? a military government does not
often possess the political and organizational skills to bring about
change in the desired direction.

As soon as it becomes evident that the

goals of economic growth and social change are difficult to achieve?
military governors will tend to focus their resources on preserving
order (Bienen 1971).

Other scholars argue that in addition to

maintaining order? military rulers are also very much concerned with the
protection of their own interests and those of the middle classes.

In

this view the military is seen as a conservative force with little or no
concern for the promotion of modernizing policies.
Nordlinger (1970) employed statistical analysis of economic change
under military regimes to advance the hypothesis that military
governments do not really act as agents of modernization.

However? he
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later modified his hypothesis by stating that) "within a particular
social and political context <when there is hardly a middle class to
speak of) and when workers and peasants have not been politically
mobilized) soldiers in mufti sometimes allow or even encourage economic
modernization"

(1970) 1134).

He maintained) that for the most part) the

military in emerging countries assumes power in order to advance its own
interests.

Under military regimes) the interests of the military are

paramount? even when they conflict with the aspirations and interests of
larger segments within the society or the nation as a whole (Nordlinger
1970, 1134).
Relying upon the World Handbook of Social and Political
Indicators, Nordlinger found that in those countries in which there was
direct military rule during at least part of the period from 1957 to
196E <n=18>, the average percentage of Gross National Product (GNP)
spent on defence was 3.65 but the corresponding figure among those
countries in which the military did not serve as governors, but did
exert a good deal of political

influence (n=E0) was 3.4; and in those

countries in which the military’s activities remained circumscribed
within their instrumental role (n=36) it was 1.9 (1970, 1135).^

Thus

it appears that the proportion of GNP devoted tD defense is almost twice
as large in countries overtly ruled by the military as it is in
countries with non-politicized military.

The conclusion seems

inescapable that when the military accedes to power,

its interests

become paramount.
Nordlinger also puts forward a proposition regarding the influence
of the officers’ middle-class interests and identities as these
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influence public policy under military regimes.

While agreeing with the

general hypothesis that the military acts to protect middle-class
interests? he advanced a supplementary hypothesis stating that "soldiers
in mufti will protect the status quo only where the middle-class
interests are seen to be threatened"

(1970, 114P-43).

From his analysis

based on data collected by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris (1967),
Nordlinger inferred that military governments failed to sponsor economic
modernization in countries where more than ten percent of the active
male population was employed in middle class occupations—
i.e., commerce, banking,

insurance, technical, professional, managerial,

administrative and clerical positions (1970, 1143).
Later works by Edward Feit (1973) and Claude E. Welch and Arthur
K. Smith (1974), rely on case studies to develop some useful
hypotheses.

Feit (1973) argued that the most military governments

evolve through three stages.

The first stage is characterized by direct

control of the polity by military officers.

In this stage all principal

offices in the country are held by military officials.

This stage is

usually of a short duration and is followed by a second phase, in which
civilian cadres, mostly from the administrative arm, are drawn into the
regime, which now claims to be apolitical.
without consensus is built.

At the same time, a cohesion

This cohesion is an alliance of mutually

hostile social forces, which are balanced against each other by the
military government as means for maintaining power.

This coalition

holds together only as long as each component believes that its interest
will be best served by remaining within it, and that none will profit
more than it will itself.

Since any serious attempt at social
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regeneration will break the coalition, any effort at regeneration is
inhibited from the outset.

In the end, observed Feit, the hostility of

the opposing interests comes to the boil, and the coalition breaks
apart, taking the military regime with it.
To avoid this, and to initiate the promised regeneration of
society upon which the military’s claim to power is based, the regime
shifts to a third phase,

in which it moves from being presumably

apolitical to being avowedly political.

In this phase, the leaders seek

a mass base as a means of legitimizing the regime and inducing
progress.

To this end, the military regime creates sets of symbols to

which it attempts to condition the masses.

The regime also creates mass

parties in which the people can be trained to a given political ritual.
However, the mass parties are unable to hold the allegiance of the
masses, because the coalition essential to maintain the sense of
representation, which is a major role of the mass party, cannot be
maintained.

Eventually the hollowness of the ritual becomes evident,

destroying any mass following the military regime may have acquired.
The military regime fails because it can neither hold together the
disparate and hostile social forces it has had to harness, nor maintain
the mass support that it needs to maintain some semblance of legitimacy
(Feit 1973, 6-19).
Feit’s model reveals that because of the constraints imposed by
political and organizational factors which limit their ability to
initiate or maintain socioeconomic development, military officers do not
make good governors.
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In their consideration of military regimes, Welch and Smith <1974)
identify four principal types:
guardian.

predatory, reformist, radical and

According to these authors, the great majority of recent

military regimes have reflected the propensity of military officers in
emerging societies to establish themselves as the unique custodians of
the "national interest."
Guardian military regimes place an overwhelming value on political
stability and order or on their own corporate interests.

Unlike radical

and reformist regimes, military guardians consider change to be of
secondary importance, and they prefer that change takes place through a
gradual and orderly process.

They are primarily "law and order" men.

The authors identified four major categories of military
guardianship.

These are:

direct, arbiter, factional, and postcolonial.

Of these, the postcolonial variety is the most prevalent in sub-Saharan
Africa.

The other forms of military guardians apply mainly to Latin

America.
In direct guardianship, the military leadership assumes direct
responsibility for government by ruling for indefinite periods.

In

arbiter guardianship, the military tend to act indirectly as custodians
of national

interest, supporting civilian elites they deem acceptable

and setting limits on the policy choices open to government leaders.
Factional guardianship is similar to arbiter guardianship.

However,

the latter pattern, the armed forces are relatively weak and
organizationally fragmented.
fundamental changes.

Consequently, they are unable to effect

in

3E
The principal objective of postcolonial guardians is to restore
orderly processes to a social order distorted by misgovernment.

The

authors suggest that> the net effect of this African variety of military
guardianship appears to be oriented more to true guardianship.

By

restoring stability and investor confidence, the military rulers serve
the interest of economic development and stimulate the growth of the
middle class.
Having described the four principal types of military regimes,
Welch and Smith then turned to the case studies of civi1-mi 1itary
relations in Thailand, Nigeria, Egypt, Peru and France (France stands
apart from the other four countries discussed by the authors).
the French military were instrumental

Although

in bringing down the Fourth

Republic, they did not threaten to supplant the civilian government
(Welch and Smith 1974, 205-33).

The case studies reveal that the scope

and character of the political role of the military are conditioned by a
large number of interacting institutional and environmental variables.
Nevertheless, Welch and Smith still conclude that the outcomes of
military intervention and its implications for socioeconomic
modernization and political development conform to a pattern which they
called the "Garrison-Managerial State."

According to this idea, as

military institutions throughout the Third World have become more
differentiated and specialized, and as officer corps have become more
professionalized, the performance in office of military politicians has
tended to be more bureaucratic than political
effect.

in both motivation and

Military rule focuses primarily on policies that serve the

narrow interests of the armed forces.

Secondarily, they seek the
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preservation of public order.

Thirdly? the military seek the promotion

of stable industrial growth; and lastly (if at all)? the military
advocate policies designed to bring about social and economic reform
<1974, 260).
In a study dealing with regime performance in Africa? BergSchlosser (1984) identifies four African regime types (polyarchic,
socialist? civil authoritarian and military) and evaluates their
performance on three main levels.

The first level includes achievement

of socioeconomic development? the second is the degree of dependence on
external economic and political forces; and the third level

is

the

achievement of a good political order (1984? 134).
The results of his analysis contradicts the widely shared view
that democracy hinders economic growth in developing countries.

Berg-

Schlosser finds that polyarchic systems fare quite well both in terms of
GNP growth and the improvement of the basic quality of life.

They also

have the best record when it comes to normative standards? such as the
achievement of a good political order (e.g., protecting civil liberties
and guaranteeing freedom from political oppression).

Military regimes

did not fare as well as their civilian counterparts.

According

Schlosser

to Berg-

(1984? 121-51) "military regimes clearly show themselves to be

no remedy whatsoever for the problems of Africa? either in terms of
their economic performance or of their observation of normative
standards."
A sort of compromise between these two views (progressive and
conservative) on military regime performance?

is offered by Huntington
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(1968), who suggests that the effect of military rule is dependent on
the level of development of the country under consideration:
As society changes* so does the role of the military.
In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the
middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the
mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the
conservative guardian of the existing order.
Thus
paradoxically but understandably, the more backward a
society is the more progressive the role of its military;
the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative
and reactionary becomes the role of its military
(1968, SSI).
Thus, according to Huntington’s argument, both views of military
regime performance are essentially accurate.

However, the question is

how to distinguish between backward and advanced societies.

It would

appear from his discussion that Huntington was referring to the level of
social and economic development.

However, no matter what standard of

measurement is applied, when compared to nations in other regions of the
world, nearly all of those in Africa will be classified as backward.
Thus, at least in the present context, Huntington’s hypothesis seems
consistent with that of Pye.

On the other hand,

in regions where

economic and social development are at a relatively more advanced stage,
military regimes will tend to act as conservative forces.

This implies

that African military governments are likely to constitute a force for
economic and social progress, whereas their Latin American counterparts
will tend to act as conservative forces inhibiting social and/or
economic change.

To be sure, there are some Latin American nations

(including Bolivia and Peru), which are as backward as many in Africa.
Within Africa itself, there is very little difference from one
country to the other in terms of the level of social and economic
development.

With the notable exception of oil-rich Gabon, and sparsely

populated Seychelles (with average annual per capita GDPs of
approximately $700.00 and $500.00, respectively) over the last ten
years, the annual average per capita GDP for most of the remaining
African states fell some where between $350.00 (for Zambia, Swaziland,
Mauritius and Cote d e ’Ivoire) and $60.00 (for Mali, Zaire, Equatorial
Guinea and Ethiopia).

At these low levels of economic development,

Huntington’s hypothesis is not likely to be of any meaningful
significance.

Thus, if they are to illustrate Huntington’s theory,

African military regimes should act as “progressive" forces, since all
societies in Africa are underdeveloped.

Regime Type Makes no Difference
Some studies of regime performance have concluded that there are
no significant differences between military and civilian regimes.

In a

cross-national, aggregate study of all independent, non-Communist
countries with a population greater than one million, R.D. McKinlay and
A.S. Cohan (1975) find that military rule in the Third World has no
discernible economic policy consequences.

They conclude that "the

occurrence of a military regime does not have a pronounced effect on
economic performance when MR (military regime) are compared to CRM
(period of civilian rule in countries that have experienced military
regimes)"

(1975, 20). They also find that military regimes have no

significant effect on economic performance when both MR and CRM are
compared with CR900 (low income countries which have experienced only
civilian rule).

With regard to overall regime performance, McKinlay and

Cohan conclude that military regimes in the Third World are not a
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homogeneous group that can be clearly differentiated from civilian
regimes (1975, 1-30).
Another significant contribution in this field of research is the
attempt by Robert Jackman (1976) to evaluate the merits of some of the
foregoing arguments about military regime performance.

Using the

Adleman and Morris (1967) data, along with a new set of data covering
the period from 1960 to 1970 for seventy-seven Third World countries,
Jackman (1976) assesses the validity of various hypotheses about the
impact of military rule.

He specifies a general model which allows for

the evaluation of the arguments of Pye (1962), Huntington (1968) and
Nordlinger (1970).
hypotheses.

His findings do not confirm any one of the competing

He concludes:

In short, military intervention in the politics of the
Third World has no unique effects on social change,
regardless of either level of economic development or
geographic region....
We can conclude that blanket
statements portraying military governments in the Third
World as either progressive or reactionary are without
empirical foundation.
This implies that many observers may
have been mistaken in attributing unique political skills to
the military, whether directed toward progressive or
conservative ends.
We can also conclude that military
regimes do not assume different mantles as countries of the
Third World become wealthier.
In short, the simple
civilian-military government distinction appears to be of
little use in the explanation of social change (1976, 109697) .

Conclusion:

Some Critical Observations

The foregoing studies have offered insights into how military
officers, and in a few cases civilians, perform upon assuming political
control of the state.

This review clearly indicates that, in coping

with the problems of developing countries, answers to questions
regarding regime effectiveness are still

inconclusive.

With the
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exception of three studies (Pye 1968; Cohen 1985; Sloan and Tedin 1987),
the proponents of these theories all arrive at the conclusion that
military rule has a negative, or at best no, impact upon social and
economic change in third world countries.
their conclusions by different routes.

These scholars all arrive at

Nordlinger

Cohan (1975), Jackman (1976), Berg-Schlosser

(1970), McKinlay and

(1984), Cohen (1985), and

Sloan and Tedin (1987) do so by employing statistical analysis, while
the others use case studies.
The conclusion of several of those scholars who believe that
military regimes are positive agents for economic and social
modernization seems to be based on several unwarranted assumptions.

The

first is that the education and training which soldiers receive
"socialize" them into professional men, with attributes that make for
good governors.

Second, there is the assumption that such acquired

values or attributes are transferable into situations or occupational
roles which are not primarily military.

The third assumption is that in

the process of governing a civilian society, these military values are
transmitted to the rest of society in a way that regulates societal
behavior and that, consequently, changes such societies for the better.
A number of studies in professionalization appear to support the
first assumption, particularly for the officer corps.

Yet, these

studies can be applied to African military elites only with considerable
caution.

The training whictn produces a top military professional

general usually of exceptional duration (Moore 1970, 6).

is in

The rapid

"Africanization" of the officer corps within African nations after
independence inevitably produced conditions in which the usual officer
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training periods were shortened.

For example,

in January of 1960, the

officer corps of the Nigerian army was only 18 percent Nigerian, but hy
the end of 1965 it was totally Nigerianized (Welch 1987, 103).

Five

years was too brief a period to adequately train the number of Nigerians
needed to replace expatriate officers.

The Nigerian military suffered

accordingly, and, in 1976, a major in the Nigerian army, lamenting the
decline in the quality of officers in the country’s army, observed that
"the degree of professional proficiency in the Nigerian Army of today,"
was significantly inferior to that of the Nigerian pre-civil war soldier
<Ogbebor 1976, 13).
Aside from the effect of indigenization, the prosecution of wars
(civil wars in Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan) creates the necessity
both for rapid and crash training, as well as for quick promotions,
because of manpower needs to prosecute such wars.

Also, in military-led

governments, the movement of senior officers to staff civilian
administrative positions brings about premature promotions of junior
officers to senior positions.

The result is the presence of

considerable mediocrity among the professional officers corps within
these nations.
Evidence also reveals that members of the military in most African
countries do not all live in isolated barracks.

The lack of barracks

facilities and the size of the army ensure that the education and
training of military personnel are conducted in facilities which are not
insulated from interference by civilians.

Civilians and soldiers mix

freely at shops, markets, sporting events and other public places to
such an extent that it can be argued that there is considerable
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"civilianization" of the military.

The absorption of military values

and attitudes will be less effective when other social groups can
interfere, albeit indirectly,
of the military.

in the educational and training processes

The fact that professional men of quality are in short

supply and professional training has been constrained by several factors
in independent Africa, necessarily makes it difficult to agree with
those scholars (Pye 1962; Daadler 1962; Johnson 1962) who argue that
military officers possess special qualities which make for good
governors.
P y e ’s assertion that possession of modern military equipment and
overseas experience of training or duty would make military officers
eager to have their own countries modernized seems plausible.

However,

it should be borne in mind that the influence of training in the west
becomes increasingly less important as the date of independence recedes.
Many African countries have their own military academies, and it is not
uncommon for some countries to have their officers trained in several
foreign countries (including the Soviet Union, China and Eastern
European countries).

Furthermore, the same arguments about the

influence of overseas training on military officers could be made for
African civilian elites (including politicians).

With very few

exceptions, African civilian elites receive most of their higher
education overseas.

Many African politicians spent several decades

overseas before returning home to lead their country to independence.
They include:

Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi

Awolowo of Nigeria, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and Hastings Kamuzu
Banda who returned to Malawi

in 1958 after forty years in Furope and the
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United States.

Moreover, the link between education or training and

political behavior in African polities is one that is difficult to
establish.

Inferences from military experience or training to military

political behavior become less valid to the extent that officers are
subject to pressures and expectations from other groups.

This is of

particular significance in the Third World and especially in Africa.
The increasing politicization of the military profession in Africa helps
to develop a politicized ethos.

Hence it is to be expected that

overseas training would become a less valid predicator and influence on
the behavior of military rulers.

When outside pressures mount and

politicization increases, the spectrum of options open to the military
and the values attached to each alternative will play a greater role in
determining actual behavior.
Nordlinger ’5 (1970) argument that increases in military spending
in countries with military regimes leads to a decline in performance of
other sectors of the economy may also be based on a faulty analysis.
The proper question to ask is:

How detrimental to economic development

is increases in military spending?

It would be necessary to compare

defense budgets with allocations for other sectors of the economy.

This

becomes a matter of evaluating data for individual countries, but this
was not provided by Nordlinger.

Another factor that Nordlinger did not

accommodate is the possible spill-over effect of increases in defense
spending.

Increases in defense spending have been known to stimulate

growth in other sectors of the economy (e.g., the United States
experienced tremendous economic growth during and immediately after
World War II, for the most part because of increased defense spending).
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Thus, it may be that increases in military expenditure under military
regimes do not preclude the ability of military governors to act as
agents of economic modernization.
The different approaches employed by these observers can impose
significant limitations on the validity of their findings.

Such is the

case, for example, with the studies by Feit (1973) and Welch and Smith
(1974), which suffer from a problem common to most case studies.

The

applicability of their findings tend to be geographically- and
temporally-bound.

For example, where Feit’s model proved useful for

explaining the performances of the military regimes that constitute the
six case studies in his book

(Spain, Argentina, Pakistan, Burma and

Egypt), it did not prove to be an adequate model for explaining military
regime performance in tropical Africa.

Thus, some military regimes in

the region (Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Liberia, Togo and Niger) have
actually skipped Feit’s first stage, going directly to some variation of
the second stage.

Still other regimes remained at the second stage

until they were toppled or voluntarily return to the barracks.

Other

regimes have gone through the first and second stages without actually
reaching the final, "mass-party" stage.

However, Mobutu’s regime in

7aire seems to have gone through all three stages (Willame 1970, 149;
Africa, March 1985).

In the West African experience, only the former

French colonies of Mali, Benin and Togo have experimented with the
formation of political parties by the ruling military.

A similar

situation exist in the Congo Republic.
Unlike the case study approach, the quantitative approach allows
for generalizations, but it rarely permits the critical evaluation of

^E
specific cases.

Furthermore, the usefulness of the quantitative

approach is heavily dependent upon the reliability of available data.
The difficulty in obtaining accurate and reliable data from Third World
countries is a familiar problem in the social sciences (Janowitz 1977,
El).
data.

Many factors mitigate against the gathering and storage of such
These include:

political expediency,

lack of modern technology,

and difficult geographic conditions.
Statistics relating to the military tend to be the most suspect.
In military regimes, the "juggling" of statistics is a common practice.
Moreover, the affairs of the military tend to be shrouded in secrecy
(especially for foreigners) and military rulers are usually very
reluctant to give information to researchers.
Furthermore,

in some instances, the duration of military or

civilian rule has been too brief for a meaningful

longitudinal study.

For example, Eric Nordlinger’s (1970) study, which concluded that
military rule was essentially conservative, is based on cross-national
data for the period of 1957-196E.

A similar study by Robert Jackman

(1976), over a longer period of time 1960-1970, produced a different
conclusion.

These results suggest that statistical data from African

countries, and especially those with military governments, should be
used with extreme caution.

Despite these limitations,

investigators who

employ statistical analysis in evaluating regime performance in third
world countries still perform a very useful task.

Among other things,

their efforts serve the purpose of directing our attention to some
relevant indicators for the evaluation of regime performance.

More
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importantly) they can serve as foundations upon which future research)
using improved data> can be based.

Endnotes

After a successful
military coup
in
government was established in Lesotho.

January 1986,

a

military

Legitimacy refers to the perception on the part of citizens that a
given system of government
is just and proper.
Where legitimacy
exists, it provides a surer basis for regime survival
than force
alone could ever do. A regime acquires
legitimacy only when its
actions conform
to a
generally accepted
tradition
and/or
constitutional and legal order.
Max Weber identified three types
of legitimate authority on which regimes may be based.
They are
traditional (where people believe in the sanctity of traditional
institutions,
e.g.,
monarchies),
charismatic
(where citizens
accept an individual’s right to rule because of a belief that he
is endowed with special
powers or qualities,
e.g., De Gaulle,
Stalin, Mcio, Nasser, Nkrumah,
Nyerere, Kenyatta and Toure), and
rationality (where citizens accept the legality of established
rules and the right
to govern of those who come to power
in
observance of these rules, e.g., the United States, Western Europe
and the Soviet Union).
Weber felt that regimes based on
rationality are the best (Weber 1947, 324-429).
Africa News, 22 August 1983; West Africa, 22 August 1983.
Nordlinger’s study
included 74
countries grouped
into four
regions:
Latin America
(N=21); Middle East and North Africa
<N=15); Asia
(N=15); Tropical
Africa <N=23).
Of the tropical
African countries only the Sudan had a military government during
the period 1957-1962.

Chapter Two
REGIME TYPE:

PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

The key concern of this study is to determine whether it makes any
socioeconomic difference for an African nation to be governed by the
military or by civilians.

No serious discussion of this question will

be complete without at least brief reference to Africa’s historical
traditions as they relate to regime types.

Precolonial and Colonial Traditions
Historical traditions have had a significant impact on the affairs
of contemporary Africa.

To be sure, these traditions, colonial ones in

particular, have set important limits within which rulers of independent
Africa have functioned and continue to function.

Of particular

significance, at least as far as this study is concerned, is the role of
the military in the political system.
The role of the precolonial African soldier varied from one time
and place to another.
societies"

For example in the so-called "stateless

(e.g., the Kungs of the Kalahari and the Ibos of Eastern

Nigeria) which developed no identifiable form of central government,
there was no place for the soldier or warrior.

On the other hand, the

soldier played an important role in the establishment and maintenance of
the various Sahelian empires (Ghana, Mali, Songhai and Kamen-Bornu).
The Sahelian empires were located south of the Sahara.

The empire

of Ghana which rose and fell between about 500 A.D. and 1S50 A.D. was
situated in the region between the bend of the Niger at Timbuktu and the
middle reaches of the Senegal and Gambia rivers;
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it occupied most of
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present-day Mali* the southeastern regions of contemporary Mauritania
and eastern Senegal.

The empire of Mali* which flourished from the mid

thirteenth century to the later part of the fourteenth century, occupied
all of ancient Ghana.

At its height the king Qf Mali’s authority

extended form the Gambia and the lower Senegal valleys in the west, to
the western region of contemporary Niger to the east, and from the
southernmost part of Algeria in the north to the northern regions of
Guinea and Burkina Faso in the south.

The Songhai empire, which reached

its height in the sixteenth century, covered all of ancient Mali and
extended further east to occupy most of present-day Niger and northern
Nigeria.

The empire of Kamen-Bornu evolved over the same time as the

Mali and Songhai empires.
fourteenth century,

However, at its height in the early

it was only about half the si 2 e of the Songhai

empire, extending from north of the River Benue in northeastern Nigeria
and northern Cameroon to the south, to all of modern day Chad and
eastern Niger to the north.
In Mali and Songhai, the king who appointed the generals was
himself the commandei— in-chief of the army and personally directed
military operations.

In each empire the army was divided into several

corps assigned to the defense of different provinces.

The generals

commanding the various units of the army had purely military powers.
There was a clear distinction between civilian and military authority
(Diop 1987, 53-59,

115-24).

The primary role of the soldier in precolonial Africa was to
engage in foreign expeditions. Military expeditions were undertaken
either to secure existing borders or to facilitate territorial

m

expansion.

For example, Mansa Musa the most famous king of Mali used

his army which was said to be about 100,000 strong, to tighten the grip
of the central government on the provinces to ensure peace and order, to
conquer new states or reconquer states which may have broken away from
the empire (Boahen, Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 28).

However, rulers rarely

directed their military establishments against their own subjects (Diop
1987, 107).
In spite of the current trend toward authoritarian forms of rule
in Africa, the notion that rulers have to be accountable to their
subjects is not alien to Africa.

In many parts of precolonial Africa,

governments were established according to democratic principles.
example,

For

long before European penetration of Africa, traditional rule in

Botswana was based on a system of consultation and free discussion on
matters of public interest in the assembly known as the "lekgotla."

The

ruler in the Botswana political system derived his powers from the
people.

This is expressed in Setswana as, "Kgosi ke kgosi ka batho,"

meaning the chief is the chief by the will of the people (Magang 1986,
103-108).

A similar principle is clearly evident in the Sotho proverb,

"A chief is a chief by the people; a people are a people through the
chief"

(Potholm 1988, 25).
In many societies in precolonial Africa there were effective

restraints on governmental power.

Although these checks were not often

written down and not often formalized, they were no less real
1951; Magang 1986; Maquet 1971).

(Busia

In precolonial Ghana, for example, the

Asantehene (titular monarch) can be "de-stooled" for behaving in a
manner that is inconsistent with Asante traditions (Busia 1951).

Among
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the Swazis, the king was always referred to as the "Ngwenyama-incouncil," to signify his reliance on the council to sanction his
actions.

Among the Sotho peoples, the national "pitso" (assembly) was

open to all and its approval was vital for any major policy decision
(Potholm 1988).
To be sure, there were also examples of authoritarian systems in
precolonial Africa.

For example, the Fulani empire which came into

being after a holy war (jihad) to reestablish Islam in what is today
Northern Nigeria, Chad, and Northern Cameroon,

led to the establishment

of some of the most highly centralized, conservative and hierarchical
political systems in precolonial Africa.

Autocratic rule through

hereditary emirs was the customary form of leadership.

Eligibility for

leadership in the emirates was conferred by birth and was viewed as a
"gift of Allah" (Coleman 1960, 39; Smith 1955, 93; Theen and Wilson
1986, 514).
A different pattern of authoritarian rule was established among
the Nguni peoples of the south east coast of Africa.

Traditionally

farmers, the Ngunis were transformed into warriors under the command of
an absolute ruler, the warrior king.

With its military political

system, the Zulu kingdom— which reached its pinnacle in the reign of the
ruthless King Chaka— has been likened to that of Sparta in ancient
Greece (Oliver and Crowder 1981, 86; Magang 1986, 103).
Although they were often deemed to be nonpolitical, in fact,
military forces in colonial Africa served the profoundly political
purpose of upholding European rule.

They were often used along with
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colonial police forces to suppress political dissent, such as strikes
and demonstrations (Welch 1987, lb-11, 101-103; Gutteridge 1975, 6).
For example, in 1906, the British declared martial

law when the

Zulus under Bambata refused, among other things, to pay a toll tax.
Perhaps the most celebrated use of force by a colonial power in Africa
was in the 1950s, when the British army was called upon to suppress the
Mau Mau movement in Kenya (Phillips 1984, 59-64).

The pattern was the

same for other European powers all over the continent.

Colonial rule

was maintained by the use of force and intimidation (Oliver and Crowder
1981, 166-67).
Since Africa was subject to rule by several colonial powers
(British, French, Portuguese, Belgian, Spanish, Italian, and German),
the colonial legacy has varied from one part of the continent to
another.

Yet all colonial systems shared a number of characteristics

that effectively influenced the course of politics in Africa.
All colonial systems in Africa were imposed or at least maintained
by the use of force.
authoritarian.

The systems of government were essentially

In all the colonies, every important decision was made

by the colonial administrator and imposed on the citizens of the
colonies.

The political patterns were overwhelmingly hierarchical, and

Africans were systematically excluded from decision-making roles
(Schoolman 1988).
Despite the claims made about their virtues, the Westminster and
French models of parliamentary democracy where never practiced in any
African country throughout the colonial period.

Although they had never

been developed under colonial rule, these models of democracy were
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nevertheless imposed on the colonial peoples at independence <Legum
1986, 175-85; Magang 1986,

103-108).

It is no wonder that* in most

African countries* the Western system of democracy collapsed almost
immediately after independence.
Whereas no direct connection seems to exist between the role of
soldiers in precolonial and postcolonial Africa, more direct links can
be traced from the role they played in the colonial era and the role
they have played since independence.

For example*

it is not uncommon

for soldiers in independent Africa to be called upon to suppress
domestic dissent.

Like the colonial rulers before them* civilian rulers

in postcolonial Africa often make use of the military to maintain
control over their citizens.

Some observers have argued that the use of

soldiers to cope with political challenges to the regime (strikes,
demonstrations and riots), encouraged the military to believe that their
intervention was necessary for political stability (Liebenow 1986, 24748).

One result is that military systems have become the most common

form of government on the African continent.

African Political Systems:

A Typology

When attempting to categorize political systems, researchers often
look at a variety of system characteristics.

Among these are the basis

of legitimacy, the party system, the pattern of recruitment of the head
of the executive, the formal vertical and horizontal separations of
power, the actual power structure, the scope of political control,
constitutional provisions and the ideological orientation of the system
(Shi Is 1962; Easton 1965; Apter 1965; Dahl 1971; Powell 1982; BergSchlosser 1984).
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Because very few African leaders, if any, govern in accordance
with the provisions of existing constitutions,

it is not worthwhile to

use constitutions as the basis for determining African system types.
Nevertheless, some useful efforts have been made to construct typologies
which may be applied to African regimes (Welch and Smith 1974;
Nordlinger 1977; Berg-Schlosser 1984; Ayoade 1986).
For the purpose of this study, I will use a modified version of a
typology of African political systems developed by Berg-Schlosser
181-51).

(1984,

Berg-Schlosser identifies the following four categories of

political systems:

polyarchic, socialist, authoritarian and military.

For this study, I have adopted only three variations of his four
categories.

These are multiparty (democratic), one-party/dynastic and

mi 1itary.
The category of socialist systems has been excluded from the
present classification of system types, because of the difficulty
involved in identifying African Marxist-Leninist countries.
to Berg-Schlosser socialist systems are noted for having,

According

"effective

single-party organization, a more centralized system of government, and
an ideology that pursues a more self-reliant and noncapitalist road to
development with the aim of a more egalitarian social order"
130).

(1984,

Although the leaders of many African countries have espoused what

has sometimes been called "African socialism," "developmental
socialism,” or "communitarian socialism," none of them has been able to
put it into practice successfully (Sargent 1987, 805-807).
As a number of African leaders have discovered, proclaiming a
country’s socialist destiny and either achieving it or making it persist
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are not necessarily the same thing.

Thus far, so-called socialist

revolutions on the continent (e.g., Angola, Burkina-Faso, Ethiopia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Tanzania), have faltered before
they even got off the ground.

External forces such as the world

economy, have produced conditions that make the implementation of
socialist goals impossible, even if everything had gone well internally.
But as Lyman Sargent observed:
Internally, all Third World countries face a multitude
of problems.
Among the worst problems are rampant
corruption, extreme differences of wealth, threat of
military takeover, and tribal and religious conflict.
As a
result, no Third World country has been in a position to put
developmental socialism into practice even if external
factors had been perfect (1987, 207).
A number of African leaders that once advocated socialism have
discarded this ideological orientation in favor of pragmatic
considerations in determining government policy.

For example,

P eople’s Republic of the Congo, collectivist methods,

in the

inspired by

Marxism-Leninism, have been discarded in favor of entrepreneurial
methods.

The minister of agriculture said simply,

revenue is Marxism without a future"

"Marxism without

(Sklar 1986, 135).

Finally, almost every country in sub-Saharan African has what
Almond and Verba have called a "parochial" political culture (Almond and
Verba 1963).

This is a political culture in which citizens are only

indistinctly aware of, or not concerned with, the central government.
Consequently, the modern political arena in a typical African country
will tend to cover a very small proportion of the whole country.

Linder

these circumstances, it is doubtful whether the solid popular base
required for an effective socialist party can be built.

These are the
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principal reasons for excluding a category for so-called "socialist"
political systems— a step which should not have any significant impact
on this study.
The classification of political system upon which this study will
be based* therefore*

is derived from three major system characteristics.

The first is the executive selection process (i.e., whether the chief
executive is elected,

inherited the office or installed by coup).

The

second criterion refers to the autonomy of the chief executive and his
cabinet (e.g., whether the assembly,
decisions).

if it exists, can veto executive

The final characteristic refers to the presence of

political parties and party competition (how many political parties are
there, and whether free competition among parties is allowed).
The characteristics used here are not only sufficient to
accommodate all of the system types in Berg-Schlosser’s classification,
but they also capture major variations in the general form of African
regimes.

More characteristics could be included, which would possibly

yield finer distinctions and a more elaborate typology.

However, these

three seem to cover the key differentiating features among regimes and
for our purposes should produce a useful classification of sub-Saharan
African regime types.
The first three of Berg-Schlosser’s categories of political
systems are associated with civilian regimes.

A civilian regime can be

said to exist in countries where civilians occupy key government
positions and openly determine national policy, goals, and objectives.
There are many expressions of civilian regimes.

A civilian regime can

take the form of a multiparty (democratic) system, a single-party
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system* or a monarchy.

It may espouse socialism or capitalism.

For

this study, the various expressions of civilian regimes are classified
under two broad categories:

multiparty and one-party or dynastic (see

Table S.l).
Multiparty (democratic) systems are competitive systems in which
candidates from two or more political parties are able to openly and
freely contest election for the purpose of assuming control of
government.

In Africa, European forms of democratic systems

(Westminster and French presidential model) were installed by the
colonial powers in many countries at the time of independence.

Not many

of these have survived (see Table £.1) and even where the original
system has been maintained to a certain extent,

it has undergone a

number of significant modifications (Sklar 1983, li-£4; Berg-Schlosser
1984, 130).

Consequently, some civilian regimes that are less than

fully competitive, but clearly not one-party systems have been included
under this heading (e.g., Kenya 1963-1981).
One-party systems are characterized by a single dominant party
structure, along with strongly centralized and highly personalistic
leadership (Berg-Schlosser

1984, 130-31).

There are no free and open

elections; public opinion is closely controlled.
similarities in their central characteristic

Because of the

(i.e., single-party

structure), Berg-Sch1osser’s socialist and authoritarian categories are
merged into this one-party category of civilian regime (see Table E.l).
Also included in this category are the dynastic systems in Swaziland and
Ethiopia (until 1974).
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Table E.l
Classification of Political Systeais in Sub-Saharan Africa* 1960-1985

COUNTRY

CIVILIAN REGIME
Multiparty System
One-Party or
(Democratic)
Dynastic System

Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
The Congo
Cote d ’Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana

Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Niger
Nigeri a
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Swazi land
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

1960-65
1970-72
1966-85
1971-73
1962-66
1960-72
--1960-62
1960-6**

-1968-70

-1965-85
1960-63
1970-71
1980-81

-1963-81
1966-85

--

1966-69
1973-85

-1960-65
1967-76
1973-85
1960-6551980-81
1963-7**
1965-68
1960-85
1971-79
1960-7** (mon. )

1960-66
1962-65
1979;1981-85
1960-6**
196A-72
1980-85

1980-85
1975-85
1966-69
1972-79
1982-85
1981-85

---1975-80
1982-85

-1960-79
196**-B5
1960-68
1965-78

---

--

196**-65

---

1960-65
1980-83
1962-73
1960-66
1961-66
1968-73
1960-69
1965-68

-1966-7951982-85
1975-85
1969-85

--

--

--

-1966-70; 197**-85
1977-85

--

1960-71

1960-6**
1968-85

MILITARY REGIME

--1980-85
1972-85

-1969-85
1979-85

--

--

1960-73

197**-85
1966-79

19B**-B5

--

197**-85

1967-85

-1967

1973-85

-1960-6** 51969-85
1968-85(mon.)
1961-85

-1966-70

1970-85

--1967-85
1971-7851980

--

1965-85

1972-85

---

--

Sources: Africa South of the Sahara (1988), Berg-Schlosser
Legum (1970-87).

<19 8 A >*
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A military regime or system is one in which military officers
occupy key government positions and openly dictate national policy?
military definitions of national goals prevail? dominating the mass
media of communication and both public and private discussion; and
military-dictated priorities supersede competing goals and policies
(Fidel 1975? 1).

Military regimes can also espouse socialism or

capitalism? and they might even have dynastic pretensions (e.g.? Emperor
Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Empire).

Military regimes are

noted for the violent means (coup d ’etat) by which they assume and often
maintain power (Berg-Schlosser 19B4? 130-31).

Although there are

various expressions of military regimes (Welch and Smith 1974?
Nordlinger 1977)? all regimes that satisfy the foregoing definition of
military system will be so identified.

African Regime Types:

Performance Expectations

Good reasons exist to expect one regime type to perform better
than another according to certain performance indicators.

As already

noted? many students of African politics argue that the structural
organization of the military? combined with the technological and
managerial skills possessed by members of the armed forces? help to
orient the military toward the goal of modernization.

Furthermore?

civilian regimes? particularly those that have a democratic system of
government? are viewed by many as a luxury that Third World countries
can ill afford (Andreski 1969; Chirot 1977; Hewlett 1980).

However?

other observers have argued that modernization cannot occur without
democratic institutions (Lipset 1959? Coleman I960; Rostow 1971).

For

example? in a study of emerging nations of Asia? Africa and the Middle
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East, James Coleman (1960, 532-44) concluded that "the major hypothesis
that economic development and competitiveness are positively correlated
is validated when countries are grouped into major differentiating
categories of competitiveness and where mean scores of economic
development are employed."
In the following pages, the main arguments regarding regime
capabilities will be presented.

From these arguments, certain

hypotheses will be derived that will guide the study.

Civilian Regime:

Multiparty System (Democracy)

The most fundamental characteristic of a democratic system is the
notion that citizens should be involved in the making of political
decisions, either directly or through elected representatives.

Whether

directly or indirectly, citizens are encouraged to have some say
regarding public policy.

This type of system demands constant political

activity by the people— debates, the formation of associations,
preparations for and participation in elections, and party competition.
Many commentators have questioned the usefulness or wisdom of
instituting such a demanding system in the newly emerging countries of
the Third World.

There are positive and negative positions on this

issue.
The positive perspective holds that a competitive system will
facilitate economic and political development in Third World countries.
According to this perspective, the only way to identify obstacles to
development is through citizen participation.

For it is the average

citizen who has to confront the problems of society in his everyday life
and who, consequently,

is best informed about what needs to be done.
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Thus, only a system that makes allowance not only for feedback from the
governors to the governed, but also from the governed to the governors,
can enable the government to identify and direct resources to sectors
where they are most needed.

A democratic system,

it is further argued,

encourages economic growth because it is the only system that is
conducive to free competition.
initiative and enterprise,

And, since free competition rewards

this type of system should facilitate maximum

increases in productivity.
Furthermore, the positive argument asserts that only a competitive
system can guarantee responsive public officials.

Public officials who

wish to be reelected, or elected in the first place, must convince
voters that their term in office will be beneficial

to the country.

One

way of doing this is to be responsive to the changing needs and demands
of the society and its population.
Conversely the negative argument views democracy as a system that
Third World countries can ill afford.

According to this perspective,

citizen participation is an impediment to national development.

The

powers of decision makers are limited; and the command structure is
ordered in such a fashion that decision makers are slow to make
important decisions, because they are bound by an established legal
order.

Thus, it often takes too much time for even beneficial programs

to be implemented.
Furthermore, in the culturally pluralistic countries of Africa,
the adoption of a democratic system could be destabilizing.

Because

substantial portions of the population still do not accept the
legitimacy of the state, democratic procedures, such as elections, could
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provoke major political disturbances (de Villiers 1976, 82-83; Powell
1982, 41-43).
For example, a general election in Rwanda in 1961 was preceded by
violent clashes between the two major ethnic groups in the country:
Hutu and the Tutsi.

the

In April and May 1972, factional struggles in

Rwanda’s southern neighbor, Burundi,

led to one of the most appalling

ethnic slaughters ever recorded in the annals of modern Africa.
Following an abortive Hutu-led coup in April, a campaign of repression
was carried out by the Tutsi, resulting in an estimated 100,000 Hutu
deaths.

From 1961 to 1964, ethnic clashes in Rwanda claimed an

estimated 20,000 lives (de Villiers 1976, 82-83; Africa South of the
Sahara 1988, 305-306, 825-27).

Racial antagonisms have also played a

significant role in Kenyan politics.

The 1961 election in Kenya was

marked by racial violence between the Kikuyus and Masais.

Further

indication of the negative impact of democratic processes on the
politics of ethnically differentiated societies include the racial
clashes that flared up soon after the 1960 General Election in the
former Belgium Congo.
Another problem arising from the cultural diversity of African
countries is that it makes democratic compromise difficult,
impossible.

if not

The different groups clamor for scarce resources and for

control of government.

This leads to what Daniel Chirot (1977, 224),

refers to as "democratic paralysis."

Even in more advanced democracies

conflicts over what Dan Usher calls "assignment" can be especially
troublesome.

For a democratic political system to survive there must be

a prior agreement among citizens on a set of rules or consensus for
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allocation of resources (Usher 1981, viii).

In such a society it is

necessary to have general agreement (what Rousseau called "the general
will") concerning certain substantive assumptions underlying the
government.

Where this is lacking, as is the case in most of sub-

Saharan Africa,

in practice democracy can in fact be very destabilizing.

Whereas some observers see free competition as a positive aspect
of multiparty systems, others maintain that such competition is often
accompanied by considerable nonproductive expenses.

They suggest that

the newly emerging countries need a planned economy if they are to
attain a rapid and sustainable level of economic growth.

They hold that

economic planning is not compatible with a representative form of
government.

Although a representative assembly can agree on the need

for planning, the argument goes, it is not likely that it can work out a
production schedule.

Such a schedule must have a uniformity and

continuity that exclude the compromises typical of democratic
institutions (Tingsten 1965, 161).

Furthermore, when a representative

assembly handles planning, the changes and additions to the program that
might result from compacts between different groups in the assembly
would tend to introduce disorder and waste into the system and interfere
with the application of certain essential parts of the original program.
Problems such as these can only serve to maintain the underdevelopment
of the newly emerging countries of Africa.
At this juncture it is perhaps proper to note that reputable
studies have shown that the greatest advancements, both socially and
economically, have generally occurred in the more democratic societies
(Lipset 1959; Powell

1982; Berg-Schlosser 198<t).

Nonetheless, even
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defenders of democracy,

including this writer, recognize that, to a

large extent, democracy is dependent on a disciplined and educated
electorate (Tingsten 1965,

IIP; de Villiers 1976).

As experience has

shown, this is a rare condition in modern day Africa.

Another criterion

for democracy— a stable middle class— is also lacking in many African
societies.

Furthermore, democracy presupposes consideration as well as

tolerance.

In a true and just democracy, the majority must uphold civil

liberties and respect the political rights of the minority.

This is

rarely the case in Africa, where the majority often uses its position to
establish such a concentration of power so as to make certain that the
minority cannot assume power.
The basic unity or consensus that is requisite for democracy is
absent in Africa.

Consequently, for the majority of African nations, at

this stage of their political development, the popularly-elected
government is not necessarily the best kind of government.

Civilian Regime:

One-Party System

Like their democratic counterparts, African one-party systems have
their advantages and disadvantages.

The major advantage that has been

ascribed to one-party systems is that, by mobilizing the country’s human
resources, the single party can ensure support for the task of national
construction and develop stable loyalties to government leaders.

Yet,

while this may be true of other single-party systems, African one-party
regimes are not well equipped to perform these tasks.
Like the political party in African multiparty states, the
dominant party in African one-party states is often very weak.

Nearly

all of the disadvantages of one-party regimes are attributable to this
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weakness.

First? because of the cultural diversity of African

societies? no single party (socialist or otherwise) has been able to
command the allegiance of significant segments of the population.
Normally? the African political party is ethnically- and geographicallybased.

Some ethnic groups support it? others are hostile to it or at

best indifferent.

Thus? a ruling party in an African one-party state?

supported equally by all ethnic groups in the country?

is an unrealistic

expectation.
Houphouet-Boigny’s Parti Democratique de Cote d e ’Ivoire (PDCI)
comes closest to this ideal? but even it has not completely eliminated
ethnic divisions.

Ethnicity remains the basis of its organization

(Lewis 1970? 8 6 ).

In Ghana? Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP)

government was faced at independence in 1957 by a number of regionally
based opposition political parties.

But? by 1964? when Ghana officially

became a one-party state? Nkrumah had successfully eliminated all
effective opposition.
based opposition?

Although his one-party state reduced ethnically-

it only did so to the extent of uniting Ghanaians from

all regions against his dictatorial regime (Boahen? Ajayi and Tidy 1986?
151-52).

Similarly, Sekou Toure had hoped to use his Parti Democratique

de Guinea (PDG)? the only political party in Guinea? to eliminate
ethnicism in that country.

However, his collectivization of agriculture

aroused much opposition among the Fula? who became the focus for growing
discontent with the PDG dictatorship (Boahen, Ajayi and Tidy 1986? 152).
Second, the governing party in single-party states usually vies
with other organizations for control of the society.

Notable among

these are the armed forces? the bureaucracy? and trade unions.

As a
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result the efforts of African one-party regimes to suppress dissidence
and to prevent organized opposition from forming have seldom been
successful

(LeVine 1966, 91).

Third, in many one-party states, the single party has proven to he
of questionable efficiency in performing governmental functions.

The

absence of legal opposition within the one-party system make it much
harder to identify and address important problems.

Although one-party

states often have parliaments, more often than not they are merely
"rubber-stamp" assemblies in dealing with the actions of the president.
Finally, African one-party regimes are highly unstable.

One-party

governments can maintain themselves only by building up an extensive
secret police which roots out opposition groups before they can do harm
to the regime (e.g., the Soviet Union).

But in fact no African one-

party regime can aspire to this degree of efficiency.

For example, Gus

Liebenow (1986, 640-42), has attributed the high incidence of military
intervention in African politics to the weakness of existing political
parties.

Writing about African political parties, Henry Bienen (1970,

99-100) observed that:
...as the victorious parties formed governments, they lost
functional relevance and coherence....
No matter what roles
parties have been assigned, almost everywhere in tropical
Africa— whether in single party, multiparty, or nonparty
states— they perform few.

Civilian Regimes:

Dynasties or Monarchies

There are only a handful of dynastic systems in contemporary
Africa.

The only two countries with such regimes in sub-Saharan Africa

are Swaziland and Lesotho.

Lesotho has a constitutional monarch (King

Moshoeshoe II) with very limited powers.

Thus, the only monarch with

6<t

absolute power in black Africa today is King Mswati III of Swaziland.
As is the case with African single-party systems, absolute monarchs in
Africa have to vie for control with other organizations (including the
military,

the civil service and trade unions).

Furthermore, the size of

African royal families means that dynastic regimes not only have to
compete with external organizations for control but sometimes, also with
factions from within the royal family.
The main source of support and consent for dynastic regimes is
custom and tradition.

In such systems citizens acknowledge that

monarchs have ruled in the past and, according to tradition, they should
continue to rule.

And as long as citizens remain loyal to tradition and

are insulated from outside influences, all will be well with monarchies.
However,

in an increasingly interdependent environment, a monarch’s

ability to insulate his subjects from new ideas from abroad is very
limited.

As the population assimilates new and foreign ideas the

ability of dynastic regimes to maintain themselves will be undermined.
As the foregoing suggests, the civilian regime in sub-Saharan
Africa may not always be the most effective in achieving national
developmental objectives.

Under civilian leadership, national unity of

purpose and method seldom prevails.

Civilian political

institutions are

often incapable of successfully arbitrating the competing demands of
various groups within the population.

If anything, civilian leaders are

often obligated to satisfy the demands of highly specific constituencies
whose interests may not only be different from those of larger segments
of the population but may be anti-development as well.
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Unlike most of their counterparts in the west, none of the African
varieties of civilian regimes can claim to have the ability to
"authoritatively allocate resources."

Ethnic divisions between and

within political parties often results in victorious parties forming
governments that do not possess effective legitimatized authority.
This, in turn, affects the capacity of the state to carry out its public
policies forcefully and effectively.

Consequently, African civilian

regimes are often unable to initiate or execute development schemes
(Duigan and Jackson 1986, 87).

More importantly, these regimes are

rarely able to control state institutions of repression in their
respective countries.

Even the dictatorial one-party and dynastic

regimes cannot always prevent the organization or expression opposition.
This fact greatly limits the capacity of African civilian regimes to
promote national integration and achieve political stability, which are
necessary for development.

Military Regimes
Aside from the regime types already identified, the only other
species existing in sub-Saharan Africa is the military regime.

As

indicated earlier, military regimes are the most prevalent on the
continent.

They can, of course, assume a variety of forms.

We are

relying upon the classification by Eric Nordlinger (1977), who
identified three types:

guardians, moderators and rulers.*

military rule is essentially authoritarian.

Yet

Just as is the case with

the other regime types, there are of course positive and negative
aspects to military rule.
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One of the positive aspects of military rule has to do with the
fact that, in nearly all the states of sub-Saharan Africa, the military
has the advantage of being the most highly organized group.

In making

decisions they are guided by established standard operating procedures
which tend to focus on the most efficient, most effective, and quickest,
means for the realization of specific goals.

The military is structured

hierarchically, where authority flows downward and responsibility
upward.

Hierarchy is also punitive, based upon the threat of the

harshest disciplinary measures, and a normative belief in unquestioning
obedience of the state as a result of military training (Levy 1971, ^3^5).

Because of their preoccupation with order, and their emphasis on

hierarchy and chain of command, new military rulers are more likely to
insist that existing government institutions function in a similar
manner.

More emphasis will be placed on adherence to rules and plans.

Consequently, the effectiveness of government is likely to increase,
making military rule perhaps more effective than civilian leadership
(Fidel 1975, 19).
Perhaps the most important positive aspect of military rule is
manifested in the absolute or relative advantage of the military vis-£vis other power centers with regard to the control of resources
available for use against

adversaries.

This fact results in part from

character traits that are

peculiar to the military.

According to

Janowitz <1977, 103), "the military establishment— regardless of its
societal context— has a unique character because the threat of violence
is a permanent reality to

its leaders....

The unique character of the

military derives from the

requirement that its key members be

67
specialists in the use of violence."

The fact that most military

regimes in tropical Africa have actually governed without extensive use
of violence should not obscure the significance of force as the basis
from which they exercise their political power.

Within military regimes

there are significant variations from one regime to another in the
commission of repressive acts.

Nevertheless» the threat of the use of

force is always present.
It is nearly universally acknowledged that the capacity of the
military to govern derives from its control over the instruments of
violence (Fidel 1975; Janowitz 1977; Bienen 1978; Macridis 1986).

It is

this fact that provides military rulers with a positive advantage over
their civilian counterparts.

As Kenneth Fidel

<1975, 9) argues, either

competing demands or gross indecision in government policy-making can
lead to civil and economic chaos.

The military, he suggests, may be the

only group in the nation capable of making hard development decisions
and imposing these decisions upon other segments of the population.

In

the absence of other strong forces capable of implementing development
programs, through the use or threat of force, the military can impose
difficult solutions.
Council

For example, the Armed Forces Revolutionary

(AFRC), which ruled Ghana for a few months in 1979, vigorously

enforced its price control policy.

There were instances where soldiers

used their guns to threaten market women and other traders to sell their
goods at and low controlled prices (Pel low and Chazan 1986, 61).
The arrest of a few citizens and the imposition of limited
political oppression can often suffice to suppress or destroy opposition
to a military regime or its policies.

On the other hand, civilian
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rulers tend to be less anxious to offend their various support groups or
coalitions by adopting unpopular measures.

Thus, comparing operating

procedures under civilian and military regimes in Nigeria, one cabinet
member of the former western Nigerian government of Brigadier Adebayo
said:
In the military regime there is no constituency
whatsoever.
Anyone who wants to influence the Governor has
no constituency to back him up in anything he wants. During
the civilian regime the reverse takes place.
The premier
would consider the influence of a person in the cabinet but
also his influence outside the cabinet....
In the military
regime there is no question of being affected in judging
cabinet members by how many people vote for them.
If it is
a civilian regime, the Prime Minister must be alert to
losing support of the most influential people (cited in
Bienen 1978, E O E >.
The last positive, and perhaps the most important, quality of
military rule is that, in fragmented societies,
of solidarity.

it may serve as a focus

It has been suggested that African military rulers are

better equipped than rival groups to deal the problems associated with
ethnic fragmentation.

According to Dennis Austin (1966, 70-71),

military elites have the advantage sometimes of starting with a "clean
slate;" they are not committed to a particular group interest and thus
are free to make decisions in the national interest.

Another scholar

has observed that, "African armies tend to be the most detribalized,
integrated and cohesive institutions in their respective states"
(Lefever 1970, SO).
According to Janowitz

(1977, 109) the operational experience of

the armies of new nations may contribute to their internal cohesion.
Extensive and successful experience contributes to a sense of
professional self-esteem and social cohesion.

For example, ex-colonial
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African armies with experience in World War II include troops from
French West Africa (especially Senegalese troops in North Africa) and
Nigerian and Ghanaian soldiers (serving in East Africa and Burma).
Similarly the military in post-independent Africa have had enough
successful experiences to foster their internal cohesion.

For example,

Rwandan soldiers have had several successful engagements with Tutsi
infiltrators from Kiru (Congo) and Uganda (Janowitz 1977, 109).
Ethiopian, Nigerian, Ghanaian, Sierra Leonean and other African troops
have had effective operational experiences in United Nations operations
in the Congo and Lebanon.
The importance of national unity in the crucial stage of
post independence development cannot be overemphasized.

Thus, at least

on the African context, the corporate solidarity of the military rulers
provides them with a significant leadership advantage over the
ethnically-factionalized political parties.

Because the military lives

in a nationalist environment and, both as a function of professional
socialization and role performance, are concerned with issues of
national survival, military officers from various ethnic background are
often willing and able to work together (Fidel 1975).
Although the ethnic divisions found in African societies are
sometimes reflected in their military establishments, these divisions
are not always as pronounced within the military as they are in other
organizations, such as political parties, trade unions, and the civil
service.

A major reason for this may be the "us-against-them" mentality

which has developed over the years within some African armies.

The

frequent use of African armies by civilian and military rulers (not to
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mention former colonial administrators) to suppress domestic dissent and
to maintain control over the population have often resulted in
situations where soldiers were distrusted and disliked, even by members
of there own ethnic group.

In recent years, there have been numerous

instances in which civilians have attacked soldiers and destroyed their
property to protest the actions of military rulers.

After a recent

series of clashes between civilians and soldiers in Nigeria, for
example, the response of the military rulers prompted a Lagos-based
national news daily to editorialize as follows:

"The picture that

emerged was one of a cleavage between the military and civil society as
if civil society were an enemy at war with the military.

0

picture of ’them against u s . R e f e r r i n g

It was a

to the same sequence of

events, Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka noted that "the theme is
usually becoming ’we versus them’" (Onanuga 1989, 9).
During the colonial era, some African armies were perceived as
agents of imperial rule and, at other times (especially under military
regimes), they have been regarded as armies of occupation (Gutteridge
1975, 6; Liebenow 1986, 247-48).

The hostility that some Africans

exhibit toward their armies is reflected in a statement made by Alao
Aka-Bashorun, president of the Nigerian Bar Association, who observed
that "in the 1940s and 1950s, anyone who joined the army was regarded as
one of a kind and even your parents detested your entry.
now have a new army.
(Onanuga 1989, 9-10).

I thought we

I am surprised that kind of army still exists"
Aka-Bashorun made the statement in the wake of a

court boycott by lawyers to protest the Nigerian military government’s
continuous disregard for established judicial processes and the
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detention without trail of the prominent Nigerian lawyer, Chief Gani
Fawehi nmi.
When confronted with distrust and hostility by the civilian
population, soldiers are apt to seek refuge in the barracks and other
military facilities.

As a result of their common experiences,

notwithstanding the differences in ethnic backgrounds, soldiers have
often found solace and security in the company of other soldiers.
Within African armies, the friendship and understanding which develops
from close and continuous association with soldiers from other ethnic
backgrounds can reduce the misconceptions which have so often been the
cause of ethnic intolerance in many African societies.

Consequently,

soldiers may be the best equipped to deal with the issues of ethnic and
cultural fragmentation that is at the root of many of the continent’s
problems.
Yet, there are some significant negative aspects of military rule.
A major problem with military rule has to do with the fact that power is
usually concentrated in the hands of a few members of the military
junta.

This situation does not allow for honest expressions of opinion.

As Herbert Tingsten (1965, 86-87) wrote, "concentration of power of
itself breeds a desire to satisfy those who control the power....

On

the one hand, the desire to please— and the fear of displeasing— those
who hold power become motivating forces that undermine independent
formation of opinion."
Although this condition is not peculiar to military regimes,
African military regimes have proven to be much more adept than civilian
ones in suppressing opposing opinions.

Consequently, the ability of
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ordinary citizens to express their views to their rulers is more
severely constrained under military regimes.

For example, some civilian

commissioners in the former IJestern Nigerian military government of
Brigadier Adebayo mentioned how "little people" were afraid to go and
see military officers because they had to go past a series of soldiers
with guns (Bienen 1978, 206).

This results in a unidirectional flow of

communication from the top down.

Where the flow of information from the

common person to the central policy-making body is poor or nonexistent,
the capacity of government to address important issues is limited.
can have negative social and economic consequences.

This

Such was the case

in Nigeria, for example where the military’s ignorance of, and
insensitivity to local demands regarding tax collection resulted in
widespread rioting in 1968 (Bienen 1978, 209).
Another negative aspect of military rule is the fact that the
military lacks leadership skills in bargaining and political
communication that are required for sustained political leadership.
This limitation is a consequence of the absence of a tradition for
dealing with people outside the military (Janowitz 1977,

109).

The

absence of regular contacts with persons outside the central policy
making bodies means that there is little or no external input into the
policy-making process.

This lack of input or feedback from the

population often results in the mismanagement of available resources.
Because military rulers rarely have sufficient knowledge of the needs of
the various sectors in the society, resources are often misappropriated.
To be sure, there are other reasons why the resources of African states
are often misappropriated,

including the avariciousness of military and
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civilian leaders as well.

Thus? the military’s ignorance of the needs

of the various sector of society often tends to aggravate an already
serious condition.
Under military regimes? there is an unhealthy tendency towards
tyrannical action.

Upon assuming power? the military immediately? and

often successfully? eliminates those participatory mechanisms which are
characteristics of representative government.

They eliminate

legislatures? political parties and other forms of organizations which
might challenge their authority.
regimes are well known:

The public hardships under military

liberty is suppressed; labor is regimented and

exploited; personal choice is severely restricted; and any opposition is
often violently suppressed.

Mass arrests? seizures of property and

death by firing squad are standard procedures for destroying opposition?
both real and imagined.
Military regimes are also associated with central planning? which
often is also incompatible with political liberty.

This means that the

state makes most of the decisions regarding what shall be produced and
consumed.

The government also decides which areas are to have priority

(manufacturing or agriculture? defense or education).

Here again? lack

of knowledge of what needs to be done can hinder the process of economic
development.

Although central planning may sometimes prove to be

necessary to promote development in Africa? there is always the danger
of too much control and overregulation.

Too much control can inhibit

creative initiatives which are also necessary to stimulate development..
Furthermore? the creation of regulatory agencies to oversee policy
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implementation not only increases the size of an already swollen African
bureaucracy but also creates new opportunities for corruption.

Some Consequences of Regime Type on Public Policy
Africa is a vast continent.

Considerable variation exists, for

example, between East and West Africa (not to speak of North Africa).
Consequently, any generalizations derived from a limited segment of the
African experience will require further testing under different
conditions.

Thus, although a number of hypotheses will be advanced, the

verification of these hypotheses is not the primary concern of this
study.

The hypotheses are essentially working hypotheses, to be used to

set the parameters within which a comparison of military and civilian
regime performance in Africa may be undertaken.

Policy Outputs
It is generally accepted that the countries of sub-Saharan Africa
have chosen the goal of socioeconomic development.

To this end, African

regimes have adopted several strategies which are best manifested in
their public policies.

Given the different characteristics associated

with African military and civilian regimes, some hypotheses regarding
regime effect on public policy may be articulated.
In the less developed societies of sub-Saharan Africa, the ability
of the state to fund every important project is very limited.
Consequently, there must be budgetary "trade-offs" and, in the
competition for scarce resources, there is a tendency for rulers to
respond first to the needs of their primary constituency before
allocating funds to other sectors.

Thus it can be hypothesized that:
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H ,:

Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where
the military controls the policy-making institutions
than in those where they do not.

Exceptionally high percentages of defense spending should
precipitate low percentages of social and economic expenditure.
Consequently it can also be hypothesized that.
Hg:

Military rule will be negatively correlated with
variables indicating budgetary allocations to economic
and social sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the
opposite effect.

From the foregoing hypotheses a general hypothesis regarding
regime effect on public policy may be articulated, as follows:
Hg;

Within any given African country, changes in regime
type should be associated with shifts in the pattern of
spending priorities exhibited by that country.

Although the notion of budgetary "trade-offs"

is present in every

society and under all regime types, in Africa, with its very limited
resources, government budgetary decisions can often be a 1ife-and-death
issue.
For example, as hundreds of thousands perished from the famine of
1983-1985, the Ethiopian Dergue allocated few resources to the Relief
and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) relative to the efforts they were
putting into other concerns of the regime, such as the build-up of the
largest army in Africa and the of training "vanguard cadres" in Marxism
and Leninism (Legum 1986, 215).

Furthermore,

in September of 1984, at

the height of the drought crisis, the same government spent about $45
million for celebrations marking the occasion of the tenth anniversary
of its revolution and the creation of the Ethiopian Workers' Party.

All

Ethiopian ministries also contributed one-tenth of their annual budgets
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toward the costs of preparing for the celebration (Shepherd 1905, 51-

54 ).
Although there are other forces at work, the spending priorities
of a regime does have a significant impact on policy outcomes and the
socioeconomic development of a country.

Policy Outcomes
Africa is faced with severe social and economic crisis.

Among

these, one has to include the crisis associated with dependency or
"unequal

interdependence,” such as the servicing of African debt.

This

has led to the preposterous situation in which financial outflows from
Africa have been greater than its inflows.

There is the additional

problem of the increasing difficulties caused by low commodity prices
for countries which are mainly suppliers of raw materials in the world
market (Whiteman 1909, A0-A2).

African societies also have the problems

of droughts, food shortages, and population pressures.

Often these

problems are of such magnitude that even moderate rates of economic
growth are not sufficient to satisfy the demands of the rapidly
increasing population.
Over the years, different policies have been promulgated in
efforts to solve such problems.

African regimes have adopted a variety

of policy measures in the hope of achieving the desired outcome:
sustainable level of significant economic development.

a

Given the

differences in the qualities of African regime types already identified,
what regime type is best qualified to improve the prospects for African
development?
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Some theorists, using a rationalist model, have observed that all
politicians seek to manage the economy so as to ensure their reelection.
Citizens are also inclined to vote for the benefits of government
spending programs, but they are opposed to the taxes necessary to
support such programs. These and other premises have been used to
explain why civilian regimes (democratic ones in particular) encourage
bigger governments, higher deficits, and more inflation (Borcherding
1977; Brittan 1979; Buchanan and Wagner 1977).

Thus, it is sometimes

suggested that civilian regimes tend to stifle economic development in
the newly-emerging nations of Africa.

On the other hand, military

regimes seem well-qualified to initiate and enforce necessary but
unpopular policies.

According to Irving Horowitz

(1975, 308), there is

a strong "functional" correlation between the coercive mechanisms that a
state can bring to bear on its citizenry and the ability to produce high
economic development.

Given this theoretical orientation,

it seems

reasonable to advance another general hypothesis.
H4:

Socioeconomic development in the emerging nations of
sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to occur under
military led regimes that are predisposed to
modernization than under regimes headed by civilians
who are similarly predisposed.

Data and Methods
In order to evaluate effectively the performance of the military
as governors,

it is necessary that their performance be compared to

those of civilian administrators who have preceded and succeeded them.
Thus,

in the chapters that follow, the performance of civilian and

military regimes in selected sub-Saharan African countries will be
evaluated along a range of major policy dimensions.
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Two methodological ajpproaches will be used to evaluate these
performances of the two regime types:

quantitative and case studies.

Both methodologies will be employed because each makes a unique and
valuable contribution in our effort to answer the question regarding the
impact of regime type on public policy.

For example,

the case study

approach often does not allow for generalizations but tends "to be very
sensitive to human agency and social processes in general"
35-51, 70).

(Ragin 1987,

On the other hand, by allowing researchers to study more

than a handful of countries at a time, the quantitative approach allows
for generalizations, but it does not reveal the underlying and
particular factors which make for specific policy outputs and outcomes.
Furthermore, the usefulness of the quantitative approach is heavily
dependent upon the reliability of available data.

And, as is well

known, data collected in developing nations, especially African states,
are often extremely unreliable.

For this reason, the validity of some

of the quantitative analyses on regime performance has been questioned.
For example, the methodology used in large cross-national studies,
including those by McKinlay and Cohan (1975) and Jackman (1976) has been
criticized for failing to consider important variables, such as a
nation's natural resources,
location.

infrastructure, size, or geographical

Instead, these studies often depend almost exclusively on the

overall economic and statistical
investigation (Janowitz,

indicators of the countries under

1977).

On the limitations of quantitative analysis of military regime
performance in Africa, Bienen (1978, 15) writes:
There may be military characteristics, responses,
orientations, and patterns of decision making that do not
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show up in cross-national analysesThat is we may be able
to capture some elements of military rule in Africa that are
consequential? but we may not be able to see these elements
in every case of African military rule? and we may not be
able to see them via aggregate data such as growth rates?
GNP, rate of urbanization? and literacy.
Therefore?

in order to overcome such shortcomings? both approaches will

be employed.
of the other.

It is expected that one approach should check the biases
As Bunce put it? "by combining these two approaches? we

can speak about processes? correlations? and causes? and be more
confident in drawing concrete conclusions about the role of succession
in generating policy innovation"

(1981? 39).

Yet it is also recognized

that using both methodologies raises the possibility that the results of
the two dissimilar approaches may be irreconcilable (Ragin 1987, 70).
To be sure? the present study has a number of limitations.
shortcoming is the reliance upon only two African regime types.

One
In

reality of course? there are several species of African military and
civilian regimes (Linz 1975; Nordlinger 1977; Bienen 1978).

Another

possible objection to the approach being employed in this study is that
two regime types (and three categories of political systems) utilized
are too few to portray African political reality in a satisfactory
fashion.

For example? within African civilian systems there has been a

great deal of variability in the influence of the military.

There is

the low end of the scale in Gambia— illustrating civilian regimes where
the political influence of the military is negligible— to the upper end,
where military elites have played major roles in determining the
outcomes of political struggles (Kenya).
African military regimes also vary according to the degree of
civilian involvement in the making of public policy (Bienen 1978? 11).
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Thus to group together as civilian regimes multiparty systems, single
party systems and monarchies on the one hand, and such military regimes
as Idi Amin’s Uganda, Mobutu’s Zaire, Gowon’s Nigeria and Rawlings’
Ghana, on the other hand, distorts political reality.

At the same time,

if every possible form of African military and civilian regime were
considered here, then the variables would become too numerous and
confusing to deal with systematically.
Another problem inherent in this study is the use of data that, as
has already been observed,
extremely unreliable.

in the African setting are sometimes

Consequently, the validity of the findings

produced by the quantitative section may be open to question.
Finally,

like most studies of this genre, the present work cannot

"prove" that specific policy outputs and outcomes are a direct
consequences of a particular regime type.

Too many other variables may

intervene between regime decision-making and socioeconomic outcomes for
this to be possible.

For example,

irrespective of regime type, the oil

crisis of the mid-1970s influenced public policy-making and outcomes in
Africa and other regions.

Thus we cannot expect regime type alone to

explain all of the variance in policy outputs and outcomes.
Nevertheless, by combining these two methodologies, this study
will provide evidence that there is some causal relationship between
regime type and public policy.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings

identified above, the study should also make a meaningful contribution
to the literature of comparative regime performance and public policy.
At least, it should yield some useful insights into the political
systems of sub-Saharan Africa.

For instance, by ranking regime
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effectiveness, we should be able to discern if later military or
civilian regimes have

learned

anything from their predecessors.

it may

be that

measures of regime expenditure priorities

and of gross domestic

product

are not the most useful

military and civilian

regime differences.

However,

indicatorsof

Analysis of aggregate data

may show that military and civilian regimes cannot be differentiated by
their effects on socioeconomic variables (Mckinlay and Cohan 1975;
Jackman 1976).

Thus, Bienen (1978), suggests that it may be more

fruitful to look for regime differences in the decision-making process.
This would entail analyzing patterns of deliberation, representation,
and pronouncement in civilian and military regimes.

Looking at the

decision-making process would also involve looking at how policies are
implemented.

As Bienen (1978) concluded, observing these processes

"should differentiate between military regimes or between some military
regimes and some civilian regimes"

(Bienen 1978, 195-96).

The case

studies should provide for this by providing us with insights into the
way political decisions are made and enabling us to discern the links
between the rulers and the population.

Relevant Countries
By the late 1980s, more than one-half of the nations in
sub-Saharan Africa were governed by military regimes.
experienced both civilian and military leadership.

All of them have

For the purposes of

this dissertation three sets of nations will be considered.

Data for

the quantitative section will be derived from the following two groups
of 36 and 21 countries respectively:

BE
Group 1
Benin? Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, The Congo, Cote d ’Ivoire, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire,
Zambia and Zimbabwe
Group B
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic,
Chad, The Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Uganda.
The first group of countries encompasses the majority of subSaharan African countries that have been independent for at least five
years.

They include countries that have had only civilian regimes or

only military regimes or both.

The second group includes only those

countries that have experienced significant periods of both civilian and
mi 1i tary rule.
For the case study approach, the focus will be centered on three
nations:

Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia.

A primary reason for choosing

these nations to provide more detailed information is because of the
availability of relevant documentary material, including economic data.
Another reason is that, like several other African states, they have all
had durable civilian and military regimes.

The durability of a regime

is an important criterion for inclusion, because a regime in power for
only a short time can do little to introduce lasting changes; at the
very least, a short lived-regime is unable to put its own policies into
effect.

Consequently, only countries in which successive military and

civilian regimes have lasted for at least four years (the same as the
presidential

term in the United States) were selected for case studies.
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The availability of relevant source materials,

including economic data,

also made these particular nations attractive subjects of .
This study will concentrate upon a comparison between regimes
within the same countries rather than across countries.

Thus, the

pitfalls associated with neglecting important environmental variables
will be avoided (e.g., population, and size).
However, this approach does risk some pitfalls of its own.
example,

For

it suffers from a shortcoming common to a majority of aggregate

research of this genre.

It does not adequately account for the

inclusion of military officers in civilian-led governments, or of
civilians in military governments.

Even when it does not formally hold

the reins of power, for example, the military may have a great deal of
influence upon policy formulation and implementation (as in the United
States and the Soviet Union).

On the other hand, in some Third World

states, there are military regimes that do not have much influence
outside the capital city and a few towns (Bienen 1983, 8).
Another limitation with the present study is that the quantitative
section does not recognize civil wars and international conflicts
experienced by the countries under examination.

Civil wars and

international conflicts obviously affect regime performance in a variety
of ways.

For example, civil wars in Nigeria, Chad and Ethiopia resulted

in substantial

increases in defense spending and a corresponding decline

in the provision of social services in Chad and Ethiopia.

Where

applicable, the impact of environmental factors on public policy outputs
or outcomes will be noted, and the direction of their influence
analyzed.

8^

Policy Areas
Almost without exception* military coup leaders in Africa declare
that their actions are necessitated by the need to "save" their nation
from economic and social catastrophe.

Different military-led regimes

adopt different policy strategies in their efforts to reverse what they
perceive as negative socioeconomic trends and to achieve a sustainable
level of development.

Leaders of sub-Saharan African countries often

define their development goals primarily in economic terms.
goals frequently are:

Specific

an increase in the gross national product,

greater exploitation of natural resources (increasing agricultural
productivity, oil production, production of hydroelectric power, etc.).
In the attempt to promote national development, social issues and needs,
such as health and education, are sometimes likely to be subordinated to
economic questions.

Health and education are often viewed as

concomitants of economic development, especially in countries that are
plagued by endemic, disabling diseases or where there is a critical
shortage of technical personnel.

In response tD these socioeconomic

problems, programs of public health and expanded educational effort are
often initiated.
For the quantitative section of this study only policy instruments
which can be compared across time and across nations will be utilized.
One such instrument is the national budget.

Budgetary priorities of

alternating civilian and military regimes in each country will be
analyzed in an effort to discern changes in policy outputs.

The major

justification for looking at budgets is that they are the major
indicators of governments’ plans.

As Boulding (1966) indicates, "The
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budget seems to be the prime expression of political decisions..."
(cited in Bunce 1981> 47).

To determine regime performance in terms of

the outcomes of the policies it proclaims, five separate areas will be
analyzed.

The first area is economic growth; the second is agricultural

production; the third is industrial production; the fourth is defense
expenditure; and the fifth is social welfare (education and health).
In the case study portion of this study, as already noted, three
cases will be selected for evaluation.

For each of the three countries,

an in-depth case study focusing on a public policy issue of major
significance for that country will be undertaken.
section, regime performance will be evaluated,

In the case studies

in large part, in

accordance with the goals and objectives adopted by the respective
civilian and military rulers themselves.

This approach will make

possible the determination of regime effectiveness,

initially in

relation to the generalizable criteria (e.g., those that social
scientists select as being intrinsically desirable— health, education
and welfare), and finally in relation to the regime’s ability to achieve
its own specified goals (Rothchild 1980, 459-79).
Policy issues to be examined will include those that successive
administrations— civilian and military— in each country have had to
address.

For example, the issue of indigenous control of the Nigerian

economy is one that successive Nigerian administrations have grappled
with.

Different administrations have held different views on how much

foreign investment should be allowed, what sectors of the economy should
be reserved for indigenous investors, whether or not to nationalize
industry, and related questions.

In pursuit of its goals, each
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administration has adopted special policy strategies.

These policies

and their outcomes will be the focus of the chapter on economic and
industrial policy in Nigeria.
Agriculture is the principle sector of Ghana’s economy, accounting
for over one-third of GDP and employing over 60 percent of the working
population.

Over the past two decades agricultural output in Ghana has

steadily declined.

In the 1980s, this decline was exacerbated by

drought, bush fires and smuggling.

Consequently, agriculture in time

became a major focus of successive Ghanaian administrations since
independence, through three military and three civilian regimes.
Agriculture will, therefore, be the central concern of the chapter on
Ghana.
The only country south of the Sahara not to have been colonized is
Liberia.

Since its establishment as a settlement for freed slaves

Liberia has had very close relations with the United States.

This

relationship with the United States tends to be at the center of many of
activities in which successive Liberian governments have been involved.
Thus in the chapter on Liberia, government policies as they relate to
foreign affairs will be examined and foreign trade patterns will be
evaluated.

Regime Evaluation
"Does it make a difference for a country to be governed by
civilians or military officers?"

If it does "make a difference" what

kind of difference does it make?

"Which regime type will be most

effective in dealing with the developmental problems of African
countries?"

The main criterion of "effectiveness" is the ability of
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leaders to identify issues of concern and to implement consistent and
effective policies in response.

Also of importance will be their

ability to achieve those goals that they set for themselves at the
outset of their stewardship.

In addition to the above, measurable

improvements or decline in the relevant economic and social indicators—
GDP, agricultural and industrial outputs, education and health— will be
analyzed to determine differences in regime performance.

Conclusion
In a recent book on comparative public policy research in Europe
and America, Heidenheimer, Heclo and Adams (1983, 1-2) wrote:
These everyday comparisons of public policies have one
important thing in common with more systematic, academic
efforts at comparative policy analysis.
Both informal and
formal approaches seek a deeper understanding than could be
gained by looking at only one thing at a time.
By assessing
one situation against another, we gain fuller perspective of
both options and constraints....
While informal comparisons
generally serve some personal end, the academic study of
comparative public policy has a broader agenda.
One aim of
this agenda is to learn why some governments seem to fare
better than others at coping with similar problems.
This is precisely the objective of this study.

By employing both

quantitative and case study approaches it is hoped that we will not only
be able to identify the most effective regime type, but also gain, via
the case study approach, a deeper understanding of government
institutions and political processes in sub-Saharan Africa.

Endnotes

According to Nordlinger military regimes can be categorized
according to the degree of the a rmy’s involvement in politics.
Military moderators
intervene to settle disputes among civilian
political
leaders, and exercise a veto power over major public
policy decisions, without
taking actual
control of government
themselves.
"They apply pressure on civilian incumbents with
threats of a coup.
When moderator
actions fail to achieve the
desired objectives,
then military officers often take control
themselves.
When this happens, the military officers are said to
be Praetorian Guardians.
Military guardians are primarily
concerned with correcting
the malpractices and deficiencies of
their civilian predecessors.
They usually stay in power for a
brief period.
Praetorian Rulers represent a third category of
military regimes.
They take direct control of the government with
the express intention of making far-reaching changes that will
take a considerable amount of time.
They are the most intolerant
of opposition (Nordlinger 1977, 21-27).
The Guardian, 29 June 1989.

Chapter Three
REGIME PERFORMANCE:

A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

In the comparative study of regime performance in sub-Saharan
Africa? two different questions can be asked about the consequences of
civilian and military rule.
each regime type?

First what are the budgetary priorities of

Are there? for example? any significant differences

between regimes in the way in which they allocate public funds to the
various sectors of the society?

Second? what are the socioeconomic

consequences of the governance of each regime type?

Does any regime

type exhibit a superior capacity to provide effective leadership for
African countries striving for rapid economic development?

An attempt

to answer these questions is the central task of this and the next three
chapters.
The specific purpose of this chapter is to explore variations in
the performance of military and civilian rulers in sub-Saharan Africa.
Using generalizable standards of measurement?

I will compare military

and civilian regime performance as it relates to their effectiveness in
attaining multiple goals at relatively low cost.

The quantitative

results relating to the impact of regime type on budgetary allocations
and economic performance will be presented in terms of outcomes in six
policy areas:

economic growth? agricultural production?

production? education? health? and defense expenditures.

industrial
This will be

followed by a discussion of the linkages involved.
Attention in this chapter will be focused on 36 sub-Saharan
African countries (see Table 8.1).

Wherever possible? an effort will be

made to include information on as broad a range of countries as
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possible, while looking in much greater detail at a few selected
countries:

Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan,

Tan 2 ania, Togo, Uganda and Zaire.

The rationale for this selection is

based on economic, political and historical factors.

The geographic

location of the countries and the availability of data were also very
important determinants for their inclusion.

With regard to policy

outputs, particular attention will be paid to budgetary allocations for
defense, education and health, and to policy outcomes as they relate to
GDP, agriculture and manufacturing.

Methodological Considerations
The methods of analysis employed in this section have been
determined by the comparative and longitudinal data available.

However,

as pointed out in the preceding chapter, although greatly improved over
the past few years, available data on African systems still lack the
reliability needed to permit the establishment of cause-and-effect
relationships with great confidence.
With the caveat concerning the unreliability of available data,

I

will nevertheless attempt to evaluate regime performance in sub-Saharan
Africa.

Empirical evaluation of political and economic performance in

African countries needs to be conducted by contemporary political
scientists.

If, for no other reason, such studies can serve as

foundations upon which future research, using improved data, can be
based.

Furthermore, as Sarkensian (1978, 21-22) noted, "the available

data are useful, if for no other purpose than to examine current
tendencies and notions about African regimes."

However, as noted above,

the outcome of contemporary empirical research undertakings that employ
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these data, including this effort, should be interpreted with particular
caution.

With the proper caveats, studying these questions is better

than not studying them at all!

Research Design
Almost all quantitative studies of comparative regime performance
in Africa have employed cross-national data (Nordlinger 1970; McKinlay
and Cohan 1975).

Cross-national analysis can be very limiting and can

distort empirical findings, because it employs data from a variety of
countries and therefore examines different situations of regime
performance.

Cross-national studies thus cannot accommodate important

economic, social, historical and geographical constraints unique to subSaharan African countries.

A useful quantitative study, therefore, must

include single-country data that capture trends over time.
The multiple interrupted time-series (HITS) design is an ideal way
to evaluate trends within a single country.
discussed and developed by Campbell
(1979).

This is a procedure

(1969) and Campbell and Cook

It has been employed in comparative policy evaluations by

Lewis-Beck and Alford (1980), Bunce (1981), Garand (1985) and Cohen
(1985).

This method of analysis is particularly useful for this study

because it features an alternating independent variable (regime type in
this instance) and a continuous dependent variable (budgetary
expenditure, and economic growth).
18) observed,

Furthermore, as Caporaso (1973, 17-

interrupted time series analysis:

is appropriate to data distributed over time...and where
there is theoretical reason to believe that some event
should cause a change in the behavior of the series.
The
key question involved in this design is whether the
occurrence of the events in question had an effect or
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whether the behavior of the series after the events
represents an undisturbed continuation of the series from
its previous state....
Twd questions are involved.
Did a
non-random change occur in the vicinity of the experiment?
Is this change attributable to the occurrence of the
experimental event? (quoted in Bunce 1981, 51).
While the interrupted time series design is an improvement over
the usual method of analyzing African regime performance,

it is, not by

itself, sufficient to rule out any plausible rival hypothesis.

The

refutation or confirmation of any hypothesis is more likely to be
expedited when all relevant and accessible data are employed.
requires the introduction of a control group.
Campbell and Laurence Ross (1970,

110-25),

This

According to Donald

in a quasi-experimentation

(such as this), even a nonequivalent control group is helpful.

The

control group "provides the only control for history (for those
extraneous change agents that would be expected to affect both the
experimental and control group), and assists in controlling maturation,
testing and instrumentation"

(Campbell and Ross 1970, 110-25).

The key point is that changes in outputs associated with regime
change could be due to other factors not in the model.
confident in o n e ’s findings if:

One can be more

(1) one includes control variables, and

the regime change coefficients continue to suggest the same effect; or
(2) one includes control nations that did not undergo a regime change.
Because control variables are not readily available,

I have opted for

the second approach.
The control group in this study will be made up of nations which
did not undergo regime change.

Individual nations from the control

group will be matched with individual nations from the experimental
group (i.e., nations that have experienced significant periods of

civilian and military rule), and using a "comparative" interrupted time
series design, a determination will be made as to the impact of regime
type on public policy.

The comparative interrupted time series entails

the same process as the single interrupted time series analysis, only
that in this instance the interruption in a nation in the control group
is simulated to resemble the actual interruption in its matching nation
in the experimental group.

The hypothesis of an impact of regime change

on public policy would be supported if there is an effect in the
experimental nation and no effect on the control nation.
However, due to the lack of sufficient longitudinal data for most
of the nations under examination, this model can be used to evaluate
regime performance in only a handful of the countries under study.

In

order to evaluate regime performance in all the countries, two
additional methods of analysis will be employed.

These are "simple

country" analysis of differences of means and "pooled" analysis.
In the first instance (simple country analysis), the mean changes
in the various indicators of policy outputs and outcomes for civilian
and military regimes in individual sub-Saharan African countries (for
which data is available) will be evaluated.
with a pooled analysis,

This will be complimented

in which the mean changes in the various

indicators of policy outputs and outcomes for the two regime types are
compared across all sub-Saharan African countries grouped together.

A

MITS design will then be employed to evaluate regime performance in the
six countries for which sufficient longitudinal data are available.

94
Data and Operationalization of Concepts
Data for regime expenditure priorities are available from a
variety of reliable sources.

However, the public expenditure data for

this study are derived from two major sources— UN Statistical Yearbook,
and IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook.

The primary source of

data for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS).

Data for agricultural and industrial

production are derived from UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics.
As I have indicated, few nations in Africa have truly reliable
data.

There are cases were data are not available for several years at

a time.

A few nations are excluded from this study primarily because

they lacked sufficient data to permit a satisfactory analysis of regime
performance.
And, as I indicated in the preceding chapter, a slightly modified
version of a typology of African political systems developed by BergSchlosser will be used to determine regime type (see Table 2.1).
briefly, military regimes will

Stated

include all those political systems in

which members of the armed forces occupy key government positions
(including that of head of government), and openly dictate national
policy.

All those systems which are headed by nonmilitary officials and

where military-dictated priorities do not dominate national policies
will be classified as civilian regimes (included in this group are the
dynastic regimes of Swaziland and Ethiopia).
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Policy Outputs
In Chapter Two, it was stated that the examination of the national
budget is one of the best ways of comparing quantitatively the policy
priorities of different regime types.

The budgetary priorities of a

regime are effective indicators of how much importance the regime
attaches to competing government programs.
One way of measuring a regime’s budgetary priorities would be to
examine the levels of total budgetary expenditure as well as
expenditure in each socioeconomic category (e.g., health and education)
every year throughout the life of the regime.
although useful for some types of analyses,
case.

However, such a measure,

is not so useful

in this

As I indicated to in the preceding chapter, the process of

budgetary allocations involves choices from among competing expenditure
claimants as to which is to receive scarce public funds.

The concept of

priority assumes a rank ordering of alternative actions and the
willingness of the decision-maker to select one alternative on the basis
of that rank ordering.

In a budgetary sense, this involves either

shifting relative shares of the budgetary pie for alternative spending
areas so that they coincide with the regime’s relative priorities.
Consequently, this study measures a regime’s spending priorities in
terms of the relative GDP shares (i.e., as a proportion of GDP at time
t) for total spending and for spending on health and education.

For

example, education priorities are measured by dividing education
expenditure by GDP.

This method of measuring the budgetary priorities

of the different regime types also helps to eliminate the impact of
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inflationary pressures on the actual dollar amount (or local currency)
spent in the various budgetary categories.

Policy Outcomes
The most commonly used generalizable standard of measuring regime
performance is economic productivity.

For this study, total output,

manufacturing output, and agricultural output are used to evaluate
regime performance.

In keeping with other studies which have employed

interrupted time-series analyses in international political economy
(Chase-Dunn, Pallas and Kenter 19B2, 391-56; Cohen 1985, 183-336), this
study measures total economic productivity as total GDP at. constant 1980
prices.

Manufacturing output is measured as GDP accounted for by

manufacturing activities, while agricultural productivity is measured as
the GDP accounted for by agricultural enterprises.

Statistical Model:

Multiple Interrupted Time Series (MITS)

HITS is conceptually equivalent to running separate regressions
for each time period separated by the interventions and determining
changes in the behavior of the time series caused by specific
interventions from one time period to the next.

In this instance it is

suggested that regime alternations in control of government can be
viewed as interventions in the process within which policy is
determined. The impact of regime alternation on policy outputs over time
(measured by budgetary outlays) can be evaluated by using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression to estimate the following equation for each of
three areas of expenditure (education, health and defense)*:
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COUNTER + bg DUMMY xt + bg COUNTxt +

+ bn.j DUMMY xt + b n COUNT);t + e t

Cl]

where EXPSHARE^e = the share of total expenditure for spending area e
at time t; COUNTER^

= a counter for each year t from 1960 to 1985, coded

from 1 (1960) to 26 (1985); DUMMYy^= a dummy variable for regime
transition years, coded 0 for observations before intervention year x
and 1 thereafter; C0UIMTxf= a counter variable for regime transition
years, coded 0 for observations before intervention year x and 1, 2,

3 , . . . for year x and after; bp = the intercept, or the level of the time
series prior to the initial regime change; bj = the slope of the time
series before the initial regime change;

b^ b g». ..bn_j, and bn = the

parameters to be estimated, representing respectively and alternatively
the shift in the intercept and the slope of the series associated with
regime alternation; e^ = a randomly distributed error term for each year
t.
In order to evaluate the impact of regime alternation on the level
and/or slope, the parameter estimates of each dummy variable (evennumbered coefficients) and counter variable (odd-numbered coefficients)
respectively, will be examined.

The value of the coefficients for the

dummy variables indicates the difference between the observed intercept
term for each post-transition period and the intercept expected given
the previous (preshift) pattern of expenditure outlays.

Coefficients

for the counter variables indicate the change in the slope of the
regression brought about by regime change.

In order to determine the

slope for the post transition period, the parameter estimate for the
counter associated with the regime change is added to the sum of all
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previous coefficients.

If the coefficients for the dummy and/or counter

variables are statistically significant (e.g.? at the .05 or .10
levels), it can be inferred that regime change does have a significant
impact on the height and/or slope of the time series.

Model Estimation
The above model will be estimated separately for each output
category,

including spending priorities in total and in each spending

area (education, health and defense).

Using the same procedure, the

above equation C13 will be estimated separately for each dependent
outcome variable (i.e., industrial production, and agricultural
production).

For every dependent variable, each of the six countries

for which sufficient data is available (at least 15 years) will be
analyzed separately.
Using this procedure,

if the series between 1960 and 1985 for

Nigeria is analyzed and the slope (e.g., industrial production) after
1966 is positive and the same slope after 1980 is negative it can be
inferred that the military regimes <1966-1975 and 1975-1979) performed
better than their civilian predecessor (1960-1966) and successor
(1979-1983).

However, making such an inference may not be entirely

proper since both regime types were not operating under similar
environmental conditions.
international environment.

Of particular significance is the
It has been argued that contractions and

expansions in the world market can and does influence the performance of
a country’s domestic economy (Kaufman 1969, 828-53).

If this is so,

findings derived from comparisons between civilian and military regimes
within a single country would be of questionable validity.

More
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dependable findings would require the use the aforementioned comparative
multiple interrupted time series design.
Candidates for this procedure in sub-Saharan Africa are very few.
The best candidates in the region are:
Sudan and Zaire;

(1) Ethiopia and Kenya;

(2)

(3) Togo and Malawi; and (4) Uganda and Tanzania.

During the period covered by this study, Kenya (civilian), Malawi
(civilian), Tanzania (civilian) and Zaire (military) have been governed
by one regime type, since there has been no alternation between civilian
and military rulers.

Thus, for the purpose of this analysis these four

countries may be viewed as the "control group."

The four pairs of

countries provide a useful test for cross-national regime performance
since they have relatively homogeneous socioeconomic characteristics
but, have often been different in regime characteristics.

To be sure,

there are socioeconomic differences among these nations, but the
differences are less than those of other groups of nations often used in
comparative analysis, such as the nations along the west coast of
Africa.
As indicated above, for those countries with inadequate data, the
mean changes in expenditure patterns from one regime type to another
will be evaluated.

While the use of these three methods of analysis by

no means eliminates the limitations imposed by unreliable data and
inadequate controls for some intervening factors,

it may encourage some

confidence in the findings should they prove consistent over the three
methods of analysis.
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Table 3.1
Description of Variables

VARIABLE NAME

DESCRIPTION

GDP
GDP80
CGDP80
PSPEND
PHEALTH
PEDUC
PDEFEN
PMAN
PAGRIC

Gross Domestic Product
Gross Domestic Product at constant 1980 prices
Percentage of change in GDP80
Total budgetary expenditure as a proportion of GDP
Expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP
Expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP
Expenditure on defense as a proportion of GDP
Percentage of contribution of manufacturing to GDP
Percentage contribution of agriculture to GDP
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Some Results from "Simple Country" and "Pooled" Analyses
Since the mid-1970s successive governments in many African
countries have sought external assistance in their efforts to stimulate
economic growth in their respective countries.
external

In order to secure

loans* the governments of these countries have generally been

required to adopt IMF and World Bank-recommended structural adjustment
programs.

A central feature of these programs is the requirement that

public spending be severely curtailed.

As was suggested in the

preceding chapter, through the use of coercion, the military may be
better able to execute the kind of austerity that is often demanded by
IMF programs (The typical austerity budget often include the removal of
subsidies on such important items as food, housing and transportation).
Although some military regimes have sought the support of the mass
public to maintain their hold on power (Nasser in Egypt, Rawlings in
Ghana and Sankara in Burkina Faso), the primary base of support for most
military regimes is the armed forces.

Consequently, a military regime

may feel no obligation to make allowance in the budget for more than the
barest economic essentials.

Conversely, because the survival of

civilian administrations requires the building of coalitions, and the
pacification of various constituent groups, civilian governments,
especially in multiparty states, are often reluctant to curb public
spending.

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that public spending will be

above average when civilians are in power and below the average when
soldiers are in power.

However, a glance at Table 3.S shows that this

argument cannot be sustained.
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Table 3.2
Total Budgetary Expenditure as a Proportion of the
Gross Domestic Product (PSPEND)

COUNTRY
Beni n
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
The Congo
Cote d ’Ivoire
Ethiopia
Gamb ia
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Liber ia
Madagascar
Maiawi
Maur itani a
Mauri tius
Ni ger
Niger ia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Rwanda
Sudan
Swazi land
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zai re
Zambia
Zimbabwe

MI LITARY(a )

Cl0ILIAN(a + b )

0.1563

--

--

0.3741
0.1438
0.2078
0.1887
0.2153
0.3055
0.1317
0.2732
0.2140
0.2240
0.3479
0.2223

0.1306
0.2222

-0.3034***

-0.253/**

-0.165'/*

--0.3686***
0.2125

-0.3593

-0.1547***
0.3 625

--o. 1 2 4 :/**
0.2006

--0.248/*
0.1396
0.3604

---

TOTAL
0.2175*
(All Nations C301 n=524)
*.05<prob.< .10
*!oi <prob .< .05
***prob.< .01
Civilian or Military only

-0.2591
0.2452
0.2396
0.1129
0.1589
0.2107
0.2213
0.0649
0.2085
0.2479
0.2326
0.1217
0.1667

-0.3280
0.3414
0.2320

t

--1.0860
-1.7498

--3.4111

--6.6501

--

Si g .

--0.2893
0.1236

-0.0025

-0.0001
—

2.2081

0.0370

---

---

-5.4388

---1.7825

--4.4468
-0.1699

---7.8205
0.6131

0.0001

--0.1179

-0.0004
0.8667

--0.0001
0.5464

---

---

-2.5038
1.3677

0.0202
0.1852

----

----

1.7368

0.0830
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Table 3.2 shows the mean public expenditure as a proportion of GDP
(PSPEND) under military and civilian regimes in those countries (n=13)
for which sufficient data are available.

As can been seen from this

table, there was no consistent pattern for PSPEND under either regime
types.

Only in seven of the countries were differences in the total

spending of regime types statistically significant.

In six of the seven

countries (Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda and Togo), PSPEND
under military administrations is significantly higher than it was under
civilian ones.

Only in Ghana was civilian rule associated with a

significantly higher PSPEND than it was under the military.

However,

although not statistically significant, PSPEND was also higher for
civilian regimes in Burkina Faso, Sudan and Uganda.

Furthermore, when

PSPEND under each regime type from all sub-Saharan African countries
(with sufficient data n=30), are pooled together, the results cast more
doubts on the argument that public expenditure is influenced by regime
type.
While the results for the simple country analysis appear to
suggest that public spending will tend to be higher under military
regimes, results of the pooled analysis suggests the opposite to be the
case.

As can be seen from Table 3.2 total PSPEND was approximately 22

percent under military regimes and S3 percent under civilian ones.
difference is statistically significant at the .10 level.
As I suggested in Chapter Two, the notion of budgetary "trade
offs" can be especially significant in sub-Saharan African countries
where resources are very limited.

In these countries, exceptionally

This
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high percentages of defense spending should precipitate low percentages
of social and economic expenditure.

Consequently,

I hypothesized that:

Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables
indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social
sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the opposite
effect.
The results reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are mixed.
example,

For

in the area of education and health services, only in three

countries (Ethiopia, Liberia, and Rwanda), were there any significant
differences between the budgetary priorities of the regime types.

In

each case, the proportion of GDP allocated to education (PEDUC) and
health (PHEALTH) was significantly more under military rule than it was
under civilian rule.

PEDUC was also significantly higher for military

regimes in Niger and Togo.

Can we then conclude that military rule

facilitates higher public expenditure on education and health?
results does not allow one to reach such a conclusion.

The

The results show

that PEDUC in three countries (Ghana, Sudan and Uganda), and PHEALTH in
seven countries (Table 3.3), were higher under civilian rule than they
were under military rule.

To be sure, the results were not

statistically significant.
It is also noteworthy that those countries in which the military
spent greater proportions of GDP on health and education, were also the
same countries in which military rulers allocated substantially higher
proportions of the GDP to public spending.

Thus the increases in

PHEALTH and PEDUC may simply be the outgrowth of the increases in the
overall public expenditure.

However, the results of the pooled analysis

provided some support for the aforementioned hypothesis.

The results

show that civilian regimes allocated more of the GDP to health and
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Table 3.3
Expenditure on Health as a Proportion of the
Gross Domestic Product (PHEALTH)

COUNTRY
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
The Congo
Cote d ’Ivoire
Ethiopi a
Gamb ia
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Mai awi
Mauri tania
Maur itius
Niger
Niger ia
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swaz iland
Tanzani a
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

MIL ITARY(a )
0.0147
-------

0.0092
0.0100
-------

0.0229

-0.0090***
-------

0.0116
-------------

0.0361***
0.0152
-------

0.0111
-------

0.0075
0.0069
0.0066***
-------------

0.0071
-------------

0.0132
0.0095
0.0168
-------------

TOTAL
0.0121***
(All Nations C303 n=474)
*.05<prob.< .10
*toi<prob.<.05
#11
prob.< .01
Civilian or Military only

CIVILIAN(a+b>
0.0156
0.0203
0.0079
0.0136
0.0080
-------

0.0123
0.0075
0.0194
0.0133
0.0156
0.0235
0.0167
-------

0.0149
0.0106
0.0219
0.0075
0.0078
0.0046
0.0123
0.0130
0.0103
0.0172
0.0144
0.0107
0.0120

-0.0223
0.0212
0.0151

t
0.3626
-------

-1.6634
2.1236
-------

---5.5025
-------

1.0100

Si g .
0.7223
-------

0.1135
0.1238
-------------

-0.0001
-------

0.3226

-------

-------

-------

-------

-5.9238
-------------

-0.3022
-------

0.1591
0.8103
-5.7754

0.0001
-------------

0.7823
-------

0.8771
0.4268
0.0001

-------

-------

-------

-------

1.6135

0.1216

-------

-------

-------

-------

-1.1026
1.0359

0.2821
0.3115

-------

-------

-------

-------

-------

—

4.3288

— —

0.0001
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Table 3.4
Expenditure on Education as a Proportion of the
Gross Domestic Product (PEDUC)

COUNTRY
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
The Congo
Cote d ’Ivoire
Eth iopi a
Gambia
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Li ber ia
Madagascar
Mai awi
Maur i tania
Maur it ius
Niger
Niger ia
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swaz i1and
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zai re
Zamb ia
Zimbabwe

MIL ITARY(a)
0.0367

-0.0224
0.0442

-0.0678

-0.025^**

-0.0328

--0.0559” *
0.0330

-0.0412

-0.0249***
0.0226
0.0261***

--0.0148

--0.0358**
0.0230
0.535

---

0.0320***
TOTAL
(All Nations [30] n=474)
*.05<prob.< .10
**01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
Civilian or Military only

CIVILIAN* a + b )
0.0299
0.0687
0.0218
0.0420
0.0242

-0.0597
0.0177
0.0297
0.0361
0.0379
0.0640
0.0299

-0.0331
0.0370
0.0375
0.0133
0.0215
0.0160
0.0381
0.0330
0.0174
0.0496
0.0317
0.0186
0.0241

4-

-3.5951

--0.2724
-0.2289

----4.6689

--

Si g .
0.1330

-0 . 783^
0.8337

---0.0008

--

0.8013

0.4308

---

---

-5.7095

---0.4055

--3.6868
-0.3401
-4.2727

0 . 0001
—
—

0.7123

-0.0050
0.7372
0.0007

---

---

1.2211

0.2356

---

---

-2.2990
0.3229

0.0314
0.7498

0.0478
0.0684

----

----

0.0366

2.8258

0.0049

--
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education than military regimes did, and the difference in both cases
are significant.
It has been argued persuasively (Nordlinger 1977, 64-67; Hiking
1883; Liebenow 1986, 240-50), and demonstrated practically (in Ghana,
Uganda and Liberia), that reductions in defense spending under civilian
regimes is a major cause of military intervention.

Consequently, with

regard to spending priorities, one would expect the greatest difference
between military and civilian regimes to be in the area of defense
appropriations.

The results reported in Table 3.5 provide moderate

support for the hypothesis that defense expenditure should be higher in
countries where the military controls the policy-making institutions
than in those where they do not.

In six of the ten countries in Table

3.7 (Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo and Uganda), military
regimes spent significantly higher proportions of their GDP on defense
(PDEFEN) than their civilian counterparts did.

The mean difference in

budgetary allocations to the defense sector were particularly pronounced
in Ethiopia, Liberia, and Nigeria where PDEFEN was more than twice as
much for military regimes as they were for civilian ones.
The results of the pooled analysis showed the impact of regime
type on PDEFEN to be significant, with all Sub-Saharan African military
regimes combined spending an average of 2.7 percent of GDP on defense,
while their civilian counterparts combined were spending only 1.9
percent of GDP (see the last row in Table 3.5).
With regard to policy outcomes, no consistent pattern is observed
for the sensitivity of all measures of policy outcomes (GDP,
manufacturing and agricultural productivity) to regime type.

For

loa
Table 3.5
Expenditure on Defense as a Proportion of the
Gross Domestic Product (PDEFEN)

COUNTRY
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
The Congo
Cote d ’Ivoire
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Maiawi
Mauritania
Mauri t ius
Niger
Ni ger ia
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swaz i1and
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

CIVILIANt a+b)

t

Sig.

0.016B

--

--

0.0278
0.0291
0.0243
0.0158
0.0354
0.0120
0.0238
0.0164
0.0200
0.0414
0.0101

---

---

1.3760
0.0431

0.1904
0.9684

----

----

MIL ITARY(a )

0.0221
0.0241

---0.0696***
0.0132

--0.0349***
0.0186

-0.1164

-0.0072
0.0357***
0.0179**

--0.0276

--0.021 Ef
0.0250*
0.0330

-—-

TOTAL
0.0275***
(All Nations C303 n=396)
*.05<prob.<.10
**.01 <prob. < .05
***prob.< -01
Civilian or Military only

-0.0154
0.0634
0.0056

-0.0121
0.0139
0.0227
0.0093
0.0323
0.0193
0.0364
0.0097
0.0173

-0.0133
0.0639
0.0199

-6.6415
1.1282

---7.6943

---0.8583

---4.5103
-2.5248

0.0001
0.2704

--0.0001

--0.4538

--0.0002
0.0233

---

---

0.8586

0.4004

---

---

-1.8289
-1.9272

----4.2658

0.0810
0.0670

---0.0001
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example,

in thirteen of the sixteen countries in Table 3.6, PMAN (i.e.,

contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP) is higher under
military regimes than under civilian ones.
significant in only six of the countries.

However, the differences are
The difference in PMAN is

also significant in Uganda, where the manufacturing sector contributes
nearly twice as much to GDP under civilian rule (10 percent)
military rule (6.6 percent).

than under

In the agricultural sector, the

contribution of agriculture to GDP (PA6RIC) is higher during periods of
military rule in only six of the same sixteen countries (see Table 3.7).
The results of the pooled analysis show that PMAN is higher under
civilian rule, whereas PAGRIC is higher under military rule.

Results of the Time Series Analysis
The results of the MITS are reported in Tables 3.8 to 3.13.

Like

the "simple country" and "pooled" analysis they show no clear pattern of
the effect of regime type on public policy.

Beginning with PSPEND, the

results show that the proportion of GDP going to spending prior to
initial

intervention ranged from approximately 10 percent for Liberia

(see Table 3.8) to 18 percent for Uganda (see Table 3.13).

For Sudan,

the only country with a military regime at the beginning of the initial
time series, the figure was 16.3 percent.

There was approximately a 0.8

percent shift per year in the rate of change over the initial time
period for the spending trend for the Sudan.

With the inauguration of a

civilian regime in the Sudan (see Table 3.11) in 1965 the DUMMY66
(intercept) coefficient was 0.0317 reflecting a short-term increase of
about three percent in the overall levels of time series after regime
change.

The coefficient of -0.0S07 associated with the slope shift in
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Table 3.6
Percentage of Contribution of Manufacturing
to Gross Domestic Product (PMAN)

COUNTRY
Beni n
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
The Congo
Cote d ’Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gamb ia
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritania
Maur itius
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swazi land
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

MILITARY(a )
0.0745

-0.1081
0.0779

-0.0711

--0.0951***

-0.0989
0.0109

--0.075^**
0.1681***

-0.0605***

-0.0535
0.0569
0.1430***

-0.0553
0.0874

--0.079E?
0.0659***
0.1086

---

TOTAL
0.0917
(All Nations C38J n=531)
*.05<prob.<.10
**01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
Civilian or Military only

CIVILIAN* a+b)
0.0677
0.0886
0.1048
0.0754
0.1808

-0.1074
0.0477
0.0778
0.0576
0.0894
0.0106
0.1175
0.0417
0.0507
0.0985
0.1006
0.0503
0.1486
0.0606
0.0583
0.0654
0.1883
0.0766
0.0846
0.1911
0.0876
0.0594
0.1001

--

t
-0.7948

--0.3813
-0.4808

-----3.6804

--0.5361
-0.3778

---3.0071
-6.7078

--3.3499

-0.9439
-1.1630
-4.8884

Sig.
0.4371

-0.7517
0.6405

----0.0018

-0.5993
0.7190

--0.0070
0.0001

-0.0085

-0.3655
0.8573
0.0008

--

--

1.5155
-0.1930

0.1461
0.8489

---

---

-1.8178
4.5680

0.0869
0.0005

0.1517
0.8319

----

----

0.0988

1.6096

0.1081
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Table 3.7
Percentage of Contribution of Agriculture
to Gross Domestic Product (PAGRIC)

COUNTRY

MI LITARY(a )

Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
The Congo
Cote d ’Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gamb ia
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Maur itani a
Maur itius
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swaz i1and
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
TOTAL

--0.4036
0.533</**

--

CIVILIAN(a+b)
0.4365
0.2691
0.3976
0.6123
0.3532

0.1155

--

---

0.3022
0.5299
0.5433
0.3771
0.5054
0.5990
0.3125
0.3275
0.2016
0.3234
0.4756
0.2641
0.1939
0.5654
0.4278
0.4020
0.2344
0.3467
0.3982
0.2393
0.4034
0.4813
0.6061

0.45B8***

-0.5146
0.5815

--0.1559*
0.3900***

-0.3509***

-0.4841***
0.3396
0.4504**

-0.3197
0.4635*

--0.3171***
0.5794
0.1979

--0.3864***

(All Nations [323 n=533)
*.05<pr o b .<.10
**01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01
Civilian or Military only

-0.1303
0.1174
0.3463

t

Sig.

2.4277

0.0253

--

--

-0.3125
3.7699

0.7583
0.0031

-----

-----

4.1645

0.0005

--

--

-0.2618
1.5425

--1.7323
-5.2336

--3.B479

-3.2122
1.3385
-2.1905

-0.5428
-1.9428

0.7968
0.1739

--0.0986
0.0001

-0.0039

-0.0083
0.1944
0.0447

-0.5936
0.0662

---

---

4.1497
0.5150

0.0007
0.6152

----

----

-3.0829

0.0022
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1966 (C0UNT66) suggest a 1.3 percent (i.e., 0.0077 - 0.0207) decline per
year in the proportion of GDP going to public spending (PSPFND) during
the life of the civilian regime.

When the military intervened again in

1969 the overall level of the series increased by 3.5 percent (DUMMY?© =
+0.0352).

However, PSPEND under military rule declined at an annual

average rate of -0.3

percent (-0.0207 + 0.0077 + 0.0105).

In the case

of Liberia, the rate

of change for the initial period was

0.9 percent.

Military intervention in 1980 resulted in a 10 percent increase in the
level of the time series.

With a coefficient of -0.0170 for C0UNT81

indicates an annual decline in PSPFND of about 0.8 percent

(i.e., 0.009^

- 0.0170).
The results of the MITS for PSPEND showed that, with the notable
exception of Togo where military intervention resulted in an immediate
downward shift in the level of the time series, regime change in all the
selected countries was associated with short-term increases in the
levels of spending.

It did not matter whether the change

was from

civilian to military

rule (Sudan 1969, Nigeria 1966, Liberia 1980 and

Ethiopia 1975), or from military to civilian rule (Sudan 1965, Nigeria
1979 and Uganda 1981).
Furthermore, there was no observable consistency in the trend of
the slopes following the initial shifts in the level of the time series.
The sensitivity of long-term trends in PSPEND to regime type is
significant on only two occasions after military intervention and in
another two following the restoration of civilian rule.

Following

military intervention in Uganda in 1971, a -0.0166 coefficient
associated with the counter

(slope) variable suggests a negative -1.5
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percent (0.0013 - 0.0166) shift per year in the rate of change over time
series for public expenditure (see Table 3.13).

However, military

intervention in Ethiopia in 1975 corresponded with a significant
positive shift in the slope of the trend line for the period of military
rule.

Positive and negative coefficients for PSPEND in Uganda (C0UNT8E

= 0.0E96) and Nigeria (C0UNT80 = -0.0369) reflect the presence of
similar inconsistencies in the long-term shifts in the trend lines for
PSPEND following the restoration of civilian rule.
When the time series for PSPEND in Ethiopia, Sudan, Togo and
Uganda are compared with that for their country pairs in the "control
group," no consistent pattern is observable.

For example, there was a

positive change in the level and slope of the series for PSPEND in
Ethiopia after change in regime.
(CDUNT76) was significant.

However only the change in the slope

The changes in the level and slope of the

simulated series for PSPEND in Kenya (Ethiopia’s country pair) were
similar to those in Ethiopian series, suggesting that the changes in the
Ethiopian series may not have been totally related to change in regime.
Similar patterns were observable for the other country pairs.

However,

changes in the level and slope of the series for the country pair of
Uganda and Tanzania are not always in the same direction.
Whereas there is a positive shift in the level of the series after
the military intervened in Uganda (DUMMY71), a simulated intervention in
Tanzania (DUMMY71) is associated with a negative shift in the level of
the series.

Although, the changes in the slope (C0UNT7E) and level

(DUMMY8E) for PSPEND in Uganda and Tanzania are identical, the changes
in Uganda are highly significant while those in Tanzania are not.

The

114
changes in the slopes (C0UNT8E) for the two series are significant at
the .01 level, but while the change in Uganda is positive, the change in
Tanzania is negative.

The complete MITS results for the selected pairs

of countries are reported in Tables 3.10 to 3.13.

Health (PHEALTH) and Education <PEDUC)
The tables also demonstrate that the sensitivity of spending
trends for health and education to regime change is not consistent in
any discernible direction.

For example, Table 3.11 shows that in the

Sudan, at the beginning of the time series,

1.2 percent and 1.5 percent

of GDP went to health (PHEALTH) and education (PEDUC) respectively.

The

initial time trend indicated a -0.04 percent and -0.01 percent shift per
year in the average rate of change for both PHFALTH and PEDUC.

The

coefficients of 0.0009 and 0.0097 associated with the 1965 return to
civilian rule <DUMIVIY66) suggest short-term increases of 0.1 percent and
1.0 percent in the overall
respectively.

level of the series for PHEALTH and PEDUC

The annual rate of change over the time series is -0.02

percent (-0.0004 + 0.0002) and -0.26 percent (-0.0001 - 0.0025) for
PHEALTH and PEDUC respectively.

The coefficients of 0.0014 and 0.0054

associated with the military intervention in 1969 (DUMMY70) reflect
short-term increases of 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent in the overall
of the series for PHEALTH and PEDUC respectively.

level

The coefficients of

-0.0006 and 0.0020 associated with the shift in slope after 1970
indicate a -0.04 percent and a -0.05 percent annual rate of change in
PHEALTH and PEDUC for the time series.
This example shows that the time series for the Sudan begins with
a negative slope (indicating a trend toward declining public expenditure

on health and education) from 1960 to 1965 and then undergoes a positive
shift in both intercept and slope, although the overall slope for the
period from 1960 to 1985 remains negative.
shift in the overall
significant.

However, only the short-term

level of the trend line for PEDUC (DlIMMY66)) is

Although the direction of the shifts in the intercepts and

slopes of the time series are sometimes different, the results of the
MITS analysis for PHEALTH and PEDUC in other countries are not
noticeably different from the Sudanese results.

In Liberia, the 1980

military coup is associated with positive shifts in the time series for
PHEALTH and PEDUC (as manifested in significant intercept shifts), but
the slope trends for the period of military rule (1980-1985) are not
significantly different from the slope for the preceding period (see
Table 3.8).

However, Liberia is the only country in which military

intervention appeared to have had a significant positive effect on the
time series for PHEALTH and PEDUC.

The only other case of a significant

positive intercept shift is in Nigeria where return to civilian rule
(DUMMYBO) seems to have occasioned an increase in the proportion of GDP
allocated to the health sector

(see Table 3.9).

On the other hand,

military interventions in Ethiopia and Togo are associated with
significant negative intercept shifts for PEDUC.
When the results of the MITS analysis for the countries in the
"control group" are compared with their pairs, no clear pattern is
discernable.

For example, there is a negative but insignificant shift

in the level of the PHEALTH series following military intervention in
Uganda, but a simulated intervention in Tanzania is associated with a
positive and significant shift.

However, while military intervention in
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Table 3.S
MITS Results for Liberia (7)

b
PSPEND (OLS)
Intercept(C)
counter(C)
dummy81(M )
count81<M)

PHEALTH (3rd)
Intercept
counter
dummy81
count81

PEDUC (3rd)
Intercept
counter
dummy81
count81

PDEFEN (1st)
Intercept
counter
dummy81
countSl

PMAN (OLS)
Intercept
counter
dummy81
countBl

PAGRIC (1st)
Intercept
counter
dummy81
count81

*.05<prob. <. 10
**01 < p r o b . < .05
***prob.< .01

t

3.828
0. 1053***
A .739
0.009A***
2.215
0.1016**
-1.327
-0.0170 0
R = 0.8163

Prob.

0.0012
0.0002
0.0399
0.2010

5.698
6.788
2.AA3
1.631

0.0001
0.0001
0.027A
0.1236

0.1033***
A; 579
9.272
0.0015***
0.0203***
3.A66
-0.0025 0
-1.A30
R = 0.9323

0.000A
0.0001
0.0035
0.1733

A. 287
0.0091***
0.659
0.0001
11.372
0.0AA7***
-0.0059***
-5.329
R2 = 0.9178

0.0005
0.5188
0.0001
0.0001

0.367
0.0015
0.0039***
13.066
-0.907
-0.0063
-2.661
-0.0052**
R2 = 0.92A1

0.7177
0.0001
0.3762
0.0159

8.221
0.3139***
-3.167
-0.0085***
-1.0A1
-0.038A
1 .917
0.023^
R2 = 0.7972

0.0001
0.0056
0.3126
0.0722

0.0079***
0.0007***
0.0093**
0.0019
I
R = 0.93AA

Table 3.9
MITS Results for Nigeria <E6)

Prob,
PSPEND (OLS)
Intercept(C )
counter(C )
dummy67(N )
count67(M )
dummy80(C)
count80(C)

PHEALTH (End)
Intercept
counter
dummy67
count67
dummy80
count80

PEDUC (End)
Intercept
counter
dummy67
count67
dummy80
countBO

0.1193 •
6.692
-0.0000
-0.009
0.0E75
0.918
0.0038
0.531
0.1888^
E.515
-0.0369
-3.786
a
R = 0.6955

0.0008
0.9933
0.3713
0.6026
0.0283
0.1085

0.0073
6.910
0.0003
1.638
0.0031
0.851
-0.0010'
-3.939
1 .939
0.0055*
-0.0003 „
-0.851
R = 0.7873

0.0001

it*
0.0819

0.1710
0.8058
0.00 33
0.0716
0.8056

6.166
0.015
0.013
0.087
-0.979
0.761

0.0009
0.9881
0.9901
0.9316
0.3630
0.6596

0.0037
0.659
0.335
0.0006
8.873
0.0870
-0.106
•0.0008
-0.698
0.0076
-0.6E6
■0.0062
R = 0.7565

0.6519
0.7621
0.0105
0.9173
0.6851
0.5608

0.0000
0 .0 0 0 1
0 .0 0 0 1
0.0168
0.0058
R = 0.6160

PDEFEN (OLS)
Intercept
counter
dummy67
count67
dummy80
count80

PMAN (OLS)
Intercept
counter
dummy67
count67
dummy80
countBO

0.0660***
8.386
0.0085*
8.068
0.639
0.0061
-0.006^**
-3.660
0.0088
0.969
0.0008
0.876
R" = 0.6509

0 .0 0 0 1

0.0533
0.5309
0.0018
0.3556
0.7870

1 IB
Table 3.9 Cont’d.

b
PAGRIC (1st)
Intercept
counter
dummy67
count67
dummy80
count80

*.05<prob.<.10
**01<prob.<.05
***prob.< .01

0.688A” *
-0.017B*
0.0171
-0.0105
-0.0016
0.0 A 88*
R2 = 0.9593

t

18.677
-1.766
0.376
-0.860
-0.030
8.030

Prob.

0.0001
0.0953
0.7116
0.A019
0.9761
0.0583
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Togo was associated with an insignificant negative shift in the level of
the PHEALTH series and a significant positive shift in the slope, the
simulated intervention in Malawi effected negative and significant
shifts in the level and slope of the series.

Defense Spend ing (PDEFEN)
As expected, there are distinctive differences in the time series
for both regime types in the area of defense spending.

The advent of

military rule in Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda is associated with
significant short-term increases in the overall
for PDEFEN.

level of the time series

However, the slopes of the trend lines during military rule

are not significantly different from those for preceding or succeeding
periods of civilian rule.

However, the results for Ethiopia (see Table

3.10), show that the time series after military intervention underwent a
significant positive shift in both the intercept and the slope.
In Ethiopia for example, at the beginning of the time series, the
proportion of GDP allocated to defense (PDEFEN)

is 3.5 percent.

There

was an average annual shift of -0.1 percent in the slope of the time
series.

Following military intervention there is a short-term increase

of 3.1 percent in the overall

level of the time series.

The period of

military rule witnesses a significant positive annual shift of 0.6
percent in the slope of the time series.
Ethiopia’s uniqueness as manifested by the significant shift of
0.53 percent per year in the rate of change in PDEFEN over the period of
military rule (1976-1985),

is perhaps due to the fact that since it

assumed office Ethiopia’s military government has been engaged in a
costly military campaign against Eritrean and Somali separatist

Table 3.10
MITS Results for Ethiopia and Kenya

b
PSPEND (OLS)
Intercept(C)
counter(C)
dummy76(M)
count76(M)

ETHIOPIA (11)
t
Prob.

0.1086***
0.0036**
0.0085
0.0181***

PHEALTH (OLS)
0.0074***
Intercept
0.0000
counter
0.0011
dummy76
0.0001
count76

b

9.74E
E.547
0.777
9.756
Fc=0.9777

0.0001
0.0E08
0.4477
0.0001

(5th)
0.1874***
0.0011
0.0019
0.0088***

IE.855
0.349
1.744
0.533
n =0.6466

0.0001
0.7319
0.1016
0.6086

(End)
0.0091 ***
0.0004**
-0.0004
O.OOOS

PEDUC (OLS)
Intercept
counter
dummy76
count76

0.0063***
0.0011***
-0.0041#*
-0.0001

S.9EB
5.3S4
- E . 137
-0.199
F?=0.8111

0.0094
0.0001
0.0475
0.8446

(1st)
0.0S31 ***
0.0014*
-0.003S
-0.0007

PDEFEN (End)
Intercept
counter
dummy76
count76

0.03 V#**
-0.0010
0.0306***
0.0063***

4.541
-1.499
3.945
4.88S
$=0.9419

0.0004
0.1546
0.0013
O.OOOS

(OLS)
0.0013
0.0009**
0.0133**
-0.0003

PMAN (End)
Intercept
counter
dummy76
count76

0.0534***
0.00E*#**
-0.0111***
-0.0016***

51.365
E7.707
-4.908
r3.06S
R2=0.9691

0.0001
0.0001
O.OOOE
0.0079

(OLS)
0.0937**
0.0013
0.0809**
-0.0131**

PAGRIC (3rd)
Intercept
counter
dummy76
count76

0.650^**
-0.01E6***
0.0137
0.C1S4***

105.386
-E0.0S5
0.968
3.711
R^O.9667

0.0001
0.0001
0.3496
0.00E3

(OLS)
0.3613***
-0.0035*
0.0433**
0.0057*

*.05<prob.< .10
*toi < p r o b .< .05
***prob.< .01

KENYA (15)
t

Prob.

SO.195
1.166
0.106
o 3.588
$=0.8630

0.0001
0.E598
0.9171
0.00E3

5.665
E.8S5
-0.E59
r0.505
F&0.9001

0.0001
0.0105
0.7979
0.6193

E.99E
1.919
-0.571
-0.39E
$=0.8664

0.007E
0.0694
0.5741
0.6993

0.386
E.53E
S.418
-0.357
$=0.7946

0.70E9
0.0190
0.0E43
0.7E46

E.309
0.346
E.lll
-E.151
$=0.E960

0.0330
0.7334
0.0490
0.0453

18.946
-E.03E
S. 405
-1.983
$=0.6196

0.0001
0.057E
0.0E7S
0.06SB

1 El
movements (Wubneh and Abate 1988, 68-74).

Although the Eritrean

struggle for independence from Ethiopia was in its fifteenth year in
1975 (when the military assumed power),

it was not until after the

military intervened that the Ethiopian government made a concerted (as
yet unsuccessful) effort to' overwhelm the liberation movements.

Thus

the armed forces which numbered 50,800 in 1975 were increased to 829,500
by 1980.

Further increases in defense expenditure was also encouraged

by the presence of thousands of Cuban soldiers and Warsaw Pact
technicians and advisers who served in the Ethiopian forces and operated
aircraft and heavy equipment

(Legum 1977, BE01? 1981, B167-16R).

The significant effect of regime type on defense expenditure is
confirmed by the results of the time series for Kenya (the "control1'
country for Ethiopia).

The results (see Table 3.10) show that a

simulated intervention in 1975 is associated with a significant shift in
the overall

level of the Kenyan time series (DUMMY76).

However, whereas

DUMMY76 in Ethiopia was significant at the .01 level, DUMMY76 for Kenya
was significant at the less impressive .05 level.

A more significant

difference is manifested in the slope of the trend lines.

Whereas there

is a very significant positive shift in the long-term trend of the
series for Ethiopia, the long-term trend for Kenya is negative.
There was at least one instance in which military intervention is
not associated with positive changes in the time series for PDEFEN.

In

the case of Togo (see Table 3.IE) for example, the proportion of GDP
allocated to defense (PDEFEN), over the initial time period is 0.10
percent.

Average yearly change in PDEFEN over the initial time series

is 0.17 percent.

Military intervention (DUMMY68)

is associated with a
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Table 3.11 Cont’d.

b

0.3409*
6.9064
0
-0.0373
-0.0516
0.0491

2.617

Prob.

0.0792

--

--

---

--

-1.039
in
m

0.0001
0.0033
0.1497
0.0070
0.6770
0.0778

b

1

*.05<prob.<.10
**.01 <prob.< .05
***prob.< .01
Insufficient data

15.773
-3.451
-1.513
3.093
0.424
-1.885
R^O.6653

Prob.

ZAIRE (34)
t

.—!

PAGRIC (OLS)
Intercept
0.629^**
counter
-0.0354
dummy66
-0.0923
0.067^**
count66
0.0189
dummy70
count70
-0.036$

SUDAN (29)
t

,1 .315

lio.7878

0.3752
0.2682
0.2800
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Table 3 . IB
MITS Results for Togo and Malawi

b
PSPEND (1st)
Intercept(C)
0.1858
counter(C )
-0.0018
dummy6B(M )
-0.0178
count68(M )
0.0198

PHEALTH (1st)
Intercept
0.0145*
-0.0009
counter
-0.0080
dummy68
count6B
0.001^**

PEDUC (OLS)
Intercept
counter
dummy6B
count68

.o b o ^**
-0.0004
-o.oiod*
0.003^**
o

TOGO (38)
t

Prob.

b

1 .476
-0.188
-0.344
„ 1.803
R = 0 ,8685

0.1568
0.8994
0.7343
0.8439

(OLS)
0.1887***
0.0065
-0.0105
-0.0019

4.809
-1.780
-0.909
o3 . 145
R^O. 8490

0.0001
0.1016
0.3747
0.0053

(OLS)
-0.0001
0.0019***
-0.0045**
-0.0013*

3.698
-0.419
-8.164
„3.585

0.0014
0.6796
0.0487
0.0081

(1st)
***
0.0885
0.0014
0.0014
-0.0016

R£=0.9ise
PDEFEN (1st)
Intercept
0.0010
counter
0.0017
dummy68
-0.0019
count68
-0.0006

0.6396***
-0.088S?*
0.0069
0.0155

* . 0 5 < p r o b . <. 10
**01<prob.<.05
**‘pr o b . < .01

m
in

PAGRIC (1st)
Intercept
counter
dummy68
count68

—0.0366
0.0174***
0.0030
-0.080=?**

1

PMAN (OLS)
Intercept
counter
dummy6B
count6B

0.057
0.560
0.150
-0.180
R^=0.4598

5.180
0.894
-6.046
R^O.7870

7.865
-8.890
0.191
1 .109
R^O.9138

MALAWI (19)
t
Prob.

5.99]
1.076
-0.331
-0.300
FtO.4657

0.0001
0.8938
0.7434
0.7666

-0.083
8.940
-8.454
-8.084
Ft0.7593

0.9881
0.0084
0.0?40
0.0509

3.840
1.359
0.891
-1.305

0.0010
0.1885
0.7739
0.8061

Fto.4591

0.9550
0.5880
0.8883
0.8588

(1st)
0.0081
0.0006
-0.0007
0.0005

0.1001
0.0001
0.7789
0.0001

(OLS)
0.0838**
-0.0005
-0.0040
0.0054

0.0001
0.0381
0.8518
0.8861

(OLS)
0.5845***
-0.0086
0.0058
-0.0164

0.088
0.166
-0.104
„0.144
Ft0.7783

0.9307
0.8700
0.9383
0.8869

8.816
-0.089
-0.897
o0.980
R^O.7374

0.0468
0.9304
0.7714
0.3755

4.957
-0.147
0.185
r0.901
ftO.B345

0.0003
0.8856
0.9083
0.3051
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short-term decrease of 0.19 percent, and the long-term trend showed a
0.11 percent (i.e., 0.0017 - 0.000 b) average yearly shifts in PDEFEN.
To be sure, Togo is the only clear case in which military intervention
is associated with a decrease in PDEFEN.

However, the changes in the

time series are not statistically significant.

Manufacturing (PMAN) and Agriculture (PAGRIC)
As can be discerned from the MITS tables (Tables 3.8 to 3.13), the
performance of the two major sectors of the economies of all the six
countries does not seem to have been overly
alternation in any

consistent fashion.

sensitive to regime

For example, the tables show

that military interventions in Ethiopia (Table 3.10) and

Liberia

3.8), are associated with short-term decreases in the overall
the respective time series for PMAN.

level of

Tables 3.9 and 3.11 show the

reverse to be the case in Nigeria and the Sudan.
countries,

(Table

However,

in all four

irrespective of the direction of the initial shift in the

intercept, the overall slope for the periods of military rule are
negative.

Furthermore,

in the Sudan, when military rulers are succeeded

by civilians, the trends are reversed.

The reinstatement Df a civilian

administration seems to effect a significant positive shift in the
overall level of the time series for PMAN in the Sudan (DUMMY66).
Although civilian succession of the military in Nigeria is associated
with a positive shift in the intercept for PMAN, the shift is not
statistically significant.

However,

in both countries the slope of the

trend lines during periods of civilian rule are not significantly
different from the slopes of the preceding periods of military rule.
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Table 3.13
MITS Results for Uganda and Tanzania

b
PSPEND (OLS)
0.1784***
Intercept(C)
0.0013
counter(C)
0.0118
dummy72(M)
count72(M )
-0.0166***
0.06991**
dummy82(C)
count.82(C)
0.0296*”

PHEALTH <O L S )
0.017^**
Intercept
-0.0001
counter
dummy72
-0.0042
count72
-O.OOO'f
0.0021
dummy82
countB2
0.0008

PEDUC (01 S)
Intercept
counter
dummy72
count72
dummy82
count82

PDEFEN (OLS)
Intercept
counter
dummy72
count72
dummy82
count82

0.0304***
0.0000
0.0042

-0.002EP*
0.0069
0.004^*

-0.0012
0.002cf**
0.0141**
-0.004:#**
0.0053
0.0045

*.05<prob.<.10
.OKprob. < .05
***prob.< .01
Insufficient data

UGANDA (33)
t

TANZANIA (31)
t
Prob.

Prob.

b

13.851
0.735
0.648
-5.752
2.460
„3.067
Fb=0.8345

0.0001
0.4710
0.5246
0.0001
0.0231
0.0061

(2nd)
0.0676***
0.0137***
-0.0102
-0.0046
0.0224
-0.0393***

9.463
-0.218
-1.594
-2.064
0.515
.605
FT=0.8049

0.0001
0.8296
0.1266
0.0523
0.6119
.5521

(OLS)
0.0057**
0.0006**
0.0041**
-0.0004
-0.0005
-0.0018*

12.062
0.011
1.161
-4.894
1.236
„ 2.537
R^=0.8136

0.0001
0.9915
0.2593
0.0001
0.2308
0.0196

(2nd)
0.0183***
0.0010***
0.0030
-0.0003
0.0072*
-0.0076***

-0.326
3.902
2.599
-5.042
0.622
. 1.581
R"=0.7305

0.7479
0.0009
0.0172
0.0001
0.5409
0.1295

(OLS)
0.0225*
-2.4286
0
0.0026
-0.0069
-0.0052

3.301
5.596
-0.571
-1.539
0.658
-3.393
R=0.8964

0.0049
0.0001
0.5761
0.1446
0.5207
0.0040

2.530
0.0216
2.172
0.0443
2.146
0.0466
-1.105
0.2845
0.8624
-0.176
0.0719
-1.919
F£0.8049

8.169
3.782
1 .540
-0.995
2.000
-6.035
$=0.9183

0.0001
0.0018
0.1444
0.3357
0.0640
0.0001

1.886

0.0836

---

---

1 .354
-0.274
-0.647
F^O. 1639

0.2055
0.7896
0.5321
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Similar inconsistencies are noticeable in the very important
agricultural sector.

For example, the return to civilian rule is

associated with a short-term decrease in the overall

level of the time

series for PAGRIC in Nigeria (DUHHY80) and the Sudan (DUMHY66), whereas
military intervention in both countries (DUMMY67 and DUMHY70)
associated with the opposite trend.

is

However, military intervention in

Liberia (DUNNY81) is associated with a decrease in the overall time
series for PAGRIC.

Although all the shifts in the overall

level of the

time series for PAGRIC are not significant, there are significant
positive shifts in the slope of the trend lines in Ethiopia (C0UNT76),
Liberia (C0UNT81), Sudan (C0UNT66) and Nigeria (C0UNT80).

Whereas the

positive trends in Ethiopia and Liberia are associated with military
rule, similar trends in Nigeria and the Sudan are associated with
civilian rule.

A significant negative shift in the slope of the trend

line is also associated with military rule in the Sudan (C0UNT70).
Since no clear evidence of policy sensitivity to regime type is
present,

it is not necessary to analy 2 e the results of the HITS analysis

for the countries in the "control group."

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Perhaps the most important indicator of economic performance is
the gross domestic product (GDP).

Table 3.1A shows the annual

percentage change in GDP (1960-1985) for twelve selected countries and
Table 3.15 shows the average annual percentage increase in GDP under
military and civilian rule.

As can been clearly discerned from these

tables, the effect of public' policy on GDP is not consistent within
regime types.

The tables show that gains in GDP are registered under

Table 3.14
Annual Percentage Change in Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1980 Prices, 1960-1985*

YEAR

BOTSWANA

ETHIOPIA

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

_
7.1
7.0
4.8
13.6
-5.4
6.5
7.0
1.9
15.1
14.9
17.2
29.8
24.8
24.2
-1.3
16.5
2.3
18.3
12.1
14.0
8.7
-2.3
24.0
20.1
8.0

.

1.7
0.6
2.7
4.9
5.9
3.9
4.5
3.0
6.0
3.6
4.5
4.8
2.7
1.4
0.1
2.3
0.6
-1.1
5.3
5.5
6.2
1.9
4.3
-

GHANA

KENYA

LIBERIA

MALAWI

NIGER

NIGERIA

RWANDA

TANZANIA

ZAIRE

ZAMBIA

-

_
-0.3
10.9
1.2
8.6
5.5
7.4
6.9
16.1
-2.3
10.8
0.8
3.9
9.4
7.2
3.9
4.8
3.9
1.7
3.7
0.4
3.9

.
1.7
19.0
-0.7
4.8
7.3
6.5
5.0
3.8
-2.5
7.4
-15.1
4.0
-0.8
3.9
4.4
-4.7
-4.4
-2.1
-3.3
-3.0
-0.9

_
4.9
1.5
2.1
11.8
2.1
9.9
5.6
-0.2
6.4
1.5
14.4
0.2
1.6
7.4
5.5
6.2
4.3
8.3
3.3
-0.4
-5.2
2.8
3.5
4.5
4.1

4.1
11.6
4.3
-5.9
6.7
23.3
-3.4
-7.8
-1.6
9.3
-3.4
-7.6
-10.9
6.2
20.5
15.3
2.8
9.8
3.8
2.1
-6.3
-

_

.
-2.0
1.3
-1.1
-5.1
8.9
0.4
9.5
9.3
11.0
11.0
1.2
0.2
3.4
0.7
2.0
1.8
5.1
9.8
9.4
-3.6
2.5
4.1
-

_

3.3
5.7
8.4
6.1
2.6
-2.0
-20.7
12.6
26.8
29.8
18.4
7.3
-5.0
12.1
-3.0
10.9
8.1
-7.3
2.5
5.3
-8.4
-3.2
-6.3
-5.2
5.2

.
5.4
4.3
4.9
3.9
3.4
12.1
2.3
4.3
9.1
9.6
6.0
0.1
8.1
3.1
-5.0
-5.2
0.8
-5.3
0.3
2.4
2.9
-3.0
1.3
2.7
2.5

-2.1
1.4
2.2
17.8
18.4
13.4
12.8
7.5
18.7
-13.7
0.1
9.8
-1.0
6.7
-2.4
4.3
-4.3
0.6
-3.1
3.1
6.2
-2.8
-2.0
-1.3
4.4

6.1
4.8
3.5
2.6
1.4
0.1
-2.3
6.4
5.8
6.7
5.6
-2.5
15.3
3.4
-12.9
-3.5
2.3
8.5
-3.2
0.0
-1.8
-7.2
0.7
-

*Bold type indicates military governmental periods

12.8
4.0
5.2
1.8
5.8
4.2
6.7
3.1
2.5
5.7
20.7
2.8
2.9
1.2
0.8
-1.1
1.3
-0.4
2.5
-0.2

.
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civilian as well as under military rule.
occur under both regime types.

Similarly declines in GDP

The results in Table 3.15 show that the

only statistically significant difference in regime performance occurred
in t iberia where the GDP increased by a yearly average of 3.24 percent
under civilian rule and decreased by a yearly average of 3.08 percent
under the military.

Summary and Conclusion
The picture that emerges from this analysis suggests that most
military and civilian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are
indistinguishable in terms of economic policy outputs and outcomes.
However, there is one category of public expenditure in which there
appears to be a clear distinction between the two regime types.

It is

clearly evident from the various statistical techniques employed in this
study that military regimes in most of the African countries included in
this study spent significantly more on defense than their nonmilitary
predecessors and successors.

But, the results also show that there are

a few countries in which the reverse is the case with civilian rulers
spending more than their military counterparts on defense.

However,

in

these few exceptional cases PDEFEN under military and civilian
administrations are not significantly different.
The results of the MITS analysis also seem to suggest that the
difference between military and civilian rulers in the area of defense
spending is directly related to the budgetary priorities of each regime
type immediately following regime change.

The results show that the

budgetary allocation to defense tends to undergo a significant increase
immediately following a successful military coup.

But upon achieving a
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Table 3.15
Percentage of Change in Gross Domestic Product
at Constant 19B0 Prices (CGDP80)

COUNTRY
Beni n
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Ethiopia
Ghana
Liber ia*
Madagascar
Niger
Ni ger ia
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Uganda
TOTAL
(All Nat ions n=85)
*.05<prob. <. 10
**01<prob.<.05
***Pr°b.< .01

MILITARY(a )

CIVILIAN(a+b)

t

Siq.

0.0591
0.0877
0.0909
0.0878
0.0073
-0.0308
-0.0088
0.0677
0.0566
0.0359
0.0900
-0.0061

0.0595
-0.0167
0.0367
0.0359
0.0317
0.0389
-0.0077
-0.0569
0.0158
0.091B
0.0958
0.0089

0.0065
-1.0769
-0.3 110
0.9115
0.9788
8.1316
-0.1188
-1.8099
-0.8996
0.8909
0.1891
0.5605

0.9999
0.3013
0.9333
0.3709
0.3391
0.0963
0.9070
0.8909
0.3803
0.7797
0.9086
0.5839

0.0851

0.0378

1.9931

0.1997
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new and higher level of spending for defense, the average yearly
percentage changes in defense spending under military rule are not
evidently dissimilar from average yearly percentage changes under
civilian rule.

This finding is consistent with Valerie Bunce’s (1979,

1980, 1981) contention that changes in political

leadership has

significant short-run impact on budgetary changes but very little longrun impact.

However the results for Ethiopia (see Table 3.10) also show

that the time series after military intervention underwent a significant
positive shift in both the intercept and the slope.
In Chapter One, three contrasting views on the effect of military
rule on economic development were presented.

The first of these views

suggested that military rulers were progressive forces promoting
economic growth and the modernization of the economic and social
structures of Third World countries (Pye 1968; Daadler 1963; Cohen 1985;
Sloan and Tedin 1987), while the second view saw military rulers as
conservative or even reactionary forces (Nordlinger 1970; Feit 1973;
Welch and Smith 1974; Berg-Schlosser 1984).

Although the regression

results for PDEFEN appear to lend some credence to views espoused by
Nordlinger (1970) and Welch and Smith (1974), that military rule focuses
primarily on policies that serve the narrow interests of the armed
forces, the overall results show that African military rulers and their
civilian counterparts cannot be distinguished by their budgetary
priorities or by the economic outcomes of their policy initiatives.
By most measures of economic performance, the results clearly fail
to show that the performance of one regime type is superior to the
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other.

The use of GDP in determining a country’s economic efficiency

remains a standard) albeit imperfect) measure.

As demonstrated in

Tables 3.1^ and 3.15? measures of GDP <at constant 1980 prices)) fails
to distinguish between the two regime types.

Trying to reduce some of

the problems associated with using a single indicator of economic
performance <GDP) by adding measures of industrial and agricultural
production served only to emphasize the suggestion that regime type is
not associated with policy outcomes.
Although results from some of the simple country studies seem to
suggest otherwise) there is no consistency in the pattern of the
association between regime type and policy outcomes.

It seems safe

therefore) to conclude that the results of the foregoing analysis
support the more recent views (McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Jackman 1976 ),
which suggests that public policy is not sensitive to changes in regime
type.

The results suggest that it may be risky to presume) as some

studies seem to have done? that either military or civilian regimes act
as monolithic bodies whose policy priorities and effect on economic
performance can be clearly differentiated from one another.

The MITS

results for the selected pairs of countries reported in Tables 3.10 to
3.13) lend further credence to this conclusion.
But where do we go from here?

An obvious next step is to attempt

to find out why there appears to be so little difference between two
distinctly dissimilar African regime types.
noted)
method.

This) as I have already

is not a task which easily lends itself to the quantitative
A more critical analysis of the policy implications of regime

type will require an in-depth study of some countries which have had

experience with both military and civilian regimes.

It is expected that

these case studies will yield a better understanding of the variations
in the policy process that are missed by aggregate-data studies.
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Endnotes

1.

OLS estimates were used for those equations where there were no
autocorrelated errors.
However, time series regression models
often suffer from the problem of autocorrelated error terms, which
renders OLS regression inappropriate.
Where this problem was
evident,
each
equation
was
re-estimated
to control
for
autocorrelation of the error variable.
In order to obtain reliable estimated parameter
values for the
models used in this analysis, a two-step process was undertaken.
First,
I examined the plots of the autocorrelation function (ACF)
and the partial
autocorrelation function
(PACF) for each model
tested.
From these plots it was possible— using the criteria
suggested by Cook and Campbell (1979) and Hibbs (1974)— to detect
the existence of
autocorrelation as well as tomake an estimate of
the order of the autoregressive process.
In those cases in which there was a significant
autocorrelation
problem, the model parameter values had to be re-estimated using a
standard Cochrane-Orcott procedure found in SAS AUTOREG program.
The result
is a set of improved parameter estimates that
are
consistent and undisturbed by autocorrelation.
See Hibbs (1974),
Ostrom (1978), Cook and Campbell
(1979), McDowell, et al.
(1981)
and Garand (1985).

8.

Shifts
in the level of the time series reflect
the immediated
short-term
impact of an intervention
(in this instance the
installation of a new regime).
Shifts in the slope of the time
series reflect the long-term impact of the intervention.

Chapter Four
REGIME TYPE AND THE ECONOMY:

AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN GHANA

The situations under which African states have been governed have
been

sd

varied that the continent provides one of the best settings

within which to test the assumption that regime type is correlated with
public policy.

Of all the countries on the African continent, perhaps

none is more suitable to test this assumption than Ghana.
Ghana is ideal for investigating the relationship between regime
type and public policy because it is one of only seven nations in subSaharan Africa to have experienced all three of the systems of
government identified in Chapter Two (competitive, one-party, and
military).

Furthermore, of these seven countries (Burkina Faso,

Burundi, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda), Ghana,
is the only one for which fairly reliable data are available.
In later pages, the Ghanaian experience since independence in 1957
will be laid out in an effort to answer the two questions posed at the
beginning of the last chapter about the consequences of civilian and
military rule— what are the budgetary priorities of each regime type and
what are the socioeconomic consequences of the governance of each regime
type?

Historical Background
Ghana was formed by a merger of the Gold Coast, a former British
colony, and the British-administered part of Togoland, a United Nation
Trust Territory.

The country attained independence on 6 March, 1957,

under the premiership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.
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In the initial years of
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independence Ghana maintained its pre-independence political
institutions,

(Westminster-type parliamentary system that had been

instituted a few years before independence).

Nkrumah had first become

Prime Minister in 1952, after his Convention People’s Party (CPP) won
the British-administered general elections of 1951.

Nkrumah continued

in power after the CPP won 71 seats in the 104-seat legislative assembly
in another British supervised general election in 1956.
Soon after Ghana became independent, Nkrumah began to take steps
to consolidate his power.

The CPP government introduced laws which

effectively banned opposition political parties (Boahen 1975, 194).
Those individuals who continued to be critical of the Nkrumah
administration were detained under provisions of the Preventive
Detention Act (Boahen 1975, 194; Woronoff 1972, 65-66).1

Consequently,

by 1960 the parliamentary Opposition had become a negligible force.
The CPP consolidated its control over unions, farmers, business,
the press, youth and women’s organizations.

Civil servants were also

pressured into becoming members of the CPP.

The party reached into

every village and directed every aspect of social and political

life in

the country (Kraus 1971, 59)/
On July 1, 1960, Ghana was declared a Republic.

The new

Constitution provided for an executive President who was elected for
life and specified by name:

Kwame Nkrumah.

The cabinet was responsible

to the President who appointed and could dismiss ministers.

The

Constitution provided for a parliament with powers to debate issues and
reject government proposals with which it is dissatisfied.

In practice

this provision was pointless since the Constitution also empowered the
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President to enact legislation by decree in the "national interest"
(Woronoff 1972, 67).

By the end of 1960, multipartism was, for all

intents and purposes, nonexistent in Ghana.

However,

it was not until

February 1964, following a referendum which was widely reported to have
been manipulated by the government, that Ghana officially became a oneparty state (Fellow and Chazan 1986, 46; Woronoff 1972, 67).
In the early 1960s, a decline in the world cocoa price— cocoa is
the mainstay of Ghana’s economy— hampered Ghana’s economic development.
Budget deficits became the norm as increases in expenditures rapidly
outpaced revenues.

The government introduced an austerity budget in

1961 and borrowed extensively both locally and abroad (Pel low and Chazan
1986, 44, Kraus 1971, 54; Baynham 1988, 206).

By the beginning of 1966,

the declining state of the economy and Nkrumah’s authoritarian rule had
coalesced to generate grievances in many sectors of Ghanaian society.
The state of the economy was also cause for concern within the
armed forces.

Because of declining revenue, the Nkrumah regime was

forced to reduce spending on defense.

Army officers blamed Nkrumah for

Ghana’s economic woes and its negative impact on the military.

For

example, Brigadier A.A. Afrifa noted that:
because of bad planning, economic mismanagement, and
political interference, this army was rendered incapable,
ill equipped, and had virtually been reduced to a rabble.
By Christmas 1965 a number of our troops were without
equipment and clothing, things essential for the pride,
morale, and efficiency of the soldier.
There was an acute
accommodation problem due to a rash military expansion
scheme that Kwame Nkrumah had launched.
It was shameful to
see a Ghanaian soldier in a tattered and ragged uniform, and
sometimes without boots during his training period (Afrifa
1966, 104).
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By the end of 1965* it was clear that Nkrumah and the CPP had lost
the confidence of the Bhanaian people, including the army and police.
Thus, on February 24, 1966, a group of army officers,

led by Colonel

E.K. Kotoka, Police Commissioner J.W.K. Harlley, and A.A. Afrifa,
overthrew the Nkrumah regime while Nkrumah was on a visit to China.
The coup was greeted with overwhelming and spontaneous jubilation
by Ghanaians.

Support for the coup came from all social sectors, and

the CPP which had ruled Ghana for fifteen years virtually disintegrated
overnight (Baynham 1988, 205).

The coup makers established a National

Liberation Council <NLC) to administer the affairs of the country.

It

was headed by General Joseph Ankrah, who had previously been forced into
retirement by Nkrumah.

The new military leaders suspended the 1960

Constitution and announced their intention to "govern by decrees which
shall have the force of law until a new constitution is promulgated."
Parliament was dissolved; the CPP was declared illegal; all political
parties were banned; and some 900 political prisoners were released
<Baynham 1988, 218; Pinkney 1972, 97).
The Ghanaian military in 1966 was clearly ill-equipped to govern.
Not only was the officer corps small, but, as a result of rapid
expansion and Africani 2 ation of the army, virtually all command and
staff posts were occupied by officers who were, on the whole, younger,
less well-educated and less experienced than should ordinarily have been
the case (Baynham 1988, 220).

Shortages of appropriately trained

personnel made it impossible for the military to govern alone.
Consequently, the NLC had to rely heavily upon top civil servants,
former opposition politicians, and university lecturers (Kraus 1971, 65).
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The popularity of the new military regime was greatly enhanced by
an official early announcement that its stay in power would be brief.
The NLC promised to hand over power to a democratically-elected
government within the shortest possible time.

This promise was backed

up by the establishment (in September of 1966) of a commission to draft
a new constitution.

The regime also tried to improve its popular

standing by deploying army units for community projects? such as
"Operation Yellow Pod" which involved carting hundreds of bags of cocoa
from remote rural areas.

Another undertaking was "Exercise Abongo-Omo,"

in which army units performed useful tasks, such as road repairs
(Baynham 1988, 219).
In spite of its popularity at home, and massive infusion of
economic assistance from the West, the NLC was unable, however, to make
any significant improvements in the economy.

Unemployment rose as

government spending in the productive sectors of the economy, such as
industries and agriculture, was drastically reduced (Price 1971b, 370).
After three and one-half years of NLC rule, the problems which beset the
country at the time of Nkrumah’s ouster continued to exist.
example, corruption and economic mismanagement became worse.

For
Early in

1969, having been accused of corruption NLC chairman, General Ankrah,
was removed from office and replaced by Brigadier A.A. Afrifa (Kraus
1971, 70; Price 1971b, 377).
A new constitution was promulgated in mid-1969.

It established a

political system based upon the concept of separation of powers.

It

provided for a President, elected by an electoral college, and a Prime
Minister appointed by the President from the majority party in the
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Assembly.

On May 1, the ban on political parties was lifted and soon

thereafter many political parties were formed.

The major parties were:

the Progressive Party (PP), headed by Professor Kofi Busia; the National
Alliance of Liberals INAL), led by Komla Gbedemah, the United
Nationalist Party (UNP), led by Joe Appiah; and the All People’s
Republican Party, led by P.K.K. Quaidoo.
held in August 1969, Busia’s Progressive

Then,

in the general elections

Party won 59 percent of the

votes, taking 105 of the 140 National Assembly seats.
The first priority of the new civilian regime was to clean up the
economic mess left by the NLC military government.

In pursuit of this

objective, the Busia administration took

a variety of steps.Initially,

in order to combat the problem of rising

unemployment it enacted the

Aliens Compliance Order, which called for the expulsion of all
foreigners from Ghana.

This was followed by the Ghanaian Business Bill,

which prohibited foreign ownership of small retail companies.

However,

these measures did little to protect Ghana’s economy from foreign
domination (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 54).
There was also a campaign to eliminate bribery and corruption.
The Center for Civic Education was established to instruct Ghanaians
about their rights and obligations as citizens.

During the anti

corruption campaign, in what has been described as a politically
motivated purge, the Busia government summarily dismissed over 500 civil
servants (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 55).
Under the PP government, Ghana’s economy,
cocoa prices, remained stagnant.

in spite of higher world

After only two years in office, the PP

government accumulated debts equal to those compiled by Nkrumah’s CPP in
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nine years (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 56).

The fall in world cocoa prices

in late 1971 forced the government to devalue the cedi

(the Ghanaian

unit of currency), and make cuts in public spending, including military
spending.
In January 1972, in the wake of increasing economic and political
difficulties, the army again seized power.

Busia was in London

undergoing medical treatment when his government was toppled.

The

constitution and all political institutions were abolished and replaced
by a National Redemption Council
Col.

(later General)

(NRC) under the chairmanship of Lt.

Ignatius Acheampong.

The policy objective of the NRC, as presented in the National
Redemption Charter, was to bring about, "a complete and systematic
transformation of our peoples into a self-reliant nation, unique in its
economic, social, cultural, political, technological and all-round
development, a united nation with a spirit of its own" (The Charter of
the NRC 1973, cited in Pellow and Chazan 1986, 56-57; Rothchild 1980,
467).
In 1975, major governmental changes took place, and ultimate
legislative and administrative authority was transferred from the NRC to
a Supreme Military Council

(SMC), also led by Gen. Acheampong.

In 1978,

after six years in office, the initiatives of Acheampong’s government
had failed to produce any significant economic gains for Ghana.

To be

sure, by its corruption and mismanagement, Acheampong’s military regime
had created an economic crisis— with severe shortages in foreign
exchange and consumer goods, and high inflation rates (Pellow and Chazan
1986, 58).

The consequence was massive civilian protest and a palace
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coup which removed Acheampong from office, in July of 1978.

Acheampong

was succeeded by his deputy, Lt. Gen. Frederick Akuffo, who immediately
upon assuming office, declared that the return to a popularly-elected
government would take place in July of 1979.
Akuffo adopted stringent economic measures as demanded by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).

For example,

increases in public

expenditure were curtailed and the Ghanaian currency was devalued 58.2
percent (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 59).

Yet these measures did not bring

about the anticipated improvements in Ghana’s economy.

Economic decline

continued, with inflation reaching 300 percent by October of 1978.
As one of the steps toward the return to civilian rule,

local

elections were held in November of 1978, and in December, a Constituent
Assembly was set up to draw up a new constitution.
party politics was lifted in January of 1979.

The six-year ban on

On June 4, only two weeks

before the elections were due to take place, the Akuffo government was
toppled in a coup staged by junior officers of the armed forces led by
Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

(AFRC) headed by Rawlings, was established as the new government.
Rawlings announced that the purpose of the AFRC was limited to "house
cleaning," to bringing to justice those former rulers who were
responsible for Ghana’s socioeconomic woes, and to restoring the
reputation of the armed forces (Legum 1981, B496).
Upon assuming power, the AFRC had announced that the elections
would be held as scheduled on the 18th of June, but that civilian rule
would be delayed by at least three months.

Eleven presidential

candidates participated in the campaign leading up to the elections.
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Seven of the candidates were sponsored by political parties.

The

People's National Party (PNP), an Nkrumahist party, won 71 of 140 seats
in the parliamentary elections held on the 18th of June.

On the 9th of

July, in a run-off election for the presidency, the PNP candidate, Dr.
Hilla Limann, defeated the Popular Front Party’s Victor Owusu.

Dr.

Limann assumed office on September 24, 1979.
The Third Republic fell victim to criticism from the start.

The

mere transition to civilian rule could not reverse Ghana’s desperate
economic plight.

Ghanaians continued to suffer great hardships.

Inflation remained high, and the shortage in foreign exchange caused
shortages in almost everything including consumer items such as milk,
soap, toilet paper, and spare parts for cars and trucks (Legum 1981,
B 4 8 6 ).
In addition to economic problems, Limann had to cope with the
conflict between the ideologues (or "Nkrumahists") and the pragmatists
within the PNP.

The President assumed a centrist position, and at the

annual party congress in Kumasi in 1980, told the delegates that it was
possible to be an Nkrumahist without being an ideologue:

"Our present

duty is to lay firm foundations for the drive towards full attainment of
the goals for which the Osagyefo lived, worked and died in agonizing
exile" (Legum 1981, B489).
His appeal for party unity went unanswered, and when Alhaji Imorti
Egala, "Father" of the PNP died suddenly of a heart attack, an
unpleasant struggle for party leadership ensued.

While this was going

on, the PNP administration’s credibility was severely damaged by a
scandal in which serious allegations of financial mismanagement were

made against people close to the President.

By the end of 1981,

therefore the PNP was fragmented; and with cocoa production at their
lowest levels since independence, the economy was on the verge of total
collapse.

These events did not help the cause of democracy in Ghana.

Assisted by the military, Jerry Rawlings, now retired from the
armed forces, seized power for a second time on December* 31, 1981.

He

cited corruption and the continuing economic decline as the reason for
his intervention.

After the coup, the constitution was abolished,

parliament dissolved, and political parties were banned.

Widespread

pro-Rawlings demonstrations early in January of 1988, indicated the
popularity of Rawlings and the coup.
Council

A Provisional National Defence

(PNDC), comprising four military personnel and three civilians,

was established to manage the affairs of the country.

Rawlings assumed

the chairmanship of the PNDC.
At the start the new regime was characterized by radical rhetoric,
calling for the creation of a new Ghanaian society based on egalitarian
values.

People’s socialism was to be the vehicle for the establishment

of this new society.

In an effort to get the people involved in the

decision-making process several national and local committees were
established (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 79).^
The PNDC adopted a series of measures that would help improve the
economy and eradicate corruption.

These measures proved to be

ineffective and by May of 1983, university students,

initially

supporters of the PNDC were demonstrating their resentment against many
of the government’s policies.

As Ghana’s economic decline persisted,

the PNDC was forced to abandon radical and ideologically based
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approaches in favor of more cautious and conventional approaches to
economic management.

Thus Ghana had to reach agreement with the

International Monetary Fund (IMF), and in 1983 it embarked on a
conventional IMF adjustment program.

Among other changes, the PNDC

agreed to maintain budgetary restrictions and to devalue the country’s
currency.

Consequently,

in October of 1983, the cedi was devalued by

almost 100 percent (Bienen 1987, 54).
Towards the end of 1985, there were signs that Ghana’s economy was
recovering.

The growth in the country’s average GDP for 1984-1985 was

nearly twice as high as the year before and there was a significant
decline in inflation.

Despite these improvements, Ghana’s fundamental

economic problems persisted, with major difficulties in the coordination
of developmental plans.

As 1985 drew to a close, it was not yet clear

whether the PNDC would succeed in bringing to an end over a quarter
century of economic decline in Ghana.
The forgoing discussion clearly shows that, irrespective of regime
type, successive Ghanaian administrations have had no success in dealing
with the socioeconomic problems which has plagued Ghana since
independence.

However,

in order to discern clearly the impact of regime

type in Ghana, the performance of successive regimes as it relates to a
major sector of the country’s economy must be evaluated.

Agriculture

has always been the principal sector of Ghana’s economy, accounting for
over one-third of GDP and employing almost two-thirds of the working
population.

Consequently,

in the remainder of this chapter,

agricultural policy under alternating civilian and military regimes from
Nkrumah (1957-1966) to Rawlings <1981 — ) will be evaluated (the first
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Rawlings administration lasted only a few months and will, therefore,
receive only brief mention).

Agricultural Policy
Agriculture Under Colonial Rule
For the most part, the policies of British trading companies and
the British colonial government were responsible for making agriculture
the dominant sector of Ghana’s economy.

The major trading companies

including the United Africa Company (UAC), Cadburys and Holts along with
the colonial administration greatly stimulated agricultural activities
in Ghana, by setting up agricultural colleges, introducing new and
improved varieties of crops and providing the necessary infrastructure
of railways, roads and ports.

Local branches of British commercial

banks were established to supply farmers with credit and agencies were
set up to deal with the purchase, grading and shipment of crops (Jones
1976, 233).

The emphasis during the colonial era was on cash crop

production to meet the European demands for tropical agricultural
products.
The success of the efforts of the colonial government and the
trading companies was reflected in the record production and export of
Ghana’s major cash crop, cocoa.

Cocoa was first introduced into Ghana

towards the end of the nineteenth century, but it was only after the
First World War that the country’s export trade really became
significant.

The volume of cocoa exports rose from 80 pounds in 1881 to

two million pounds in 1901 and to 88.9 million pounds in 1911.
made Ghana the world’s leading producer of cocoa.

This

The export of cocoa
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continued to rise until it reached the record figure of 305j000 tons in
1936 (Boahen, Ade-Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 128).
In 1948, the colonial administration established the Cocoa
Marketing Board (CMB) as Ghana’s sole buyer, grader, seller and exporter
of cocoa.

The ostensible purpose was to protect the Ghanaian cocoa

farmer from the fluctuations of the world commodities market.

The CMB

bought all Ghanaian produced cocoa at a controlled and stable price and
resold it on the world market at the then current world market price.
By setting the domestic price lower than the world price, the colonial
administrators hoped to build a reserve fund which could be used to
develop the country’s economy and to pay local farmers in the event of a
shortfall in world prices (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, 40).
Despite the fact that the greater portion of the CMB reserves were
diverted to Britain, for use in rebuilding her shattered postwar
economy, Ghanaian agriculture was still able to make some impressive
contributions to Ghana’s economy.

For example, CMB reserves were used

to build roads, dispensaries, clinics, wells, watei— catchment devices,
maternity and community centers, and schools (Pedler 1979, 90).

At the

time of independence in 1957, Nkrumah and his CPP government were able
to inherit a buoyant economy, with a per capita national income higher
than any in Africa outside of South Africa (Omari 1970, 100).

The

colonial government also handed down to the CPP government foreign
reserves amounting to about 200 million pounds and a foreign debt of
only 20 million pounds (Boahen 1975, 192).

Nkrumah and the CPP had

every reason to be optimistic about the future.

1<*8

Agricultural Policy Under the Nkrumah Administration (1957-1966)
From his writings and speeches, Nkrumah made it abundantly clear
that he was a Marxist who was determined to push through a socialist
program of political and economic development (Nkrumah 1957; 196S).

In

his autobiography published in 1957, Nkrumah had stated that capitalism
was too complicated a system for a newly independent nation to adopt
(Nkrumah 1957).

Moreover,

less than a month before independence, on

February E5, 1957, Nkrumah told the CPP’s National Delegates’ Conference
that he would construct in Ghana a "socialist pattern of society"
(Boahen 1975, 197).
In view of Nkrumah’s avowed commitment to socialism, observers
were expecting some really revolutionary measures in the economic field.
However, contrary to all expectations, Nkrumah’s CPP government did not
take any decisive step towards adopting a socialist pattern of
development.

In spite of pressure exerted on the government by the more

radical members of the CPP,

including C.K.K. Baah, W.A. Wiafe, and 3.R.

Asiedu, who advocated the indigenization of retail trade and the
introduction of restrictions on import-export trade, the CPP government
refrained from taking any actions that might curb the dominant position
of foreign companies in these fields.
It was only in two fields, the purchasing of cocoa and banking,
that any real changes occurred.

The Ghana Farmers’ Marketing

Cooperative established in May of 1957 and the Ghana Cooperative
Marketing Association, using licensed indigenous buying agents, soon
became the major purchasers of Ghanaian cocoa.

This partial

indigenization of cocoa purchasing, was welcomed by most of the foreign
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companies involved in the cocoa trade.

In time, these companies

including the UTC, UAC, GBO» SAT, and CFAO, voluntarily withdrew from
the domestic cocoa purchasing business (Boahen 1975, 19B).
Apart from the fields of cocoa purchasing and banking (the Ghana
Bank was established in 1957 as the central bank) the other economic
sectors experienced no change whatsoever.

Nkrumah continued on the

economic path laid down by the former colonial administration.

Thus,

although Nkrumah desired to institute a program for the rapid
industrialization of Ghana and the diversification of the one-crop
(cocoa) economy, his government exercised restraint, being guided by
pragmatic, as opposed to ideological, considerations.
In the first three years of independence, the economic policies of
the CPP government produced some significant gains for the country.

Its

open door policy attracted some foreign capital for the construction of
new industries.

During this period, Ghanaians experienced an

unprecedented increase in their standard of living (Omari 1972, 100;
Boahen 1975, 200).

However, the repatriation of profits by foreign

cooperations, together with the decline in world cocoa prices, placed a
tremendous burden on the country’s foreign reserves.

To arrest this

adverse trend, new policy measures were initiated.
The new policy measures were consistent with Nkrumah’s Marxist
rhetoric.

A socialist type, mixed economy replaced the free market-

dominated, mixed economy of the immediate post-independence years.

E.N.

Omaboe, Chairman of the National Economic Committee has suggested that
this change was prompted by Nkrumah’s desire to emulate the impressive
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economic achievements of the communist countries which he had visited in
1961

(Omari 1972, 102-103).
The new policy priorities of the CPP were included in the Third

Development Plan (the Seven-Year Development Plan, 1963-1970) and in the
Program of the Convention People’s Party for Work and Happiness, which
was a comprehensive, detailed document for economic, educational,
health, and social development.

The new plans laid considerable stress

on industrial expansion and the productivity of agriculture.

The plan

included heavy emphasis on centralized planning and the establishment of
state-owned industries and joint ventures between the state and large
foreign firms (Pellow and Chazan 1986, A3; Woronoff 1972, 176-91).
In implementing its new, noncapitalist, development policies the
Nkrumah government placed its real hopes for Ghana’s economic
advancement on industrialization.

Table A.l shows the government’s

priority for industry and mining.

Of the total investment of 25 percent

allocated to industry and mining, fully 23 percent, the highest ever,
was public investment (Woronoff 1972, 178).

Only 1A percent of total

public expenditure was allocated to the agricultural sector.
One of the major objectives of the new policy in agriculture was
to reduce the dependence on cocoa by diversifying production.

Another

objective was to raise productivity through improved techniques, the use
of irrigation and modern machinery.

The CPP government decided that

these goals would be best realized through the creation of cooperatives,
state farms and Workers’ Brigade farms.
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Selected Plan Data:

Table 4.1
Seven-Year Development Plan* 1963-1970

Investment Allocation (Public and Private)

#m

Percentage

Agriculture
Industry
Mining
Unallocated private

176.6
£06.4
41.7
75.£

17.4
£0.3
4.7
7.4

Directly Productive

499.9

49.8

Transport equipment
Other physical infrastructure

6£ .9
109.4

6.£
10.7

Physical Infrastructure

17£.3

16.9

61.3
£0.4
76.£
£3.4

6.1
££.1
7.5
£.3

Human and Social Infrastructure

101.3

19.B

Administration
Renewal of Fixed Assets

££.8
104.£

£.£
13.8

1,015.0

100.0

Education
Health
Housing
Social services

TOTAL

SOURCE: Seven Year Development Plan, 1963-1964 to 1969-1970 (Accra,
Ghana, 1964).
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The Workers’ Brigade and state farms were intended as an
instrument to alleviate urban unemployment and rural underdevelopment
(Jones 1976) 228-29).

In its efforts to promote diversification)

government plans directed that these farms should produce palm
oil) rubber) sugar cane5 cotton and meat (Woronoff 1972, 186).

The

Soviet government and some East European countries agreed to help manage
the state farms.

They also supplied machinery) tools) construction

materials) fertilizers and chemicals (Smertin 1987) 112).
These farms were supposed to help increase Ghana’s cash crop
production and produce enough food to satisfy the country’s domestic
needs.

More importantly) they were to become not only financially self-

sufficient) but also be able to generate sufficient profits to help
facilitate the development of other sectors of the economy.

To get them

going> the Plan provided a fair share of the agricultural budget) $26
million for state farms and $13 million for the Workers’ Brigade farms
(Woronoff 1972, 186).
The creation of state and Workers’ Brigade farms progressed very
rapidly beginning with 26 such farms in 1962, and by 1966, when the CPP
government was toppled, there were well over 100 state farms and 3^
Workers’ Brigade farms (Woronoff 1972, 186; Smertin 1987, 112).
The private farmers did not receive as much government support as
their numbers and productive capacity would suggest.

While the whole

farm population may have benefitted from the million of dollars spent
for research and for irrigation, a disproportionately larger share of
total government expenditure went to the state farms sector.
Furthermore,

in addition to reducing the prices paid to the farmers by
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the CMB, the CPP government discontinued several significant forms of
assistance:

the subsidies on insecticides and spraying machines, the

grants for replanting areas where diseased cocoa trees had been cut out,
the traditional, end-of-season bonus to each farmer, and the practice of
providing off-season advances without interest (Esseks 1971, 17; Berg
1971, 209).

Furthermore, the Agricultural Development Corporation

originally established to provide assistance to private farmers was
dissolved (Olajide 1976, 79).
The new institutions,

including the United Ghana Farmers’ Council

(UGFC— that replaced the independent National Farmers Council, which had
been opposed to many of the government’s agricultural policies), took
over the responsibilities of purchasing, grading, storage and
transportation of cocoa from the farmers to the dockside (Jones 1976,
232-37).

The UGFC, which was also responsible for providing assistance

(financial and material) to private farmers, tended to discriminate
against those who did not belong to the cooperative movement (Berg 1971,
209; Amonoo 1981, 128-29).

The cooperative movement, like the UGFC, the

Workers’ Brigade and many other government sponsored groups were all
auxiliaries of the CPP.
The CPP government’s socialist-oriented agricultural policy failed
to improve Ghana’s economic performance.

Most of the state farms failed

completely and the Workers Brigades could not even produce enough food
to feed themselves, let alone the nation (Boahen 1975, 216).

Although

the state farming sector got most of the money, it produced very little
in the way of output.

More than 98 percent of total agricultural output
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was produced by the private sector (Smertin 1987,

1 IS— 13; Berg 1971,

196).
The CMB, which the colonial administration had established in the
1940s, gave the CPP government easy access to the savings of the
country’s cocoa producers.

The CPP not only maintained the CMB, but

also extended its area of operation to include other crops, such as palm
oil, coconuts, groundnuts, and bananas.

The CMB reserves that were

intended to be used to stabilize the price that farmers got for their
produce and to promote the development of the country’s economy, were
diverted into the coffers of the CPP (Munger 1959, iii-56; Jones 1976,
234).
After 1961, things became worse for the farmer when the UGFC
intervened between the him and the CMB, and ever greater proportions of
the profits were withheld from the farmer.

This fact, coupled with the

general restrictions on consumer imports, encouraged farmers to smuggle
cocoa and other agricultural output to neighboring countries where they
fetched higher prices.

Between ten and thirty thousand tons of cocoa

each year are said to have been smuggled out of Ghana during the period
1960-1965 (Berg 1971, 199).
The ideological motivated relations between the Nkrumah regime and
the Soviet-bloc countries caused considerable harm to Ghana’s
agricultural productivity.

Agricultural machinery and other equipments

supplied by East European countries were often not suitable for Ghana.
For example, one East European country supplied Ghana with several
hundred ’agricultural’ tractors which turned out to be snowplows (Omari
1972, 108).

Even when the proper type of machinery was delivered, spare
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parts were often not available, and thus servicing was seriously
impaired.
The failure of the state farm sector, the unfavorable treatment of
private farmers, and the lack of adequate farm machinery and spare parts
all coalesced to bring about a decline in agricultural productivity.
There were food shortages and food queues became a common sight in the
major towns all across the country (Jones 1976, 25A, 258; Woronoff 1972,
188; Boahen 1975, 216).
Perhaps the most unfavorable consequence of the CPP government’s
agricultural policies was the slump in the cocoa industry.

The

activities of the CMB and the UGFC did only encourage smuggling of cocoa
out of the country, but also led to a decline in the planting of cocoa
trees.

Furthermore, in order to save funds, the campaign against

swollen shoot disease, the cocoa tree’s worst enemy, was interrupted and
the disease returned.

All of these culminated in a decline in cocoa

production at a time when the price for cocoa on the world market was
also falling.

By the time Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, cocoa

production which only two years earlier had reached the record level of
580 tons per year had declined to about 380 tons per year (see Table
A.2).
The Nkrumah years saw the gradual disappearance of the substantial
reserve fund, which at the time of independence had amounted to some 200
million pounds, and its replacement with a national debt of 3A9.2
million pounds— more than seventeen times the size of the debt at the
time of independence (West Africa 1965, 1123).
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Table 4.2
Production of F;ajor Crops (000 tons)

YEAR
1948-56*
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

RICE

MAIZE

YAMS

23
—
30

168
—
183

482
—
—

—

—

—

—

—
30
31
33
43
33
30
52
65
61
69
55
47
62
73
71

—
—
183
173
209
358
363
301
304
442
384
389
438
486
343

—

—

—

58
60
55
62
79
70
70
66
90

309
340
380
390
378
285
172
575
411

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—
—
1153
1055
748
1134
1351
1305
1617
909
660
686
—
—

—

CASSAVA
600
—
1092
—
—
—

788
1194
122
1171
1171
1577
1446
1320
1596
2388
2813
2865
1770
1800
1800
1800
2100
2200
2250
1650
1976
1729
4083
3076

GROUND
NUTS
—
—
—
—

—
—

57
61
61
61
61
39
62
61
60
102
89
122
148
110
60
90
80
90
92
100
110
70
90
128

PALM OIL/
KERNELS

— n

4/8
5/3
— /3
— /2
— /8
25/6
26/10
37/22
44/22
56/22
54/25
55/34
60/37
60/37
61/38
61/38
23/33
24/34
30/32
15/30
21/30
21/30
21/30
21/30
23/30
25/30
30/30
42/30

COCOA
253.3
—
259.6
254.2
307.7
416.0
428.4
427.7
580.9
415.7
381.0
423.5
327.0
414.3
396.2
470.0
415.7
343.0
382.0
396.0
320.0
271.0
265.0
290.0
255.0
247.0
203.0
160.0
173.0
212.0

*average
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United
Nations, 1961-1987.
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Agricultural Policy Under the NLC (1966-1969)
Whereas the CPP government’s economic and social policies were
based on detailed
for governing

plans, the NLC assumed office with no detailed plans

the country.

chairman of the NLC),

As Brigadier A.A.

Afrifa (member and later

later remarked:

We knew we would form some kind of revolutionary council.
Originally we had planned to set up a small high-powered
group of civilians. We were aware that as soldiers we were
not cut out to do politics...we thought we could stand in
briefly and put things right as quickly as possible. The
emphasis was on speed (Legon Observer, quoted in Bebler
1973, 38; Baynham 1988, 880).
However, the NLC did recogni 2 e that the economy demanded immediate
attention.

Thus, on the day of the coup, an economic council,

consisting of top civil servants, was formed to advise the new military
government.

The initial position of the new government was to reverse

the economic policies instituted by the Nkrumah regime.
Guided by the recommendations made to the CPP government by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1965, the NLC adopted a policy of
austerity.

Thus, Nkrumah’s ambitious Seven-Year Development Plan was

abandoned and work on several prestige projects such as Accra-Tema
concrete motorway was stopped (Boahen 1975, 888-89; Chazan 1983, 15859).
In the agricultural sector, the NLC instituted several changes.
The state monopoly on the domestic marketing of cocoa was terminated and
Ghanaian private companies and cooperatives were invited to re-enter the
field (Esseks 1971, 84).

The UGFC was dissolved and its functions were

transferred to the Purchasing Department of the CMB (Milburn 1977, 108).
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The N L C ’s Two-Year Development Plan (1968-1970), which dealt with
agriculture, fisheries, mining and roads, allocated substantial funds
for the construction of agricultural feeder roads.

The NLC government

also resumed subsidies on insecticides and spraying machines, and
reinstated the end-of-season bonuses.

In response to farmers’

complaints about the price they received for their crops, the price paid
to cocoa producers was revised upward.

Beginning in 1966, cocoa farmers

benefitted from four increases in the producers’ price, and in March of
1969 were receiving twice as much for their crops as they did when the
NLC first came to power (Esseks 1971, 24; Boahen 1975, 829).

The N L C ’s

"Operation Yellow Pod" provided further assistance to the private farmer
by deploying army units to help in the transportation of cocoa from
remote rural areas.
The new head of state, General Ankrah indicated the NLC’s
preference for private, rather than public, enterprise.

Guided by the

IMF recommendations, he tried to limit the number of state enterprises.
State involvement was limited to "certain basic key projects especially
where private capital might not be available"

(Olajide 1976, 85).

In

pursuit of this new policy, the government cut down the number of state
enterprises from 58 to 19; and of the more than 180 state-owned farms,
only 39 were retained by the State Farms Corporation and 80 by the Young
Farmers League (Bebler 1973, 41-42; Olajide 1976, 85).

The rest were

sold to private concerns, while others which were not viable were
abandoned.
The NLC’s efforts to improve agricultural productivity led to
increased emphasis on a more traditional,

labor-intensive approach to
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agriculture.

To facilitate the transportation of crops from the rural

areas to the ports and inner city markets, over 450 miles of feeder
roads were constructed between 1967 to 1969 (Rothchild 1980, 467-68).
Despite the overall commitment to agricultural improvement, there was no
mistaking the N L C ’s priorities where public spending was concerned.
There were substantial increases in current and capital expenditures on
the armed forces and the police.
These increases went to finance improvements in pay and
conditions, and the purchase of new equipment for both services.
Justifying the increases, Commissioner of Finance Brigadier A.A. Afrifa
argued that "owing to the neglect suffered by our armed forces in the
past,

it has become imperative to re-equip the entire army to make it

justify its existence" (Omari 1972, 164; Bayham 1988, 229).

Whereas

government spending in the non-productive defense sector was greatly
increased, budgetary allocations to other sectors, particularly in such
productive sectors as industry and agriculture experienced substantial
reductions.
Despite higher world prices for cocoa, the Ghanaian economy under
the NLC did not achieve the level of agricultural production of the pre
coup period.

During the three and one-half years of NLC rule, cocoa

production further declined reaching a nadir of 414 tons in 1969 (Chazan
1983, 159).

Although the rising prices did permit the NLC to raise the

purchasing price paid to farmers, it failed to halt the smuggling of the
crop to neighboring countries.

According to Robert Dowse <1969, 242),

anything up to 20,000 tons was being smuggled to Togo and the Ivory
Coast.

Furthermore, although NLC policies led to some decline in the
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rate of inflation, there was no discernable change in the cost of
locally produced goods, since the cost of basic foodstuffs such as
plantain and yams remained high (Boahen 1975, 234).

At the same time,

the country actually got further into debt; there was high unemployment;
and the median per capita income declined by an average of twenty
dollars in the three years of the military government's tenure in office
(Dowse 1969, 243; Chazan 1983, 159).

Agricultural Policy Under the Busia Administration (1969-1971)
Dr. Kofi Busia’s Progressive Party (PP) government assumed power
with no clearly defined economic policy.

Like the NLC before it, the PP

affirmed its "support for and confidence in private enterprise" and
placed considerable stress on giving Ghanaians a "greater stake in the
economy of their own country"

(Progressive Party Manifesto 1966, 5-7).

There was also, a renewed emphasis on agriculture and rural development.
In his first budget speech, J.H. Mensah, the Minister of Finance and
Economic Planning, summed up the importance of agriculture to the
nation’s economy, as follows:
Agriculture remains by far the biggest preoccupation of the
government.
Once we can be assured of adequate food
production, of maintaining our place in the world cocoa
market and of a reasonable supply of agricultural raw
materials, the economy can be considered to be established
on secure foundations.
Until then we will continue to live
insecurely, at the mercy not only of the weather at home but
also of the evei— rising costs and vagaries of outside
sources of supply, for the most basic requirements to
sustain our lives (cited in Legum 1971, B354-55).
Soon after assuming power, the PP passed the Aliens Expulsion
Order, which effected the expulsion from Ghana of some tens of thousands
of people from other West African countries who did not possess valid
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residence permits.

The order was ostensibly motivated by severe

unemployment in Ghana* by underemployment in the cocoa growing regions*
and by a growing resentment of alien intrusions into the field of petty
trading (Chazan 1983, 159; Killick 1978, 312).

Although not

specifically an agricultural policy initiative, this first major act of
the Busia government had a significant impact on the agricultural
sector.

Naomi Chazan (1983, 160) observed that "the immediate effects

of this policy were to somewhat ease the unemployment problem and to
create serious resentment among Ghana’s neighbors."

More importantly

however, N.O. Addo <1972, 39), found that the expulsion worsened an
already existing shortage of agricultural labor (particularly in the
much needed seasonal agricultural sector).
Reconfirming the Busia administration’s commitment to agricultural
development, J.H. Mensah,

in 1970, declared:

We aim to intensify our support to the agricultural sector
and generally to the rural population.
This policy should
aid our search for greater self-sufficiency in food
supplies.
It should contribute to our quest for a more even
development as between different parts of the country
(Rothchild 1980, 468).
In line with this aim, a series of policy initiatives were put
into effect.

The new agricultural program provided incentives to

producers, upgraded rural services, and sought to improve infrastructure
in the countryside.

Budgetary allocations for rural development and

agriculture rose substantially as the government expanded subsidies to
such agricultural inputs as fertilizers, seeds and implements.
Funds were also made available to cocoa farmers for use in
seasonal advances.

Furthermore, payments to cocoa producers rose to a

new record in 1969-1970 and were sustained throughout the life of the
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Second Republic.

Payments to cocoa farmers were slightly above CISOm

(or 120 million Ghanaian cedis),

in two years of the Busia government,

as compared with an average of CB^m in the three preceding years
(Killick 197B, 307, 324n).

Apart from cocoa, the Busia administration

made significant efforts to promote the cultivation of other crops.
Particular emphasis was placed on the cultivation of rice and maize.

To

encourage farmers in this area, the government provided the Grains
Development Board with a substantial budget to assist growers and
guarantee them competitive prices for their produce (Legum 1971, B35658).
To compensate for the increases in public expenditures in rural
development and agriculture, significant cuts were made in other areas.
For example, while the budgetary allocations for agriculture rose from
CEO.3m,

in 1968-1969 to C27.4m in 1970-1971, those for defense declined

from C50.2m to hC*t2.7m in the same years (Rothchild 1980, 468).

The

increases were also made possible by the fact that during the first year
of the Busia government cocoa fetched a record price on the world
l

market.

Whereas in the eight preceding fiscal year government revenue

from cocoa export duty had brought an annual average of C39.5m,
1970 the average was C133.7m (Killick 1978, 3E^n).

in 1969-

When the increases

in total government revenue from cocoa is taken into account, then the
increases in budgetary allocations to the agricultural sector becomes
less impressive than they at first appear.
The two years of the Busia administration was perhaps not enough
time to assess its agricultural policies, although it did seem that the
stress on rural development was beginning show some dividends.

To carry
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out its rural development program, the Busia government established the
Rural Development Fund in 1970 (Pellow and Chazan 1906» 55).

The

administration also instituted a National Development levy of up to 5
percent of all incomes above C3A per month to finance the development of
the rural areas.

The administration’s achievements in this area,

included the provision of water, electricity, feeder roads and rural
health facilities and education.

Progress was also being recorded in

the production of rice (Killick 1978, 311; Chazan 1983, 160-68).
The most important economic measure for which the PP government is
perhaps best remembered was its 88 percent devaluation of the cedi in
December of 1971.

The devaluation was prompted by the fall in world

cocoa prices, a commodity which still accounted for about 65 percent of
Gha n a ’s foreign exchange earnings.

By the time of the military

intervention on January 13, 1978, the Busia regime had accumulated debts
equal to those compiled by Nkrumah’s CPP government in nine years
(Pel low and Chazan 1986, 56).

Agricultural Policy Under the NRC/SMC (1978-1979)
Unlike the NLC and PP governments, the new military government
under General Acheampong had definite views about the economy and on how
it intended to tackle Ghana’s economic problems.

Thus, immediately

following the coup, Acheampong’s NRC moved swiftly to implement some
short term remedies to the country's problems.

The cedi was revalued by

over AO percent, and a number of medium term debts, contracted during
the Nkrumah era, were repudiated (Austin 1980, A33).
The long-term policy objectives of the NRC was presented in their
January,

1973 Charter of Redemption.

According to the charter, the
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N R C ’s policy objectives were aimed toward "a complete and systematic
transformation of our peoples into a self-reliant nation, unique in its
economic, social, cultural, political, technological and all-round
development, a united nation with a spirit of its own"

(The Charter of

the National Redemption Council 1973; Pellow and Chazan 1986, 57).
A practical step to promote self-reliance was manifested by the
launching of Operation Feed Yourself (OFY), a plan for the development
of food self-sufficiency.

The OFY program sought to increase the

production of foodstuffs (rice, maize, cassava, yams, groundnuts,
plantain, and millet) for the domestic market.

It was hoped that

increasing the domestic production of foodstuffs will ensure the
availability of Ghana’s basic food requirements at reasonable prices and
arrest the country’s excessive dependence on imports.

OFN demonstrated

the N R C ’s commitment to self-reliance by means of agricultural
expansion.

The new government’s commitment to improving agricultural

productivity was further demonstrated when it designated the 1972-197A
period as "agricultural years"

(Rothchild 1980, 468).

A related policy

measure, Operation Feed Your Industries (OFYI), was designed to produce
raw materials (e.g., cotton, tobacco, oil palm, and sugarcane) for use
by Ghanaian industries.
Public expenditure on agriculture rose steadily throughout the
N R C ’s tenure in office.

Whereas budgetary allocations to agriculture

was C29.2m in the 1971-1972 financial year, it rose to C37m in 19751976, C53m in 1976-1977, and C65m in 1977-1978.

In addition,

significant investments were made in the agricultural sector by both
public and private lending agencies.

Government loans, at very generous
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terms, were extended to farmers.

The two major development banksj the

Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the National

Investment Bank

(NIB), expanded their activities in the agricultural sector during the
Acheampong period.

The link between heightened ADB lending and the

N R C ’s OFY program is made clearly apparent by the increase in bank
lending from C8,622,441 in 1971 to an unprecedented C2B,468.713 in 1972.
The NRC years also witnessed increased foreign investment activities in
the agricultural sector

(Rothchild 1980, 469).

The government also

subsidized the cost of seeds, seedlings, fertilizers, cutlasses,
insecticides and expert agricultural advice.

Customs duties on

agricultural machinery and spare parts were waived, tax exemptions were
placed on income from cocoa and taxes on incomes from farming
enterprises in their first five years of operation were abolished
(Rothchild 1980, 470-71; Oquaye 1980, 13).
OFY and other associated NRC policies of self-reliance were, at
least in the short term, a modest success.

The OFY program had acted as

an incentive to agricultural production at many levels.

Even urban

dwellers began to engage in backyard gardening, growing some basic food
items and vegetables.

For about the first three years of the Acheampong

military government, Ghana produced a large proportion of its food
requirements and by 1975 there was hardly any food importation into the
country (McCaskie 1985, 410).
Within three years of its inception, the enthusiasm for OFY fell
noticeably.

O F Y ’s declining impetus was reflected in Ghana’s poor

agricultural performance after 1975.

After registering impressive

growth rates between 1972 and 1974, agricultural production started on a
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downward trend in the mid 1970s.

The production of important crops such

as cassava» maize, rice, palm oil and palm kernels fell noticeably
during this period (see Table 4.2).
Quite obviously declining rainfall in the northern regions of
Ghana during the mid 1970s contributed to O F Y ’s declining impetus.

Yet

in part, at least, it also resulted from government mismanagement and
ineffective planning.

Moreover, as Rothchild (1980, 471), noted,

"government policies, as measured in terms of planned and actual
expenditures, did not match the rhetoric of military rulers."

For

example between 1972 and 1975, public expenditures in agriculture
declined from 6 to 5 percent, while those for defense rose from 8 to 9
percent (Rothchild 1980, 472).
Nowhere was government mismanagement more apparent than in the
area of rice production.

According to the Governor of the Bank of

Ghana, by 1975, the country was no longer importing rice (Legum 1976,
B586).

However, by 1976, the government’s reluctance to assist rice

growers by providing them with much needed farm equipment resulted in a
decline in production.

Unavailability of machines to harvest their rice

on time was a problem for many farmers.

Thousands of acres of rice went

up in flames from bush fires as a result of undue delay in harvesting.
Furthermore, the refusal of the Acheampong administration to pay farmers
a favorable price for their produce encouraged some farmers to hoard
their produce and others to smuggle quantities across the borders to
neighboring countries where they fetched higher prices (Oquaye 1980, 1516).
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The performance of the dominant cocoa sector during the Acheampong
era was particularly unimpressive.

Although the government created a

Ministry of Cocoa Affairs in 1975, cocoa production steadily declined in
the mid 1970s until by the 1978 season, production had fallen to 865
tons, the lowest level in nearly twenty years (see Table 4.8).

This

meant that Ghana was unable to take advantage high cocoa price prevalent
then on the world market.

Government’s efforts to encourage farmers to

produce more by increasing the producer price paid to farmers was of
little consequence.

New producer price increases were always made

meaningless by the soaring inflation rate.

Furthermore, because of low

producer prices, cocoa farmers were forced to smuggle their produce to
neighboring countries where they fetched much more generous prices
(Oquaye 1980, 50).
By July of 1978, the deteriorating economic condition was such
that the army, anxious to protect its reputation, ousted Acheampong in a
palace coup led by his chief of Defense Staff, Lt. Gen. F.W.K. Akuffo.
Upon assuming power, the SMC under Akuffo introduced a series of mediumterm policy measures aimed at easing Ghana’s economic problems.

The

cedi was devalued by 58.S percent and the new administration introduced
an austerity budget.
The 1978-1979 budget, declaring the agricultural sector to be the
government’s top priority,

increased the budgetary allocation to the

sector from C65 million to C76.8 million.

Because of devaluation,

however, this, in, fact represented a significant decline (51 percent)
in allocation to agriculture (Legum 1979, B633).

Despite increasing the

producer price of cocoa, only a small increase in production (9 percent)
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was recorded* while the smuggling of cocoa to neighboring countries
persisted as farmers tried to get competitive price for their produce.
This was due to the fact that increases in producer prices were negated
by high inflation rates (Rimmer 1980, 442).
The policies of the Akuffo administration did not result in any
significant improvements in the agricultural sector or in the economy as
a whole.

The rate of inflation remained high and consumer goods,

particularly local foodstuffs, remained scarce (Rothchild 1980a, A141).
As the situation continued to deteriorate, Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings and
his colleagues toppled the Akuffo regime.

The Armed Forces

Revolutionary Council AFRC) and its chairman, Jerry Rawlings, were in
office for only three months before they handed over power to a civilian
government.

However, in those three months, the AFRC temporarily

dissolved the CMB and the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs which had been
created by Acheampong.
and other cash crops.

They also increased the producer prices on cocoa
The AFRC was in power for too brief a period for

its policies to have had any significant impact on Ghana’s agricultural
sector.
Despite encouraging rhetoric, the various policies of the military
regimes from 1972 to 1979 did not produce a significant increases in
agricultural productivity; Ghana was still not self-sufficient in food
production.

During this period, the growth of agriculture (as part of

GDP) was -0.1 percent, and in terms of per capita income, -3.1 percent
(Pellow and Chazan 1986, 136).

Indeed, the last year of military rule

witnessed significant declines in the productivity of all the major
crops (see Table 4.2).

More importantly, Ghana, which at the beginning
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of 1972 when the NRC first assumed power, was the world's leading
producer of cocoa (accounting for over 25 percent of total world
production), had by 1979 lost it preeminent position, accounting for
only 18 percent of world output (see Table 4.2).

Agricultural Policy Under the Limann Administration (1979-1981)
With production in the agricultural and industrial sectors at low
levels, consumer goods in short supply, and inflation at over 100
percent, President Hi 11a Limann’s PNP administration assumed office in
September 1979 under the most inauspicious of circumstances.
Considering the economic crisis confronting Ghana, the new
administration wisely eschewed ideology and concentrated instead on what
Limann described as realistic solutions to the country’s problems
(Rothchild 1980a, A142).

The first budget of the PNP government called

for cuts in government spending and increases in the prices of such
items as beer, cigarettes and petroleum products, as well as in a
variety of taxes on self-employed persons (Rothchild 1980a, 142).
Since agriculture still accounted for over 40 percent of Ghana’s
GDP and 70 percent of total export earnings,

increasing the productivity

of this sector was a major preoccupation of the PNP government.
Speaking about his administration’s emphasis on agriculture, Limann
declared that "agriculture shall be our first priority now, and for the
foreseeable future.

It is unacceptable that a country which abounds in

arable land should import food or else go hungry"

(Rothchild 1980a,

A142).
Announcing a two-year crash program for agriculture, code-named
the "New-Deal," Limann said that his administration was determined to
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make Ghana self-sufficient in food production.

The government’s plan

involved efforts to bring down food costs by encouraging the peasant
farmer to increase productivity.

This was to be achieved by means of

price incentives and by the provision of subsidized inputs such as hoes?
cutlasses? fertilizers? improved seeds and insecticides.

In order that

quick results may be attained? the administration placed emphasis on the
production of quick-yielding food crops such as plantain? yam? maize?
rice? guinea corn? millet? groundnuts? and soya beans (West Africa 1981?
1039; Legum 1981, B493).
The PNP government also affirmed its support for intensive
production of important foreign exchange earners such as cocoa and palm
oil.

The government’s plan also envisaged a significant increase in the

total area of arable land devoted to agricultural production (West
Africa 1981? 1039).

To carry out its program? the PNP government?

in

its 1980 budget? allocated C14B million to the agricultural sector.
This was 74 percent more than the budgetary allocation to this sector in
the previous year (Legum 1981? B493).
As can be seen from Table 4.E, the agricultural programs of the
Limann administration did not result in the expected increases in
agricultural productivity.

Although there were some modest increases in

the production of some crops (rice and maize)? production of other crops
actually declined during the two years of the Limann administration.
More significantly? cocoa production declined still further from 290
tons in 1979 to 255 tons in 1980 and 247 tons in 1981? the lowest since
the early 1950s (see Table 4.2).

The effects of the decline in

agricultural productivity was manifested in the negative trends in major
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economic indicators.

For example, by the end of 1981 the inflation rate

which had dropped to 50 percent in 1980, rose again to 116.5 percent.
Furthermore, real GDP declined at an average annual rate of 6 percent
during the tenure of the Limann administration (World Bank 1984, 2;
Kraus 1985, 165).

Agricultural Policy Under the PNDC
When Rawlings seized power again in late December of 1981, his
administration focused attention on two major areas:
system of justice and restoring the economy.

imposing a new

During the first year of

PNDC rule, leftist intellectuals and activists were its key supporters
and leaders.

During this period Ghana's economic policy directions were

phrased in radical and catchy rhetoric, most of which alluded to
breaking out of dependency relationships with the "imperialist West"
(Pellow and Chazan 1986, 81).

The first year of PNDC rule witnessed an

increase in direct state participation in economic affairs.

Harking

back to the days of Nkrumah, the PNDC’s Programme for Reconstruction and
Development, unveiled in December of 1982, mandated state control of the
economy.
In the agricultural sphere, where transportation and storage of
crops were major problems, a campaign was launched to evacuate the cocoa
crop, and pool food production, primarily by using student task forces.
To facilitate the transportation of harvested crops, volunteer work
groups were deployed to repair roads.

Furthermore,

in an effort to curb

smuggling, black-marketeering, and currency trafficking, the PNDC
government, in September of 1982, closed all of Ghana’s borders.
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However, the borders were reopened in January of 19B3, to allow for the
re-entry of over a million Ghanaians who had been expelled from Nigeria.
As 1982 came to end it was abundantly clear that the PNDC’s
policies were not producing the desired improvements in Ghana’s economy.
Shortages of almost everything grew more severe, manufacturing was
almost at a standstill; inflation continued at over 100 percent and
cocoa production dropped to 203 thousand metric tons.

Conditions were

further aggravated by persistent drought condition during the 1982-1983
and 1983-198^ planting seasons.

Fires which broke out as a result of

the drought destroyed 300,000 acres of cocoa farms and hundred of acres
of plantain, yam and cassava crops (Legum 1985, B440).
In March,

1983, the PNDC government launched an Economic Recovery

Programme (ERP) which included a number of major reform measures
designed to improve the country’s economy.

These included policies to

reduce the huge price distortions, restore exports, reduce inflationary
budget deficits,

increase prices to cocoa farmers, raise interest rates,

and rehabilitate key productive sectors.

As Jon Kraus <1987, 206),

wrote, "these measures were necessary to obtain promised large infusions
of capital from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank,
and Western donors, without which recovery could not occur."
One of the first, and a major corrective action taken by the
Rawlings administration under the ERP was the devaluation of the
overvalued Ghanaian currency, the cedi.

The cedi was devalued five

times between March of 1983 and January of 1986, culminating in a total
devaluation of 3,172 percent.

The March, 1983 devaluation, along with

budget proposals that imposed a severe austerity regimen, was a
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precondition for the extension of a $300 million loan from the IMF
(Pel low and Chazan 1986, 83).

These measures were immediately effective

in attracting foreign assistance.
In the agricultural sector, the PNDC government was making efforts
to improve productivity.

Cocoa) still the mainstay of the economy

received special attention.

Following the drought and bush fires of

198E-1983 and 19B3-1984, the government embarked on a national cocoa
replanting program aimed at replanting all burnt farms.

Cocoa seedlings

were distributed and compensation of C350 per acre was paid to farmers
who replanted burnt farms.

The program was enthusiastically embraced

only by farmers near the borders) where farms were maintained mostly
because of the ease of smuggling their produce to the more lucrative
markets in the Ivory Coast and Togo (Legum 19B75 B43).
The producer prices paid to cocoa farmers were increased by 67
percent in April of 1983s and by a further 50 percent in May of 1984
(Kraus 1985) 168).

However) given the soaring inflation rates)

increases in producer prices were often inadequate to encourage cocoa
farmers to increase productivity.

Furthermore) difficulties in cashing

government checks paid to cocoa farmers for their crops) was reported to
be encouraging a changeover from cocoa to food farming) from which an
income was more certain (Africa South of the Sahara 1986, 489).
Consequently) cocoa production fell to 160,000 tons in 1983, although it
improved to 173>000 tons in 1984 and 812)000 tons in 1985 (see Table
4.8).
Planting of staple crops was high in 1984> and favorable weather
conditions, combined with new price incentives, helped to facilitate

m
bumper food harvests in 1984 and 1985.

Although rice production fell

from 7 0 s000 tons in 1983 to 66j000 tons in 1984, it increased to an all
time high of 90)000 tons in 1985.

Maize production rose to 575)000 tons

in 1984) although it declined to 411)000 tons in 1985.

As can been seen

from Table 4.2, cassava output more than doubled between 1983 and 1984)
while yams) groundnuts and palm oil showed noticeable improvements in
1984 and 1985.

However) the rise in food production was not sufficient

to meet the country’s food requirements.
As 1985 came to a close5 to ensure the continuity of food supplies
throughout the year, the PNDC administration was making plans to improve
the storage facilities to facilitate the storage of surplus produce.

A

price-support structure) to combat fluctuating producer prices was
introduced in 1985) and moves were under way to sell some of the
remaining state farms (Africa South of the Sahara 1986) 490).

Impressed

by the commitment of the Rawlings government to the Economic Recovery
Program (ERP), foreign donors were eager to invest in agricultural
improvement projects.

For example) the state-owned Food Distribution

Corporation (FDC) was able to build a number of silos with financial
assistance from Britain and the World Bank.

Similarly) the

International Development Association <IDA)5 provided a credit of $40m,
to allow the importation of farm inputs, such as fertilizers) spare
parts for farm machinery and vehicles (Africa South of the Sahara 1986)
490; Legum 1987, B43).
In spite of the gains made in agricultural productivity in 1984
and 1985, the fear is that this trend may not continue.
Choi, the World Bank’s Accra representative admitted:

For as Seung
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Table 4.3
Ghana’s Share of World Cocoa Production for Selected Years

1958

1961

1964

1967

1970

1973

1976

1979

1988

1985

E60
565
980

416
830
1140

581
1190
1530

484
978
1366

396
1066
1461

343
941
1354

380
890
1387

890
1011
1681

803
979
1711

818
1070
1963

Percentaaes
Africa
46.0
Wor Id
88.3

50.1
36.5

48.8
38.0

43.4
31.0

37.8
87.1

36.5
85.3

36.0
83.1

88.7
17.9

80.7
11.9

19.8
10.8

YEAR
000 tons
Ghana
Africa
Wor Id

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations? United
Nations? 1961-1987.
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The sort of reforms Ghana is undertaking will
succeed only if they can be sustained over time.
But there is always a time lag concerning the
benefits, which raises the question of the
social and political acceptability of this sort
of program.
Some governments get stuck on some
issues and the reforms may not Continue (Novicki
1987, 50-51).
The ERP, which was responsible for most of the gains made in the
agricultural sector, demanded a considerable amount of sacrifice from
Ghanaian citizens.

As the period covered by this study came to an end,

the trade unions were beginning to clamor for an increase in minimum
wage and students were protesting the removal of meal and housing
subsidies.

Should the Rawlings administration acquiesce to demands to

relax the stringent austerity measures dictated by the ERP, the modest
gains made in the various sectors of the economy will quickly disappear.

Conclusion
The results of the quantitative analysis in Chapter Three (see
results in Tables 3.3 to 3.16), indicate that there was no clear and
consistent difference between military and civilian regimes, according
to selected generalizable standards of measurements.

The results as

they relate to Ghana are reproduced in Table 4.A below.

They show that

civilian rulers in Ghana allotted a greater proportion of GDP to overall
public expenditure (PSPEND) than did their military counterparts.
Although the difference between the two regime types was significant in
this regard, the results also indicate that there was no significant
difference between Ghanaian regimes in the way in which they allocated
public funds to the major sectors of the society or in the outcomes of
their policy initiatives, as measured by productivity in the
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Table 4.4
Results of Siatple Country Analysis for Ghana, 1960-1985

VARIABLE
PSPEND
PHEALTH
PEDUC
PDEFEN
PMAN
PAGRIC

*.05<prob.<.10
*!oi<prob.<.05
**prob.<.01

MILITARY*a)
0.0165?*
0.0116
0.0328
0.0132
0.0989
0.0989

CIVILIAN(a+b)
0.2140
0.0133
0.0361
0.0164
0.0894
0.0891

t
2.2081
1.0100
0.8013
1.1282
-0.5361
-0.5361

Sig.
0.0370
0.3226
0.4308
0.2704
0.5993
0.5993
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manufacturing and agricultural sectors.

These findings are consistent

with the general pattern of regime performance demonstrated in this
chapter.

This examination showed that, in the formulation of public

policy, there were no discernable homogeneous differences between
military and civilian regimes in Ghana.
The case study of Ghana has shown that policies of both regime
types were guided at various times by capitalist principles and, at
other times, by socialist ones.

For example, the policies of civilian-

led CPP government (from 1963 to 1966) and those the military-led PNDC
(from 1981-1983), were based on socialist economic doctrines; by
contrast, the economic policies of three of Ghana’s military regimes
(NLC, NRC/SMC I and SMC II) and those of its civilian successors (PP and
PNP) were based on capitalist principles.
Irrespective of their guiding ideology, alternating civilian and
military regimes in Ghana acknowledged that agriculture was the mainstay
of the economy.

Consequently, in their attempts to master the country’s

tottering economy, agriculture was made the centerpiece of their
respective economic policy initiatives.

Measured by their objective

achievements, their efforts since independence, and especially between
1962 and 1983, were clearly unsuccessful.

The performance of Ghana’s

agricultural sector has been poor since the early 1960s and has
deteriorated sharply since the mid-1970s (see Table 4.2).
Although it is still too soon to determine the outcomes of the
policies of the Rawlings administration, this study clearly shows that
no regime type has been able to develop and sustain an effective
economic policy.

Furthermore, the study illustrates that although
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control of the policy-making process alternated between civilian and
military regimes) "the fact remains that the economic outcomes remained
by and large persistent) negative) and somewhat mysteriously
predictable"

(Chazan 19835 178).

The problems which beset the economy

at the time of the fall of one regime continued to exist) and some even
became worse by the time of the fall of its successor.

The decline in

agricultural productivity is a case in point.
The ability of respective Ghanaian regimes to bring about
sustainable growth in the agricultural sector has been undermined by a
variety of factors.

As Rothchild (1980) 471) observed) the failure of

the N R C ’s OFY program was a reflection "of a variety of constraints that
had long affected Ghanaian agriculture adversely:
capital)

lack of investment

inadequate foreign exchange) mounting domestic and

international inflation) poor transportation facilities) smuggling) a
shortage of farm laborers) over-centralization5 and ineffective
planning."

Similar constraints could be blamed for the ineffectiveness

of the agricultural policies of the other Ghanaian regimes.
Among all the foregoing) factors perhaps the most pertinent
constraint was the inability of Ghana’s rulers to develop effective
plans for the implementation their respective agricultural policy.

Had

the immediate post-independent governments (CPP & NLC)5 been able to
follow the system of priorities outlined in their respective development
plans) there probably would have been no problems with lack of
investment capital)
of farm laborers.

inadequate foreign exchange) smuggling) or shortage
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The "Second Development Plan" of the Nkrumah administration
provides many indications of the lack of consistency between policy and
implementation.

For example* the "Plan" allotted almost SO percent of

total planned public investment during the period 1963-1969, to the
agricultural sector.

However, what actually happened was that the state

agricultural sector during the first two years of the plan spent at rate
far exceeding its allocation in the plan, and development expenditure in
activities affecting private small holders was far below plan
allocations (Berg 1971, 196, S08).

The failure of government to spend

on the private sector its allotted share <50 percent) of total planned
agricultural

investment had a negative impact on productivity.

It

encouraged the reallocation of farm labor to the inefficient state
farms, which paid better than the traditional farming sector.
Consequently, reducing the availability of labor to the more productive
private sector.
The series of military and civilian regimes which came after
Nkrumah were similarly unable to follow established plans.

The tendency

to misallocate funds to unproductive sectors of the economy was a major
characteristic of all of Ghana’s governments since independence (Boahen
1975; Jones 1976; Oquaye 1980; Chazan 1983; Kraus 1982; 1983; Pel low and
Chazan 1986).

Both military and civilian governments were equally

unable to exercise budgetary discipline or impose strong control on
public expenditure.
Yet it would be unfair to conclude on a totally negative note.
Since Ghana attained independence, there has been a considerable
enhancement of the physical infrastructure and of the social amenities.
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New roads and buildings* factories and airports* schools and hospitals,
and the Volta and Kainji Darns, stand out as substantial accomplishments.
Although most of these structures have not been well-maintained, post
independence Ghana contrasts sharply with the colonial Gold Coast, where
there was much uncultivated land and little infrastructural development.
Development, however, properly consists of more than tall office
blocks and luxury hotels.

Unfortunately for Ghana, in the sometimes

mistaken urge to build big, and to industrialize at any cost,
agriculture (despite such exhortations about "green revolution,"
"Operation Feed Yourself" campaigns, and the periodic rhetoric of its
supposed primacy), has often been ignored.
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Chapter Five
REGIME TYPE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR IN LIBERIA, 1945-1985

Whether it makes a difference for a country to be governed by
civilians or military officers cannot be conclusively determined by
looking at regime performance in only one or two policy areas.

Regime

performance in a variety of policy domains needs to be investigated.
Any serious discussion of this issue will not be complete without at
least a look at the foreign policy behavior of the different regime
types.

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether there

is any correlation between regime type and foreign policy behavior.
this end, the following additional hypothesis will be tested:

To

Regime

change is more likely to bring about variation in foreign policy than
continuous leadership.
This hypothesis is derived from Rosenau’s (1971, 111-17),
observation that a change in the incumbent leadership will bring about a
change in foreign policy.

The plausibility of the hypothesis is further

enhanced by Sang-Seek Park’s (1980, 138-43) observation that a violent
leadership change is more likely to install a new regime whose
ideological position is different from that of the incumbent.
The external policy of an administration is reflected in a variety
of foreign policy initiatives.

For example, formal diplomatic and trade

relations are two very important indicators of an administration’s
foreign policy priority.

Since most sub-Saharan African countries are

not economically self-sufficient, attempts to secure foreign aid are
often a major preoccupation of these national governments.
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1B<*

Consequently, the type of aid sought and received, and the source of
aid, are also very important indicators of the foreign policy direction
of an administration.
This chapter will focus exclusively on the relationship between
changes in regime type and foreign policy behavior in Liberia.

Liberia

has been chosen as the focus of attention for several reasons.

Its long

membership in the United Nations (Liberia is one of only two African
countries that were original members of the UN), its unique relationship
with the United States, and the availability of data make Liberia a good
subject for this case study.
Since its creation as an African settlement for freed slaves, the
nation of Liberia has had a "special relationship" with the United
States.

The United States has been the major source of economic and

military aid, as well as the major international trading partner of
Liberia.

A comparison of the status of the relationship between Liberia

and the United States, the status of the relation between Liberia and
the rest of Africa, and Liberia’s trade relations under both civilian
and military administrations in Liberia, should provide a useful
yardstick for determining whether it makes a difference for a country to
be governed by a civilian or military leaders.

Historical Background:

Important Domestic Developments

Modern Liberia’s history dates from the early nineteenth century
when the American Colonization Society was founded in the United States
to provide for the welfare of some 200,000 freed slaves.

It was decided

that the most promising plan was to repatriate the freed slaves to
Africa (Strong 1930, 32).

Having purchased land from the African
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inhabitants of the "Malagueta" or "Brain Coast" the American
Colonization Society, with the tacit approval and economic support of
the United States government, started shipping freed slaves to Africa.
The first settlers landed at the site of present-day Monrovia in 1BE2.
On July £6, 1847, the settlement was proclaimed the independent
republic of Liberia, the first independent republic in Africa.
Monrovia, named after President James Monroe, who had been instrumental
in convincing Congress to appropriate funds for the new settlement, was
chosen as the capital of the new republic (Sisay 1985, 13).
The constitution of the newly independent country was modeled
after the constitution of the United States.

It contained a declaration

of rights, defined legislative and executive powers, and outlined the
organization of a judicial branch much in the same fashion as the U.S.
Constitution.

This 1847 constitution remained, with few amendments, the

law of the country until 1980, when the civilian administration of
President William Tolbert was overthrown by members of the Liberian
mi 1itary.
No discussion of the Liberian state can get very far without
discussing the relationship between the Americo-Liberians (as the freed
slaves who founded Liberia called themselves), and the indigenous
population.

Although Liberia is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa

that was never a colony, the relationship between the Americo-Liberians
and the indigenous tribal groups bore a close resemblance to colonialism
(Brown 1941, 117, 137; Wrubel

1971, 189-204).

Americo-Liberians were Christian zealots.

They spoke the English

language and regarded the non-English speaking, non-Christian natives as
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"uncivilized."

The native people were encouraged to remain in their

homelands in the hinterland.*

Exceptions were made, however, when

inexpensive labor was needed on the large estates established by
Americo-Liberians (Nelson 1985, xxiv).

The two groups remained distinct

societies at practically all levels.
The territorial distinction between Americo-Liberians and the
native Africans was disrupted when the "scramble for Africa" began at
the beginning of the twentieth century, forcing the Liberian government
to confront the colonialist ambitions of the European powers.

In its

efforts to demonstrate effective control of its hinterland, Liberia
gradually became an active participant in the scramble for Africa’s
interior, and was at times, even prepared to accept the "rules of the
game" as laid down by the Berlin conference.

In 1906, for example,

President Arthur Barclay noted "...that several Liberian expeditions
have been sent to that section of country, that the Liberian flag has
been raised, that Liberian patrols have been stationed there, and that
the territory is now occupied in the same manner that interior territory
is occupied by European Power"

(Gershoni 1985, 33-36).

Subsequently, the hinterland population was brought under the
direct control of the central government when citizenship status was
extended to "all peoples of Negro descent" in Liberia.

The hinterland

regions were divided into three provinces, and these were divided into
tribes, each of which was governed by clan chiefs, responsible to a
district commissioner appointed by the president.
was directly represented in government,

None of the provinces

in contrast to the five coastal

counties which were controlled by Americo-Liberians, and whose elected
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representatives made up the legislature (Wrubel 1971, 191).

This system

of indirect rule was copied from neighboring British-ruled Sierra Leone.
This colonial pattern of rule continued until

1943 when William

Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman was elected president of Liberia.

In his

inaugural address on January 3, 1944, the new president declared that
his administration ’’shall engage in and strive at the assimilation and
unification of our various populations composing the body politic.
Liberia must be a place for all Liberians to live alike, all to stand
equally privileged, responsible and protected by like administration of
the law" (Boley 1983, 64).

Tubman’s inaugural declaration later became

known as the “National Unification Policy."
The National Unification Policy resulted in the initiation of
several steps aimed at bringing the indigenous population into the
country’s political and economic processes.

For example, reforms were

introduced that brought about universal adult suffrage and extended the
principle of direct legislative representation to the hinterland
regions.

Notwithstanding this and other changes initiated by Tubman,

Americo-Liberians remained the dominant force in Liberia.

For example,

voting rights granted to the indigenous population did not translate
into any real political power as Americo-Liberians continued to be over
represented in the legislature (Dunn and Tarr 198B, 62).

Furthermore,

the True Whig Party (TWP) remained the only political party and the
leadership of the party remained concentrated in the hands of a few
Americo-Liberian families (Liebenow 1987, 107).
In the economic sphere, the Tubman administration adopted the
"Open Door Policy" which had been recommended in 1930 by an
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International Commission of Inquiry (Boley 1983, 6**).

The Open Door

Policy was intended "to encourage the investment of foreign capital
the development of the country (Clapham 1989, 591).

in

These policies

opened the hinterland to foreign investors searching for mineral
resources (including iron ore, diamonds and manganese).

Consequently in

the early years of Tubman’s rule, Liberia witnessed a tremendous growth
in its economy.

This growth was fueled primarily by foreign investment

in mining and agriculture (Clower, et al. 1966; Wilson 1971, 200).
The last years of the Tubman era were marked by economic recession
and the government had to implement austerity measures.

Ihis, in turn,

created discontent among Liberians and increasing, though clandestine
opposition political activity.

In July of 1971, Tubman’s twenty-seven-

year rule ended suddenly with his death at an eye clinic in London.
Having served for two decades as vice president to Tubman, William
Richard Tolbert became the nineteenth president of Liberia on July 23,
1971.

In his first

inaugural address, Tolbert asserted that theprimary

objective of his administration was to
"wholesome functioning society."

make Liberia what he called a

Tolbert declared:

We seek a wholesome functioning society where merit, not
favoritism; productivity not influence and connection;
selflessness, not selfish individualism, form the criteria
for real distinction....
Especially devoted to discipline
and order under the law, the wholesome functioning society
must express concrete concern for the poor and
underprivileged, and must ensure security and protection tor
its citizens, and their freedom from fear and intimidation.
It must guarantee opportunities for all, with the
corresponding responsibility that all must be equally
dedicated, as a prerequisite, to enjoyment of the benefits
to be derived
therefrom...(Boley 1983, 80).
Tolbert’s inaugural

address raised the hopes of many Liberians.

Indigenous Liberians were particularly gratified by Tolbert’s promise to
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resurrect and expand lubman’s unification program, which had been
neglected in the last years of the Tubman era.
Tolbert emphasized the need for self-reliance, decreased
dependence on foreign aid, and the Liberianization of the economy.

He

proposed the organization of a national fund-raising rally for the
purpose of raising funds to implement national development objectives
(Boley 1983, 88-83; Liebenow 1987, 184).
By the end of his first term in office Tolbert had become the
dominant a political figure in Liberia.

Despite the call by Former

Attorney General Abayomi Cassell for the formation of a second party, no
opposition group registered and Tolbert ran unopposed in the October
1975 elections.
began to develop.

However, soon after his election victory opposition
Among the opposition were groups such as the Movement

for Justice in Africa (MOJA), formed by professors and students at the
University of Liberia; and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL)
formed by Liberian students in the United States (Boley 1983, 97;
Liebenow 1987, 174-78; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 75).
In the late 1970s, in the face of rising energy costs and a
decline in the world price of iron ore (Liberia’s principal export), the
Tolbert administration was forced to introduce austerity measures.

In

April of 1979, the government’s announcement of a 50 percent increase in
the price of Liberia’s staple food, rice, led to mass public
demonstrations.

Police attempts to restore order resulted in the deaths

of many demonstrators.

Alarmed by the intensity of the confrontation,

Tolbert called upon President Sekou Toure of Guinea to dispatch Guinean
troops to restore order (Liebenow 1987, 178).
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On April IS, 1980, almost a year to the date of the "rice riots,"
as the events of April,

1979 have been labeled, the Tolbert government

was toppled in a violent coup, led by an indigenous Liberian, Master
Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe.

Tolbert and twenty-six other occupants of

the Executive Mansion were killed during the coup.
The coup makers established the People’s Redemption Council
to administer the affairs of the country.
Doe.

(PRC)

The PRC was headed by Samuel

As Chairman of the PRC, Doe became the twenty-first Head of State

of Liberia.

Thus, after 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule, the

indigenous Africans, who constituted the vast majority of Liberia’s
population, finally took power.
Among the first acts of the new military leaders was the
suspension of the 1847 Constitution, and the banning of the TWP.
Several

leaders of the TWP were arrested and charged with various crimes

against the Liberian people.

After being tried and found guilty by a

military tribunal, thirteen of them were executed and the rest sentenced
to long prison terms.
abroad, the executions,

Although they aroused widespread condemnation
like the coup itself, were popular in Liberia

(Liebenow 1987, 186, Dunn and Tarr 1988, 93).
In his first policy

statement after the coup, Doe assured

Liberians that the military will initiate "real change" and direct the
"building of a new society"

in which the injustices endured by the

masses will be alleviated

(Holloway 1981, 161; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 94).

But the objectives of the

PRC represented an enormous task for a

military government composed of young soldiers lacking in administrative
experience and formal education beyond high school level.

Candid
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recognition of these limitations resulted in the appointment of a
cabinet in which key portfolios were given to civilians (Nelson 1985j
xxvi i ).
The Liberian economy was on the verge of collapse at the time of
the coup and the Doe regime was obliged to accept an IMF economic
stabilization plan, under which the PRC was required to adopt an
austerity program.

In compliance with the program, a $9 million subsidy

on rice prices was lifted, gasoline and income taxes were raised.2
However, defense spending was not affected by the PRC's austerity
program.

Consequently the overall spending on national security

(defense and cost classified as "public order and safety") more than
doubled during the first year of the Doe regime (Dunn and Tarr 1988,
96).
In the political sphere the PRC made preparations for a return to
civilian rule by its promulgation of a new constitution in 1984.

The

constitution bore a strong resemblance to the one that had been in force
before the coup.

Changes from the old constitution included the

abolition of property qualifications for voters and the reduction of the
initial presidential term from eight to four years.

The ban on

political activities was lifted in July of 1984.
Among the many parties that tried to register to participate in
the forthcoming elections, only four were allowed to register.

They

included the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) led by Samuel
Doe, the Unity Party (UP) led by Dr. Edward Kesselly, the Liberian
Action Party (LAP) led by Jackson Doe (a former TWP politician and no
relation to Samuel Doe), and the Liberian Unification Party (LUP) led by
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Gabriel Kpollahj a teacher.

More serious opponents to D o e ’s candidacy

were not allowed to contest the election (James 1986, 33).
By the time of the election, opposition to D o e ’s reqime was
widespread.

Opposition groups were harassed and Doe had some of their

leaders detained.

The election which was held on the 15th of October

1985, was widely believed to have been fraudulent.

After a two week

delay it was announced that Doe had eked out a 50.9 percent victory in a
four-way race for the presidency (Clapham 1987, 593; Liebenow 1987, 29396).

President Doe was formerly inaugurated as the first president of

the Second Republic on January 6, 1986.
During Doe’s five and one half years as head of the PRC Liberia
had struggled with a steadily worsening economy, and by the time of his
inauguration the economy was far less viable than it was in 1980.

Liberian Foreign Policy

Historical Background (1847-1944)
In 1848, Great Britain became the first country to recognize the
new independent Republic of Liberia.

Despite continued economic and

military support, it was not until 1862 that the U.S. extended official
recognition to the Republic.

Despite official recognition, however,

American relationship with Liberia remained ambiguous.

At a time when

Liberia was trying to ward off both European and native African
challenges to its territorial claims, the U.S. government remained vague
in its expression of support for Liberian cause (Sisay 1985, 15-16).
Uncertain of U.S. commitments to protecting Liberia’s sovereignty,
the Monrovia government appealed to Britain for security and financial
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support.

Subsequently) the British government agreed to aid Liberia in

reforming its monetary and judicial systems and in establishing a
Liberian "frontier force" (LFF)

(Gershoni 19B5) 92-93).

British-

Liberian ties were also manifested in the areas of trade and education.
Britain became the primary source of Liberia’s imports and the British
pound became and remained Liberia’s official currency until 1993) when
it was replaced by the U.S. dollar.
Although Liberia’s foreign relations during the early part of the
twentieth century were European-oriented) the American connection
remained strong.

For example) when British involvement in Liberian

affairs culminated in a situation in which Britain attempted to
transform Liberia into a British colony) Liberia guaranteed its
independence by securing United States assistance (Boley 1989) 36-37;
Gershoni 1985) 99-95; Liebenow 1987) 17).

Army officers from the United

States assumed the responsibility for the command and training of the
LFF.

Their efforts succeeded in providing Monrovia with the means to

impose its control over the hinterland population.
In May of 1922) Britain announced the "Stevenson Plan" by which
rubber exports from British producing areas will be regulated so as to
facilitate an increase in the price of rubber.

During this period)

Britain effectively controlled 80 percent of the world’s production of
rubber> while the United States consumed about 70 percent of total
production (Boley 1963) 38).

In an effort to offset the detrimental

impact of the Stevenson Plan on the U.S.-based Firestone Tire Company)
its president) Harvey S. Firestone) Jr.) decided to establish a rubber
plantation in Liberia.

Subsequently) a concession agreement was

19A

concluded between Firestone and the Liberian government (Lowenkopf 1976,
38-39).
With the coming of Firestone, the "European period" of Liberia’s
foreign relations ended.
largest employer,
Liberia.

The Firestone plantations quickly became the

importer, exporter and trainer of human skills in

Firestone’s dominance of the Liberian economy was such that

the country became colloquially known as the "Firestone colony"

(van der

Kraaij 1983, xv).
Rapid changes in Liberia’s foreign relations began with World War
II.

When Japanese activities in southeast Asia began to affect the

sources of raw materials to the U.S. and her allies, Liberia’s
significance to the allies was greatly enhanced (Sisay 1985, 135).
Liberia became the principal source of rubber for the allies— a source
that needed to be safeguarded.

Consequently, in March of 19A2,

President Roosevelt declared that the defense of Liberia was vital to
the defense of the United States.

He then proceeded to send a "Special

Representative" to Liberia to negotiate the use of Liberian facilities
in the war effort.

This resulted in the signing,

in March of 19A2, of a

defense agreement between the United States and Liberia.

According to

the agreement, the Government of Liberia granted to the United States
for the duration of the war:
the right to construct, control, operate and defend at the
sole cost and expense of the latter and without charge to
the Republic of Liberia, such military and commercial
airports in the Republic as in consultation with the
government of the Republic of Liberia may mutually be
considered necessary; and the right also to assist in the
protection and defense of any part of the Republic which
might be liable to attack during the present war, said grant
to include the right to construct access roads from Monrovia
to the airport at Roberts Field on the Farmington River and
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the seaplane facilities at Fisherman Lake in the county of
Grand Cape Mount (Dept, of State Bulletin, VII p. 979, cited
in Goodrich and Carroll 1944, 600-604).
In July of 1940, in implementing of the agreement, U.S. forces were
stationed in Liberia.

The United States also agreed to train and equip

the Liberian army (Lowenkopf 1976, 40).
Germany protested the U.S.-Liberian agreement, calling it a
violation of Liberian neutrality; and Berlin threatened to hold Liberia
answerable for every disadvantage and damage suffered by German citizens
as a result of the Republic’s agreements with the United States (Sisay
1985, 136).

Having been assured U.S. protection, Liberia ignored the

German protest and, subsequently, ordered the German Consul and his
staff to leave Liberia (Goodrich and Carroll 1944, 601).

In January ot

1943, the U.S. signed a lend-lease agreement with Liberia.

Foreign Policy During the Tubman Era, 1944-1971
The election of Tubman as Liberia’s new president in 1943, led to
the introduction of policies which effected at least two important
changes in Liberia’s international relations.

The first of Tubman’s

programs to alter Liberian international posture was the "Open Door
Policy," which invited virtually unrestricted foreign investment into
Liberia and changed the economic landscape of the country forever.
Another change occasioned by Tubman’s election was the establishment of
Liberia as an important actor in Pan-African politics.

Despite these

two important changes, the focus of Liberia’s external relations
remained dominated by its "special relationship" with the United States-a relationship which intensified under the Tubman administration.
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Liberian-U.S. Relations During the Tubman Era
On January £7, 19AA, three weeks after Tubman’s inauguration,
Liberia declared war against Germany and Japan.

Having thus forcefully

demonstrated its commitment to the allied cause and to the United States
in particular, in a further display of its affinity with the U.S.,
Liberia converted its currency from the British pound to the U.S.
dollar.
Liberia was subsequently a founding member of the United Nations
and its specialized agencies.

In 1960, it became the first African

state to be selected to seat on the Security Council.

As a member of

the UN during the Tubman era, Liberia seldom deviated from the American
position when important international issues were discussed.

For

example, Tubman as well as his successor, Tolbert, provided diplomatic
support for the American position with respect to the war in Vietnam.
Liberia’s commitment to the Western position in general and the U.S.
position in particular were so strong that it occasionally led to
Liberian equivocations on the major issues in postwar African politics
(Dunn 1979).

For example, despite Liberia’s support for the O A U ’s

advocacy of nonalignment in the cold war, the country remained
vigorously anti-communist during the Tubman era.
Throughout the Tubman period Liberia also had no diplomatic
relations with a communist country (although diplomatic relations with
the USSR were formally established in 196^, they were not actually
initiated until 197S when a Soviet embassy was opened in Monrovia).
Although Liberia regularly extended invitations to communist states to
attend Tubman’s many inaugurations, when these communist states would
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reciprocate by inviting Tubman to visit their countries, excuses would
be offered for Tubman’s inability to accept the invitation.
negative responses to these invitations were no doubt,
United States.

Liberia’s

influenced by the

For example, in 1956, the Liberian ambassador in

Washington was told by an official of U.S. State Department to decline a
Soviet invitation to Tubman because to accept it "would unfavorably
reflect on the prestige of the U.S. government, especially so due to its
close ties with the Liberian government" (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 191).
Liberia’s international stance during this period was consistent
with Tubman’s declared policy objective of cultivating "the closest
possible friendly relations" with the West and supporting "their general
national and international aims"

(Dunn and Tarr 1988, 172).

It was

during the Tubman presidency that an Agreement of Cooperation between
Liberia and the United States was signed.

The 1959 agreement made

Liberia the first— and thus far the only— African state to conclude a
mutual defense pact with the United States (Liebenow 1987, 136).
In terms of economic assistance, Article II of the 1959 Agreement
stipulated that the United States "will continue to furnish the
Government of Liberia such assistance as may be mutually agreed upon
between the Government of the United States and the Government of
Liberia in the effective promotion of its economic development and in
the preservation of its national independence and integrity"
1960, 429-30).

(Zimmer

Thereafter, the U.S. substantially increased its

financial and technical assistance to Liberia.

In addition tD emergency

measures, such as the sale of rice in 1966 at low cost under the Food
for Peace program, the U.S. provided technical assistance in the fields
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of road construction, agriculture, forestry, fish production, public
administration and veterinary science.

The greatest technical

assistance, however, was in the field of education, especially in the
form of the Peace Corps volunteers sent to Liberia.

Since 1962, two

hundred Peace Corps volunteers have served in Liberia each year on twoyear contracts (Liebenow 1987, 136).
During the period 19A6-1972, U.S. official development assistance
to Liberia totaled $195 million ($119 million in grants and $76 million
in loans).
loans were:

Among the major projects completed with U.S. grants and
the Free Port of Monrovia, Roberts International Airport,

major segments of the interior road systems, a hydroelectric dam at Mt.
Coffee near Monrovia, elementary and secondary schools, and the National
Medical Center in Monrovia which included the 271-bed John F. Kennedy
Hospital and Training Center

(U.S. Dept, of State 1973, 3).

Additional

support for Liberia’s development efforts were provided by American
business, missionary, and educational organizations, which were very
active in the country.

Liberia and the Rest of Africa During the Tubman Era
Until the late 1950s, Liberia’s international affairs were limited
to relations with the United States and the European colonial powers.
The surge toward independence among African states in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, however, brought about a pronounced reordering of Liberia’s
foreign policy priorities.

The independence of Ghana in 1957 and of

Guinea in 1958 encouraged Liberia to become a more active participant in
African affairs.

Tubman was concerned about the ideological disposition

of the leaders of the two newly independent African states, and their
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effect on Africa in general and Liberia in particular.

The Monrovia

government was especially concerned about the socialist regime of Sekou
Toure in Guinea, Liberia’s neighbor to the north.

Liberia’s

apprehension regarding its own well-being in an independent Africa was
expressed by the Secretary of Defense in his Annual Report for 1960:
With the attainment of independence of our sister African
brothers [sic] contiguous to our borderline? problems which
we never thought of are arising and have to be grappled with
[with] every degree of efficiency and alertness.
Not only
are the problems of the crossing into out territories of
citizens of other states involved but also the question of
national ideologies, some of which are divergent to ours and
destined to threaten and uproot the very foundation upon
which our democratic institution was founded.
To ensure
that the situation just referred to will be averted and not
permitted to take a foothold in Liberia we have to
strengthen and increase our border control units and give
more attention to border problems as they arise from day to
day (cited in Liebenow 1987, 143).
Dreading isolation on the continent, Liberia aligned itself with
the cause of decolonization and self-rule for all of Africa.
became an active champion of Pan-Africanism.

Tubman

However, he was reluctant

to go as far as Ghana’s Nkrumah who envisaged a political union of all
independent African states (Nkrumah 1957; 1963).

Tubman was also

disturbed by Nkrumah’s ambition to assume the leadership role in
independent Africa.
In furtherance of his ambition,

in April of 1958, Nkrumah had

taken the initiative in inviting to Accra the first conference of
independent African states.

The conference was attended by all of the

eight independent African states (Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia,
Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia).

However, other than Nkrumah, Tubman

was the only head of state and government present.

Apparently, the

leaders of Arab north African states were not ready to accept Nkrumah’s
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leadership.

Nkrumah was not discouraged, however, and as soon as Guinea

attained its independence, Nkrumah began making overtures to its leader,
Sekou Toure.

Soon after, the two leaders declared that their two

countries had united to form the Union of West African States.

Other

African countries were invited to join.
Although the Ghana-Guinea union amounted to nothing more than a
paper union,
leaders.

it was sufficient to cause some concern among Liberian

Tubman was probably disturbed over the possibility of

Nkrumah’s having access to Liberia’s border by way of Guinea.

In an

effort to contain Nkrumah’s radical version of Pan-Africanism, Tubman
invited both Nkrumah and Toure to a meeting.

The meeting took place in

Liberia’s remote interior at Sanniquellie in 1959.

At the meeting,

Tubman put forth an alternative Nkrumah’s political union idea.

He

suggested a loose political federation that would agree in areas of
mutual economic and political interests.

Tubman succeeded in convincing

Toure that his idea of functional cooperation was more practical for the
time being.

The resulting Sanniquellie Declaration was a victory for

Tubman (Holloway 1981, 35-36).
In May of 1961, a conference of Heads of African and Malagasy
States took place in Monrovia.

This conference signaled the deepening

cleavage between the radical socialist-oriented states (called the
Casablanca Group) and the more moderate or conservative states (which
came to be called the Brazzaville and later the Monrovia Group).

The

Monrovia conference endorsed Tubman’s approach of functional cooperation
in such areas as trade, communications, transportation, and the like,
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rather than the political union favored by the Casablanca Group (which
included Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Algeria).
At the Monrovia meeting, African leaders agreed to hold another
summit meeting in Lagos, Nigeria in 1962, in order to develop technical
and cultural cooperation and carry forward the "unity of aspirations and
actions" of African states.

In preparation for the African summit, the

Tubman administration prepared a draft charter for a future African
organization, as well as a detailed proposal for non-political
cooperation.

Upon presenting the draft to those present at the Lagos

Summit, Tubman pointed out that it "represented the thinking of the
Liberian government on the organizational mechanics of African and
Malagasy cooperation," intended by no means to be definitive.

"It may

be accepted, amended, revised or completely rejected", he added (Dunn
and Tarr 1988, 185-86).

The Liberian draft proposal, after some

revisions was accepted and subsequently became on May E5, 1963, the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Tubman’s moderate

imprint on the Charter was clear.
The trend in post-1963 Africa toward economic cooperation
represented a significant victory for Tubman’s African policy, which had
resisted Nkrumahs’ bid to lead Africa into some kind of political union.
Under Tubman, Liberia collaborated with other African countries to forge
functional associations.

A 1960 Liberian proposal for West African

economic cooperation was the beginning of a collaboration which
culminated in the establishment of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) in 1975.

202
Throughout the Tubman era, relations between Liberia and other
African countries (with the notable exception of Ghana)9 were very
cordial.

Only after Nkrumah’s ouster in 1966 did the two countries

resume normal relations.

Despite widely divergent ideological outlooks,

relations between Tubman and Toure and their two countries were very
friendly.

Tubman’s remarkable political and diplomatic skills enabled

him to assume a vigorous stance on southern Africa, while the domestic
situation in his own country still bore some resemblance to apartheid.
Even more significant was the fact that Tubman vehemently opposed South
Africa’s apartheid system at a time when Liberia’s constitution
specified that only "persons of Negro descent" could become citizens,
vote or own land thus excluding thousands of Lebanese entrepreneurs long
established in Monrovia solely on racial grounds (Adelman 1979, 9-12).
Tubman’s skills also enabled him to support the O A U ’s policies on
southern African liberation, anti-colonialism, and even nonalignment in
the cold war, while maintaining Liberia’s "special relationship" with
the U.S. To be sure, Liberia’s forceful anti-communist stance during the
Tubman era compensated for any of Liberia’s OAU motivated policies which
may have been incompatible with U.S. positions.

Foreign Trade and Economic Policies During the Tubman Era
Before the end of World War II, the only important foreign
investor in Liberia was Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, which, in
1926, had obtained a huge concession agreement from the Liberian
government.

Firestone’s contribution to the Liberian treasury (made up

of yearly rent payments, rubber export tax, consular fees, and port and
harbor dues), represented a major proportion of total government
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revenue.

After the introduction of the income tax system in 1951)

Firestone’s income tax payment represented almost half of the total
government revenue in that year (van der Kraaij 1983) 60-6^).
Firestone contributions to the Liberian economy convinced Tubman
that a policy that encouraged more foreign investment would be
beneficial to Liberia.

Thus)

of 19*t4) Tubman announced:

in his first inaugural address in January

"We shall encourage the investment of

foreign capital in the development of the resources of the country)
preferably on a partnership basis) and we shall accord to investors the
necessary protection and fairness of treatment."

Subsequently)

in 1945>

the Tubman administration granted Col. Lansdell Christie) a former U.S.
Army officer9 "exclusive exploration rights in an area of about three
million acres and exclusive mining rights in respect of all minerals
except gold) diamonds) and platinum" in an area not exceeding 25)000
acres (to be chosen from the exploration area)

(van der Kraaij 1983).

In 19^7) Tubman signed a statement of understanding with
Stettinius Associates-Liberia5 Inc.) a company owned by former U.S.
Secretary of State> Edward Stettinius) to establish the Liberian
Company.

Stettinius’ company was granted an 88-year concession "to

exploit any line of business) except activities already expressly
granted to other concessionaires"

(Dunn and Tarr 1988)

177).

It was in the same y ears 1947> that the Tubman administration used
the term "Open Door Policy" for the first time.

After the signing of

the agreement with Stettinius) the government issued a press release
expressing the hope that "people of all races and nations who have
either skills or funds to employ in any specific projects for the
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development of Liberian resources will come in....

Liberians will

always come first to the extent of their available contributions but the
policy of the open door is to be fol lowed... (van der Kraaij 1983, ‘♦A).
Nine years later? in his third inaugural address, President Tubman
reaffirmed his Open Door Policy (Clower, et al. 1966, 118).
In accord with the Open Door Policy, foreign companies were
granted tax-free holidays.

There were also no restrictions on the

repatriation of profits and dividends, and no expropriation of foreign
investment.

In furtherance of this policy, virtually unlimited control

over large areas of land and freedom to exploit Liberia’s natural

resources was extended to interested foreign companies.
Initially, the Open Door Policy was not very successful.

The

expected diversification in natural resource exploitation did not occur.
Until well into the 1950s, Liberian economic growth was almost
exclusively dependent upon export earnings from rubber.

Indeed, aslate

as 1957, rubber was responsible for as much as 77 percent of Liberia’s
total export earnings (Liebenow 1987, 60).

Furthermore, Liberia's

excessive dependence on the U.S. and U.S.-based companies remained
virtually unchanged in the first few years following the

introduction of

the Upen Door Policy.

major

For example, until 1950, only two

concessions (both U.S. based) were added to Firestone:

the Liberian

Mining Company, founded by Col. Lansdell Christie and the Liberian
Company, founded by Stettinius.

Total trade in that year amounted to

$38.2 million, and 90 percent of Liberian exports went to the U.S.,
which also provided 70 percent of the imports (Schulze 1982, 581).
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Beginninq in 1950, there was a tremendous influx of foreiqn
investors into Liberia.

By the end of the decade there were 15 major

companies from six different countries (see Table 5.1).

The arrival ot

these companies led to a significant increase in government revenue.
The performance of the Liberian economy was so impressive that, in lVfal,
Tubman unilaterally made further assurances to foreign investors.
asserted that nationalization "will never happen in Liberia"
1985, 155).

He

(Sisay

By the time of Tubman’s death in 1971, there were more than

one hundred foreign companies in Liberia.

Although over fifty of these

companies were from the U.S., Liberia’s dependence on revenues from
U.S.-based companies had diminished considerably.

For example, total

trade in 1971 reached $386.1 million, but only 21.8 percent of Liberia’s
exports went to the U.S., which now provided only 32 percent of
Liberia’s imports (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3).

Some diversification of

Liberia’s trading patterns had thus taken place.
such as Germany, Sweden, Britain,

European countries,

Italy and the Netherlands not only

became major sources of foreign investments, they also became important
trading partners as well.
Along with the diversification in trading partners came an
impressive decline in Liberia’s nearly exclusive dependence on one
export commodity— rubber.

Tubman’s Open Door Policy had resulted the

signing of a number of concession agreements with foreign companies
interested in mining operations.

Subsequently, mining became a major

industry in Liberia, and by 1961, iron ore had replaced rubber as
Liberia’s principal export.

In 1971, iron ore accounted for over 65

percent of total exports thus replacing rubber to become Liberia’s new
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Table 5.1
Major Concession Holders in Liberia as of 1960

Concession
Holder

Principal
Product

Firestone
Liberia Mining
Liberia Company
African Fruit
Goodrich
Delimco
Lamco
Monrovia
Breweries
National Iron Ore
Liberia Indepen
dent Forest Co.
Limpex Palm Oil

natural rubber
iron ore
rubber
rubber
rubber
iron ore
iron ore
soft drinks,
beer
iron ore
lumber

Munarriz Works
Le Tourneau
of Liberia
Maryland Logging
Providence
Mining
Source:
p. 202.

Year of
Agreement

Development Cost
(in millions) Country

1925
1946
1947
1952
1954
1953
1953
1956

$32.0
37.0
2.0
4.5
4.3
100.0
215.0
3.5

1958
1958

30.0
.4

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Germany
U.S.
Germany
Sweden
Switzerland
U.S.
Spain
Germany

palm oil,
pineapple
bricks, soap
lumber

1958

.5

1952
1952

.2
3.0

Spain
U.S.

lumber
diamonds

1960
1960

.5
.05

England
England

Wilson, Charles M.

1971

Liberia:

Black Africa in Microcosm,

toy

monoculture.

A significant outqrowth of the decline of rubber as an

export commodity was the drop in Firestone's contribution to the
Liberian treasury from 35.9 percent of total treasury receipts in 1955
to under 6 percent in 1971.
The Open Door policy also enabled the Liberian government to
secure revenue from the registration of foreign ships.

Liberia provided

certificates of registration to the operators of convenience flag ships
at lower fees than other countries.

Thus within a short period of time

Liberia had a large merchant fleet) comprised of ships owned by
companies of many nations but registered in Monrovia (though few of the
ships ever went there).

By 1970) more ships were registered in Liberia

than in any other country (Pedler 1979) 113).

This soon became a very

important source of revenue for the Liberian government.
The open door strategy proved to be Tubman’s most successful
economic policy initiative.

The influx of foreign investors into the

country led to an exceptionally rapid increase in government revenues.
For example) in 1944 when Tubman first assumed the presidency) total
domestic revenue was only $1.6 million; but ten years later in 1954, it
had risen to $12 million; and at the end of the Tubman era in 1971 it
had reached the staggerinq sum of $69.5 million (van der Kraai.i 1983)
307, 333).

Foreign Policy Under the Tolbert Administration
While maintaining close links with the West, Tolbert expanded
Liberia's relations with the Communist bloc.

However, the most

significant feature of his foreign policy was the promotion of closer
ties with Liberia’s neighbors in Africa.
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Liberia-U.S. Relations, 1971-1980
Liberia’s foreign policy, traditionally pro-Western, was not
significantly affected by the change in leadership.

However, in his

first annual message to the Liberian legislature, President Tolbert
observed that there was a need to explore additional sources of aid.
Perhaps out of this need to diversify its sources of aid and trading
partners or because of Tolbert’s wish to play a more significant
leadership role in African affairs, Liberia began to display a
relatively more independent international posture.
In the first few years of his presidency, some of Tolbert’s
foreign policy initiatives appeared to be designed to help Liberia shed
her image as "America’s little brother" (Adelman 1979, IE).

For

example, Liberia increasingly began to vote with the nonaligned
(particularly the African) bloc in the UN.

Furthermore, Liberia

established diplomatic relations with all East-bloc countries, as well
as China and Cuba.
arrived in Monrovia.

In December of 197E, a resident Soviet ambassador
Trade agreements were also negotiated with a

number of communist countries.

The Liberian government sought and

received an increasing number of scholarships for Liberians to study in
Europe, Canada and even Soviet-bloc countries (Legum 1973, B647;

1975,

B 7 0 E ).
Another indication of Tolbert’s bid to move Liberia away from the
U.S. and closer to the African position on foreign policy matters was
provided when, in November of 1973, Liberia became the E5th African
country to break off diplomatic relations with Israel.

A few years

later in 1976, Tolbert dismissed the Liberian delegate to the UN, Dr.
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T.O. Dusumo Johnson, for voting with Israel against a resolution
condemning Israeli policy in occupied Arab territory (Legum 1974, B691;
1976, B746).
This pattern of disengagement did not involve any significant
shift in Liberia’s guiding ideology.

Thus, in response to a question on

Liberia’s relations with communist countries and with the United States,
Tolbert noted that:
In recent times, we have come to observe that political
ideologies can be completely differentiated from economic
cooperation on the international level.
Thus, we have been
seeking harmonious relations with all nations, regardless of
ideological differences, once they are willing to respect
our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to treat us as
equals.... Liberia’s historical relationship with the United
States stems originally from the fact that the country was
founded by free blacks from the United States, thereby
creating extraordinary links between Liberia and the United
States.
Because of this historical tie, both Americans and
Liberians have always referred to their relationship as
special and traditional, without any political domination or
patronage.
We share a similar system of government, our
economies are based upon the free enterprise system, and our
legal system draws substantially on the common laws system
you have, coupled with our African customary laws.
Since the founding of Liberia, our ties with the
United States have been kept vigorously alive through trade,
contacts, religious interactions, and other areas and by
virtue of similarities in our political systems.
Our past
relationship is therefore the outgrowth of this historical
and cultural fact or phenomenon.
In respect to our existing
relationship with the United States, it can be described as
having matured over the years and is fast evolving from mere
historical and cultural ties to bilateral cooperation, in
which there is increasing appreciation of our efforts to
respond to the basic needs of our two peoples.
Thus, our
relationship with the United States is very friendly and
will remain friendly.^
Despite promoting policies which helped to broaden the Liberian
perspective beyond its traditional narrow focus upon the United States,
Tolbert continued to stress the existence of a "special relationship"
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between the two countries.

The primary benefit for Liberia from its

special relationship with the U.S. was in the form of economic
assistance.

The Tolbert administration recognized the importance ot

U.S. assistance to Liberia’s economic well being, and thus, even when it
strayed from the U.S. position on international matters,
not to offend American sensibilities.

it was careful

For example, on the very

important and sensitive issue of the war in Vietnam, the Tolbert
government, like Tubman’s before it, continued to support the American
posi tion.
In 1973, when Tolbert paid an official visit to Washington,
President Richard Nixon pledged to continue U.S. economic aid to
Liberia.

Thus, throughout Tolbert’s presidency, the U.S. remained the

largest single supplier of aid to Liberia.

In return for U.S. aid,

Liberia permitted the construction near Monrovia of a Voice of America
transmitter powerful enough to cover the entire African continent.

This

gave the U.S. a considerable advantage in the propaganda war with the
USSR (Liebenow 1987, 137).

The U.S. linkage was further reinforced

through the opening in 1976 of the $7.A million OMEGA navigation station
in Liberia.

The system which provides worldwide assistance to shipping

in all weather conditions was constructed by the U.S. government but
administered and staffed by Liberians.

It is one of eight such stations

in the world and the tallest manmade structure in Africa (Legum 1977,
B629; Liebenow 1987, 137).
The special relationship between Liberia and the U.S. was
reaffirmed when President Jimmy Carter visited Monrovia in April of
1978.

Liberian relations with the Soviet Union became strained after
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Soviet embassy personnel in Monrovia, and Cuban embassy personnel trom
Sierra Leone were implicated in the "rice riot" of April, 1979.

"For

the benefit and security of the Republic of Liberia," Tolbert expelled
three Soviet diplomats (Hughes 1979, 8; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 192-93),

Liberia and the Rest of Africa During the Tolbert Administration
Tubman’s high-profile African policy was continued under the
Tolbert administration.

Tolbert also vigorously pursued his

predecessor’s policy of regional economic cooperation within Africa.
This was reflected in the signing in October of 1973, of the Mano River
Declaration by President Tolbert and President Siaka Stevens of Sierra
Leone.

The Declaration established the Mano River Union (MRU) which

brought about "closer links in trade and in cultural and economic
cooperation" between Liberia and Sierra Leone.

All customs procedures,

regulations and laws were harmonized and a common external tariff
between the two countries was initiated in October of 1977 (Legum 1979,
B696).
The MRU was an integral part of the larger Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS).

The Tolbert administration played an

important role in formulating and defining the objectives of ECOWAS.

In

January of 1975, Tolbert hosted the founding meeting of ECOWAS, which
purpose was to effect the eventual elimination of internal customs
duties within the community and the establishment of a common external
tariff.

In addition, ECOWAS aimed to promote the free movement of labor

and capital among all member states and to bring about the adoption ot
common economic policies (Legum 1978, C196-98).

Liberia’s strong

commitment to ECOWAS was forcefully expressed by President Tolbert when
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Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obansanjo, the Nigerian Head of State visited Liberia.
Tolbert declared that, if necessary, Liberia was ready to relinquish any
privilege arising from its relations with other groups or countries in
order that ECOWAS should realize its full potential

(Legum 1980, 8684).

Under Tolbert, Liberia continued to play a key role in the OAU.
Liberia served on many important committees of the OAU. During the
Tolbert administration the country was best known for its work on the
OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration.
example,

For

it was the Liberian initiative which ended a long-standing

dispute between Guinea and Senegal on the one hand, and Guinea and Ivory
Coast on the other (Legum 1979, B697; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 188).
On the issue of southern Africa, Tolbert initially adopted a
firmer and more militant attitude than his predecessor.

While lending

both moral and material support to "liberation movements" in southern
Africa, Tolbert repeatedly expressed his opposition to any dialogue with
the Pretoria regime.

However,

in February of 1975, in a spectacular

reversal of his position on the issue of dialogue, Tolbert invited the
South African Prime Minister, John Vorster to Monrovia.

Despite

Tolbert’s protestations that Vorster was invited only after
consultations with other African leaders including SWAPO leaders in
Namibia, the meeting was roundly criticized in African circles (Liebenow
1987, 149).

The launching of a Liberation Fund for southern Africa to

which the Tolbert administration contributed $100,000 and Tolbert’s
renewed advocacy of a militant stance against the Pretoria government
were probably instrumental
issue.

in Tolbert’s return to respectability on this
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Throughout Tolbert’s presidency Liberia was steadfast in its
identification with OAU objectives.

Liberia’s role in the fostering of

greater inter-African cooperation was accorded due recognition when, in
1978, Liberia was selected to host the 1979 OAU Summit Conference.

At

the conclusion of the conference Tolbert automatically became the
presiding chairman of the organization.

Foreign Trade and Economic Policies, 1971-1980
Upon assuming the presidency, Tolbert outlined plans to lessen
foreign domination of the Liberian economy, while encouraging more
indigenous participation.

He called for a more equitable partnership

between Liberians and foreign investors (Legum 1973, B609).
Tolbert introduced some measures which were aimed at increasing
Liberian participation in the economy.

For example, privileges formerly

granted only to foreign investors (including tax-free holidays and
import restrictions on competing products), were extended to "qualified"
Liberians.

Some economic activities were made the exclusive preserve of

Liberian nationals and major foreign cooperations were ordered to reduce
the number of their expatriate employees (Legum 1973, B609;
B649).**

1974,

These measures facilitated a significant increase in the

number of Liberian entrepreneurs.

For example, whereas nearly 7£

percent of the 8,535 businesses registered in Liberia in 1978 were
foreign owned and by 197B, less than 60 percent belonged to foreign
investors (Legum 1974, B649; 1980, B685).
Tolbert’s call for a more equitable partnership between Liberians
and foreign investors was given substance when his administration
reviewed and renegotiated the country’s concession agreements with
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Firestone, LAMCO, Bethlehem Steel and other concessionaires.
agreements called upon

The new

concessionaires to give preference to qualified

Liberians when employing labor, and further to provide on-the-jobtraining, operate vocational training facilities, and grant scholarships
to qualified Liberian employees to pursue advanced studies abroad (van
der Kraaij 19S3, 80-83).
Traditionally, foreign enterprises operating under concessions
agreements in Liberia were not subject to Liberian laws.

Under the new

agreements concessionaires became subject to Liberian laws (van der
Kraaij 1983, 228-31).

However, because of their immense contributions

to the Liberian economy, the Tolbert administration, even while
renegotiating more advantageous concession agreements, was careful not
to include any clauses that might have frightened the foreign investors
away.
In fact, the Tolbert administration continued to offer incentives
to attract foreign investment.

Under a new investment code foreign

companies were offered comprehensive guarantees against nationalization
and tax-free holidays of up to seven years.

There was also the added

attraction of the complete absence of foreign exchange control.

The

result of Tolbert’s continued adherence to the Open Door Policy was that
over one-third of the country’s GDP was generated by foreign firms.

It

was also clear that the renegotiations of concession agreements did not
produce a hostile climate since foreign investors continued to find
attractive opportunities in Liberia.

Subsequently, foreign investment

rose from $23 million in 1966 to $180 million in 1977 (van der Kraaij
1983, 228).
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Table 5.8
Principal Trading Partners (Value in Millions)

YEAR WEST GERMANY
Export Isport
1948
1951
1958
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1978
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1988
1983
1984
198ff

0.0
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.6
1.6
8.1
8.7
9.8
5.7
6.8
3.9
13.1
86.9
36.8
48.5
44.6
33.0
—
38.1
41.3
48.0
55.7
75.9
84.7
186.4
107.8
108.9
137.4
144.0
138.1
149.0
130.9
134.8
140.7

—
0.8
1.1

1.8
1.5
8.9
8.6
4.8
4.4
4.5
6.0
8.8
17.1
81 .8
18.7
—
15.0
10.1
—
81.7
15.6
80.7
83.9
87.1
38.8
49.6
48.6
58.4
56.5
50.1
48.4
48.9
50.4
49.8
88.0

ITALY
Export- Isport
0.0
—
—
—
—
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.8
1.8
3.7
4.7
5.3
18.8
11.5
17.7
18.5
16.9
88.1
88.7
43.8
48.0
49.3
51.0
63.9
58.7
54.9
56.8
61.7
70.3
65.9
75.3
68.8
68.7

0.0
0.1
0.8
0.1
0.8
0.3
—

0.5
—
0.8
1.5
8.9
5.0
1.8
8.7
1.9
1.6
8.8
1.7
3.7
3.4
4.1
4.6
5.9
3.5
11.1
80.3
80.5
16.8
4.3
4.6
3.8
4.0
5.8
8.9

NETHERLANDS
Export Import
8.8
8.4
1.3
3.1
1.9
8.3
8.8
3.0
3.3
9.8
14.8
13.8
8.3
6.8
7.8
8.5
8.0
83.6
37.7
38.6
33.7
35.4
40.6
50.5
38.5
85.7
38.7
88.7
37.7
51.4
87.5
19.8
88.8
88.0
19.0

0.6
0.4
0.6
1.0
1.6
1.8
1.6
1.8
1.9
8.3
3.7
5.5
3.7
6.5
3.7
4.5
4.4
4.5
4.3
16.8
13.0
9.6
6.3
10.7
11 .7
83.9
39.9
81.7
36.8
39.4
40.8
31.0
40.6
34.8
18.6

U..K.
Export Import
0.0
0.0
0.5
1.1
0.8
0.9
1.3
1.4
3.0
5.0
11.7
5.5
10.1
14.8
10.0
18.7
14.1
10.1
11 .8
14.0
11.7
15.8
55.8
10.4

8.8
11.9
16.0
14.6
81.1
81.7
80.4
19.7
11.9
6.9
4.6

1.1
1.9
1.7
8.0
8.3
8.8
3.8
3.4
3.8
5.1
7.6
11.3
11.4
10.7
10.5
10.6
8.7
11.8
9.7
11.1
14.5
16.4
18.4
87.8
31.5
38.8
33.8
41.5
41.1
31.5
83.7
17.3
80.1
88.3
81.1

U. S.A.
Export Import
18.6
48.8
34.6
85.6
88.1
37.8
35.4
31.5
35.8
40.9
43.6
88.6
33.4
57.3
50.0
58.3
47.5
43.9
54.8
49.5
48.4
50.8
65.6
94.3
86.5
88.0
94.8
105.5
106.3
184.5
180.6
88.5
76.8
90.9
83.8

6 .4
11.1
18.4
18.5
15.3
16.1
16.7
84.0
81 .3
80.8
37.6
44.5
39.0
44.1
49.5
50.6
55.0
43.4
38.7
46.4
51 .9
54.1
53.8
88.0
104.8
119.1
181.9
116.7
180.3
180.8
140.4
117.3
101 .3
80.8
73.9

S o u r c e s : U n i t e d N a t i o n s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e S t a t i s t i c s Y e a r b o o k , 19551989; *A f r i c a S o u t h o f t h e S a h a r a , 1 9 8 8 , E u r o p a P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1989.
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Under the Tolbert administration, an effort to broaden the range
of economic ties with the global community was apparent in the area of
international trade.

For example,

in 1978 alone, trade agreements were

negotiated with East Germany, South Korea, China, the Soviet Union,
Pakistan and Egypt (Legum 1980, B686).
In analyzing Liberia’s relationships with its major trading
partners during this period,

it is clear that despite minor fluctuations

there was steady growth in both imports from and exports to the U.S.
Imports from the U.S. rose from $51.9 million in 1971 to $120.3 million
in 1980.

Exports to the U.S. underwent a similar expansion, from $48.4

million in 1971 to $124.5 million in 1980 (see Table 5.2).

However,

Table 5.3 indicates quite another story with respect to the relative
position occupied by the United States in trade with Liberia during the
same nine-year period.

Although the U.S. continued to be the single

most important country in terms of imports into Liberia,

its share of

total imports into Liberia fell from 32 percent to 22.5 percent.

Even

more important was the relative reduction in significance of Liberian
exports to the U.S., with West Germany actually surpassing the U.S. as
the major destination for Liberian exports.

As the U.S. share of

Liberian exports fell from 21.8 percent in 1971 to 20.9 percent in 1980,
that of West Germany went from 18.6 percent to 24.1 percent over the
same period (see Table 5.3).

Foreign Policy Under Military Rule
The April,1980 coup, the assassination of Tolbert and the
execution of members of Tolbert’s cabinet were vigorously denounced by
the international community (Holloway 1981, 160).

African nations
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Table 5.3
Principal Trading Partners (Value as Percentage of World Total)

YEAR WEST GERMANY
Export Isport
1948
1951
1953
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
196E
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
197E
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
198E
1983
1984
1983

ITALY
Export Isport

NETHERLANDS
Export Isport

0.0
—
—

17.1
4.7
9.9
5.3
4.9
7.3
6.1
14.7
17.E
SS.E

7.1
E.6
5.3
7.0
5.9
4.8
5.0
5.3
5.4
6.0

O.E
0.0
3.5
E.O
E.9
3.5
5.6
7.4
14.1
8.8

IE.4
10.9
10.6
11.0
11.8
8.8
8.3
11.8
11.1
IE.5

78.6
9S.4
8S.7
86.9
79.5
78.0
65.6
61 .1
5E.8
46.S

73. E
65.0
67.0
62.0
6S.E
6E.7
55.5
47.0
54.4
49.1

10.3
5.4
5.3
5.6
5.0
14.1
19.3
15.3
15.1
14.5
IE.5
IE.6
9.8
5.6
7.3
5.9
7.0
8.6
5.E
4.E
5.4
6.S
4.4

3.4
5.9
3.5
4.0
3.5
4.E
3.8
10.8
8.0
5.4
3.1
3.7
3.5
6.0
8.6
4.6
7.1
7.4
8.4
7.E
9.9
9.6
6.5

IE.6
11.3
7.4
8.4
8.9
6.1
5.7
6.6
3.3
E .3
3.4
E.6
E.l
E.6
3.6
3.0
3.9
3.6
3.9
4.a
E.8
1.5
1.1

10.5
9.7
10.1
9.4
6.9
11.0
8.5
7.4
8.9
9.E
9.5
9.4
9.5
8.E
7.E
9.1
8.1
5.9
5.0
4.0
4.9
6.E
7.4

41.3
45.6
36.9
34.8
39.9
E6.E
E7.7
EE.7
El .8
E0.6
E0.3
S3.6
EE .0
19.3
El .E
El .7
19.8
E0.9
E3.0
17.5
18.0
20.2
19.E

36.0
39.7
47.4
45.E
43.9
40.6
33.9
31.0
3E.0
30. E
E7.8
S8.4
31 .4
E9.8
26.3
E4.3
E3.7
EE.5
E9.4
E7.4
E4.6
EE.3
E6.0

0.0
l.E
1.1
3.6
4.6
6,6
17.1
8.5
8.a
6.3

—
4.6
6.5
11.3
9.7
11.0
11.5
10.5
8.6
9.7

O.E
—
0.1
—
1.3
E.E
6.0

0.0
0.4
0.4
1.3
—
1.4
—
1.9
E.E
3.S

16.1
El .4
E6.7
E8.3
E8.1
19.7
13.5
17.9
18.6
17.E
17.E
19.0
El.5
E7.7
E4.0
EE.4
E5.6
E4.1
S5.E
31.5
31.0
30.0
3S.3

15.8
19.7
1E.1
—
1S.0
9.5
14.3
14.5
9.6
11.6
IE.4
9.4
9.9
IE.4
9.E
10.9
11.E
9.4
10.1
10.0
1S.E
11.1
9.9

5.9
4.S
9.0
7.7
11 .E
11.0
8.7
10.4
IE.9
18.0
13.0
IE.3
13.0
14.0
13.1
11.3
10.5
10.3
13.4
14.0
17.8
15.3
15.8

4.6
1 .6
E.6
1.7
1.3
S. 1
1.5
E.4
E.l
S.3
E.4
E.O
1.0
S.8
4.4
4.3
3.E
1 .0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1 .4
1.0

U. K.
Export Isport

U.S .A.
Export- Isport-

S o u r c e s : U n i t e d N a t i o n s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e S t a t i s t i c s Y e a r b o o k , 19 5 5 1989; *A f r i c a S o u t h o f t h e S a h a r a , 1 9 8 8 , E u r o p a P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1989.
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called for the isolation of the new Liberian government.

To African

leaders* the assassination of Tolbert was especially disheartening since
he was the current chairman of the OAU.
The overthrow of Tolbert was applauded in some quarters.

The

Soviet Union, which had had some of its diplomats expelled by Tolbert
only a few months before the coup, was one of the first countries to
extend diplomatic recognition to the new military government.

Other

states which expressed immediate support for the government included
Ethiopia, Cuba and Libya (Legum 1981, B549).
with Liberia’s new friends.

The PRC flirted briefly

Top Liberian government officials visited

the capitals of some the "friendly" countries.

Gabriel Baccus Matthews

the new foreign minister visited Addis Ababa in May of 1980, and again
in August when he travelled with Doe’s party to Ethiopia and Tanzania.
Perry Zulu the finance minister, went to Libya in February of 1981
(Legum 198E, B53E).

Doe even sent some Liberians to Ethiopia for

training in adult literacy and the government accepted a number of
Libyan scholarships for Liberian students to go to Tripoli

(Legum 198E,

B533; Liebenow 1987, E00).
In the first few months of the Doe regime, Liberia’s foreign
policy seemed to be more closely aligned with those of the East-bloc
countries.

However, by mid-1981, with the closure of the Libyan

People’s Bureau and the drastic reduction of the staff of Soviet Embassy
in Monrovia, this initial appearance of a reorientation in Liberia’s
foreign policy had vanished.
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Liberia and United States Under Military Rule
Despite the mildly hostile reaction of the United States to the
coup,

it was to the United States that the new military rulers first

turned to for assistance.

Almost immediately after the coup, U.S.

diplomats were approached by the new leaders for counsel and aid.

Doe

personally requested the U.S. military adviser in Monrovia, Col. Robert
Gosny, for help and advice on how to maintain order after the coup
<Legum 1981, B544; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1982, 6).
The official American response to these initial advances was not
encouraging.

In fact, because of the executions and the unstable

atmosphere of the immediate post-coup period, the U.S. canceled a
Pentagon training mission that had been scheduled to go to Monrovia on
May 1, 1980 (Sisay 1985, 167).
The U.S. soon reversed its position on this matter and, about one
week after the coup, announced America’s continued support for Liberia
and rescheduled the Pentagon training mission.

Furthermore, a

commission headed by Congressman William Bray of Pennsylvania was sent
to Liberia to review the status of U.S.-Liberian relations.

This high-

level U.S. mission, which arrived in Monrovia in late May of 1980,
included Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
(Dunn and Tarr 1988, 175-76).
At the time of the coup, the Liberian economy was on the brink of
collapse.

The PRC inherited a large outstanding debt, totaling about

$740 million (Culley 1983).

The new regime needed immediate

international financial assistance, and recognized that it was in its
best interest to maintain and even expand on Liberia’s special
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relationship with the U.S.

Members of the Gray commission were

sympathetic to the plight of the PRC.

Upon their return to Washington,

they recommended that the U.S. government increase its level of
assistance to Liberia.

In his report to President Jimmy Carter,

Congressman Gray, made mention of the tremendous popularity of the coup
and noted that the new military rulers were committed to the capitalist
system (Sisay 1985, 168).
However,

in the immediate post-coup period, Libya and other

socialist leaning countries were making overtures to the Doe regime.
Besides the initial favorable response to these overtures, the PRC tried
to use the interests of these countries in Liberia as leverage, in its
efforts to secure aid from the West.

Thus, Doe warned Liberia’s

traditional friends that, unless they increased their level of aid, his
C.

government would be forced to look elsewhere for help."'

The U.S. was

particularly disturbed by Liberia’s new African friends, fearing that
the PRC would seek to strengthen relations with Ethiopia and Libya, two
of its most persistent suitors.

To assure that this did not happen, the

U.S. response to subseguent PRC requests for aid was prompt and
generous.
U.S. aid from the time of the coup to December,
million.

1980 totaled $18

In addition, the U.S. provided the PRC with military equipment

and provided funds to help with the construction of houses for the
Liberian army (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1982).

In

December of 1980, while announcing an American commitment to providing
Liberia with more economic aid in the future, Secretary Moose told
Liberia’s military rulers that it was not necessary for them to obligate
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themselves to Libya out of financial concerns.

He described Liberia as

a country which has a "very special meaning to the United States."

He

noted that the U.S. and Liberia have been "valued allies" for many
years.

"We want that relationship to continue into the future/' he

added .6
To protect American interests (which included the Voice of America
transmitter, an OMEGA Navigational System, U.S. bank loans and private
investments), and, at the same, to promote the special relationship, U.S
aid to Liberia during the period of military rule shattered all previous
records.

From an annual average of $8 million in the twenty years

preceding military rule to an annual average of about $65 million during
the five years of military rule (see Table 5.4).

By 1985, Liberia had

become the world’s largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid, with about
one-third of the country’s budget coming from the U.S.’
There were also certain symbolic, yet significant, gestures of
friendship between the U.S. and Liberia during this period.

For

example, in response to a request by Doe, the U.S. government sent 100
U.S. Green Berets and the destroyer Thorn to Liberia.

The timing of the

visit was significant, coming on the first anniversary of the coup?
Doe used the occasion of the anniversary to express his country’s
gratitude to the U.S. government, which had become Liberia’s largest aid
donor.

A month later the PRC ordered the closure of Libyan People’s

Bureau and the Soviet Union was ordered to reduce its embassy staff from
0

15 to six.
Despite some congressional disapproval of the lack of democracy in
Liberia, Liberian-American relations during the period of military rule
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Table 5.4
U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Liberia* 1946-1985
(in millions)

YEAR

ECONOMIC AID
Loans Grants Total

1946-■48
1949-■58
1953-■61
1961- 68
1963
31.3
1964
7.4
1965
9.3
1966
8.8
1967
1.9
1968
1.3
1969
5.6
.9
1970
—
1971
1978
8.1
18.9
1973
—
1974
9.0
1975
—
1976
1977
11.8
—
1978
—
1979
10.0
1980
1981
15.0
15.0
1988
16.7
1983
1984
15.0
1985
Source:

10.4
9.1
9.8
9.5
8.3
7.8
7.4
7.1
8.0
9.8
5.7
6.0
6.7
5.8
9.6
7.8
17.6
13.5
40.8
50.5
46.8
51.0

'

MILITARY AID
Loans Grants Total

7.5
8.3
89.8
11.9
41.7
16.5
19.1
11.7
10.8
8.5
13.0
8.0
8.0
17.3
18.6
6.0
15.7
5.8
81.4
7.8
17.6
83.5
55.8
65.5
68.9
66.0
75.5

Dunn and Tarr* Liberia:

—
—
—
—
8.0
—
—
1.8
1.7
.5
.5
1 .8
8.5
4.7
7.0
7.0

.8
.7
.5
.5
.7
.4
.8
.1
.1
.1
.1
.8
.3
.8
1.6
5.6
5.7
18.8

8.3
1.5
.1
.4
1.1
.6
.8
.7
.5
.5
.7
8.4
.8
.1
1.9
1.8
.6
.7
1 .5
8.7
6.3
18.6
18.7
18.8
16.8

TOTAL AID

7.5
8.3
31.5
13.4
41.8
16.9
80.8
18.3
11.0
9.8
13.5
8.5
8.7
19.7
18.8
6.1
17.6
7.6
88.0
7.9
19.1
86.8
61.5
78.1
75.6
78.8
91.7
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were clearly as strong if not stronger than they were during the
preceding twenty years.
predecessors.

The Doe regime became more pro-Western that its

Attacks on Soviet policies and a corresponding adoption

of an extremely pro-American attitude was vigorously pursued by the Doe
regime.

Liberia’s voting pattern in the UN became increasingly more

consistent with that of the U.S.

(Dunn and Tarr 1988, ll^).'y

Perhaps

the clearest demonstration of the P R C ’s pro-American foreign policy
posture was the 1983 resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel
(Liebenow 1987, 252).*' Furthermore, by the end of the military
interregnum, the Doe regime had severed many of the communist contacts
established by the Tolbert administration.

Diplomatic relations with

the USSR were frozen, both countries having withdrawn their personnel
from their respective embassies (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 193).

Liberia and the Rest of Africa During Military Rule
The military coup and the assassination of President Tolbert (who
was then the incumbent chairman of the OAU) lead to a near rupture of
Liberia’s relations with her African neighbors.

Tolbert had been a very

active participant in OAU affairs and had acguired considerable prestige
on the continent.

Thus, his assassination and the subseguent executions

of members of his cabinet aroused the hostility of many African leaders
to the coup and to the new military rulers.

Perhaps an even more

profound cause for concern was the anxiety of African leaders about the
vulnerability of their own governments to a similar kind of takeover.
Understandably, Nigeria, which had only a few months before restored
civilian rule after thirteen years military rule, took a strong lead in
condemning the coup and the executions.
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D o e ’s claim to automatic succession as chairman of the OAU was
rejected and the OAU appointed President Leopold Senghor of Senegal as
interim chairman.

However,

the first major open display of hostility by

African countries toward the Doe regime came at the OAU special economic
summit in April of 1980.

When Liberian Foreign Minister Gabriel

Matthews flew into Lagos, Nigeria in an attempt to represent Doe at the
meeting, he was compelled to return to Monrovia when his plane was
refused permission to land at Murtala Mohammed Airport in Lagos.

It was

later revealed that, with the exceptions of Libya and Ethiopia, all the
other OAU member states had opposed Liberian participation (Dunn and
Tarr 1988, 189).
The refusal to grant the Liberian delegation landing rights in
Lagos was followed by other decisions denying Liberian participation in
other African organizational affairs.

For example, no invitation was

extended to the new Liberian defense minister to a meeting of defense
ministers of ECOWAS in May of 1980.

Two weeks later, Sgt. Doe and his

delegation were denied participation at the ECOWAS summit meeting in
Lome, Togo.

The decision greatly embarrassed the Liberian delegation

who had already arrived in the Togolese capital and had been accorded a
welcome befitting a leader and his delegation.

A four-nation committee

(Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Togo) was formed by the summit
to monitor events in Liberia.
In response to the diplomatic snub by its African neighbors,
Liberia recalled her ambassadors from the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone,
Nigeria, ECOWAS, and the Mano River Union.

Nigeria, which had been a

leading critic of the Doe regime, was also asked to reduce its Monrovia
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embassy staff to two officers like the Liberia embassy in Lagos.

In

announcing the diplomatic recalls) foreign minister Matthews warned that
"the government of Liberia is not disposed to simply assume its
responsibilities without exercising its rights in any regional or
international organization.

Liberia is therefore suspending all its

obligations to ECOWAS until its rights are restored...."^
The presidents of Ivory Coast) Sierra Leone? Guinea and Togo
visited Monrovia in June of 1980 and discussed the conditions they felt
should be fulfilled before relations will be normalized.

These included

the release of A.B. Tolbertj son of the late president) the release of
other political prisoners and the reinstatement of the French ambassador
to Liberia (the PRC had demanded the recall of Louis Dollot) the French
ambassador to Liberia) after A.B. Tolbert was discovered taking refuge
in his residence).

In rejecting all three conditions) the Liberian

Minister of Information) Gabriel Nimley5 said that "the Liberian
government would not be subject to pressures from other African
governments to accept standards of human rights that are ignored
elsewhere on the continent"

(Holloway 1981) 173).

Following the normalization of relations between Liberia and
Nigeria in September of 1980} relations between Liberia and the rest of
Africa began to improve.

Doe attended the 1981 OAU and ECOWAS summit

meetings in Nairobi and Freetown.

In 19B£5 the three leaders of the

Mano River Union (Liberia) Sierra Leone and Guinea)) officially
established a customs union.
Despite the noticeable improvements in Liberia’s intra-African
relations) Sgt. Doe did not become as active as his predecessors in the
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determination of continental issues.

With the restoration and expansion

of the "special relationship" between Liberia and the U.S.* foreign
policy under the PRC became decidedly pro-Western.

This Western

orientation also colored Liberia’s stands on African matters.

For

example* Liberia protested the OAU handling of the Western Sahara
dispute.

It consistently opposed the admission of the Sahrawi Arab

Democratic Republic (SADR) in the OAU and even threatened to boycott the
1982 OAU summit meeting if the SADR were not excluded.

Liberia’s

position on this issue was consistent with that of Morocco (another
strongly pro-American state)* which had claims on Western Sahara.
Finally,

in July of 1985* the Doe regime accorded full diplomatic

recognition to the SADR (Legum 198^, B493; 1987, B85).
Another clearly pro-American foreign policy initiative was the
P R C ’s 1983 decision to restore diplomatic relations with Israel.

This

decision was decidedly inconsistent with the OAU position on the Israeli
question.

In keeping with OAU policy, twenty-six African countries had

severed diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war.

Only Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi had continued to maintain

relations with Israel since then.

Zaire, another of America’s African

ally, resumed relations with Israel in 1982.

Foreign Trade and Economic Policies Under the PRC
The success of the Open Door Policy was, for the most part, due to
the liberal investment policies upon which it was based.

However, the

fact that Liberia has had durable civilian regimes, seemingly immune
from coups, provided foreign-owned enterprises with another strong
incentive to invest in the country.

The April,

1980 coup was therefore
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not a welcome intervention as far as foreign investors were concerned.
After the coup, uncertainties about the future led to a sharp fall in
private sector liquidity, from $175.6 million in March of 1980 to $10E.6
million in December of 1981, as both local and foreign depositors moved
their convertible assets abroad (Clapham 1987, 597).
The actions of the new military rulers during the first few days
following the coup (the public executions, a decree limiting the
repatriation of earnings, and the military’s inability to halt the
looting of business premises), seriously alarmed the foreign business
community.

Shippers were reluctant to come into port during the first

days of the coup.

Shipowners began to question the advantages of

registering their vessels under Liberia’s "flag of convenience."

Some

even threatened to switch their registration to Panama, a move which
would have deprived Liberia of a substantial source of revenue (Liebenow
1987, 8^3).
Managers of foreign-owned enterprises also complained about the
uneconomic effects of the curfew which was instituted immediately
following the coup.

Perhaps the action that caused the most anxiety

within the foreign business community, was the announcement by the
newly-appointed justice minister, Chea Cheapoo, that twenty managers of
foreign corporations were to be placed under house arrest.

Although the

order was immediately rescinded by Sgt. Doe himself, the signals that
Cheapoo’s action sent to the business and financial interests were
ominous (Liebenow 1987, 8 4 3 - ^ ) .
In an effort to soothe jittery investors and arrest the decline in
investor confidence, the PRC gave assurances to foreign investors, to
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owners of ships registered under the Liberian flag, to local bankers,
and to Lebanese merchants that there would be no major changes in the
country’s free enterprise system (Legum 1981, B545;
1987, 245).

1982, B534; Liebenow

The PRC’s concern over the future of foreign investment in

Liberia was also reflected in some long-term policy commitments, such as
the stated intention to continue the use of the U.S. dollar as official
currency; the promise not to make any "structural changes in the near or
medium term;" the honoring of all foreign debts; the lifting of a post
coup currency regulations which limited repatriation of earnings; and
the commitment to continue the Open Door Policy (Liebenow 1987, 245).
Despite these reassurances,

investor confidence was never fully

restored, and flight of capital continued.

It was estimated that $200

million left the country between 1981 and 1983 (Legum 1985, B479).
proposal in January,

A

1983, to restrict certain types of business to

Liberian citizens was not very well received by foreign investors and
was rescinded in May.

In the same year, the already liberal foreign

investment code was revised to encourage more investment (Clapham 1987,
597).
Given Liberia’s post-coup "shrunken" currency base, depressed
prices for its principal exports (iron ore and rubber), and high oil
import prices, the Doe regime was never able to halt Liberia’s economic
decline.

The depressed economy was further aggravated by the

introduction of new Liberian five-dollar coins.

Referring to the

introduction of the new coins and its impact on investor confidence, the
leader of the Unity Party, Edward Kerselly said:
Foreign investors have no confidence in Doe and until they
can have faith in him things are not going to get better. I
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will admit he has been given bad advice, but it was his
fault that he took it. The very worst thing he could have
done he did, and that was to listen to the people who
suggested he mint his own money. We may never get over that
blunder (James 1986, 33).
The minting of five-dollar Liberian coins have proved economically
disastrous.
currency,
to

Although the U.S. dollar remained the official

it became increasingly hard to come by.

legal

Derisively referred

as "Doe dollars" or "little soldiers" the introduction of the seven-

cornered five-dollar coin caused many in Liberia to transfer their U.S.
dollar holdings abroad or hide them (James 1986, 33; Liebenow 1987, 203,
2A5).

In accordance with Gresham’s law, bad money literally drove out

good money.
When the Doe regime first assumed power, the preponderance of
Liberia’s trade relations were with the West.

The Doe regime did not

try to be innovative and maintained these trade ties, which had proved
to be very beneficial for Liberia in the past.

Although the relative

position occupied by the U.S. and West Germany in their trade with
Liberia had improved during the period of military rule, in real terms
there was a decline in trade.

For example,

imports from the U.S.

declined from $120.3 million in 1980 to $73.8 million in 1985 while
exports decline from $12A.5 million to $83.8 million over the same
period.

The trend was the same for Liberian/West German trade (see

Table 5.2).
The U.S. continued to be the most important country in terms of
imports into Liberia, accounting for 26 percent of total imports into
the country.

This represented an increase of nearly four percent over

the period at the time of the coup in 1980.

The U.S. also maintained
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its position as the second most important destination for Liberia’s
exports, while West Germany’s significance as the leading destination
for Liberia’s exports remained unchanged.

West Germany’s share of total

Liberian exports actually went up from 24.1 percent in 1980 to 32.3
percent in 1985 (see Table 5.3).
Iron ore (64 percent) and rubber (18 percent) continued to account
for most of Liberia’s exports and remained major sources of governmental
revenue.^

However? the international market for both commodities was

depressed.

Thus as Liberia prepared for a return to civilian rule in

January of 1986, the judgment on the performance of the Doe regime
seemed clear.

Capital flight, declining investment, high oil import

prices and worsening export markets had virtually ruined the Liberian
economy.

Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion, it is abundantly clear that the
very survival of Liberia is inextricably tied to its international
relations.

For example,

in 1985 about 60 percent of total domestic

revenue was derived from the activities of foreign enterprises in
Liberia (Clapham 1987, 600).

Taxes on the profits of these enterprises

were responsible for a significant proportion of governmental revenue.
Taxes on foreign trade (e.g., customs and excise duty) accounted for
just over 25 percent of total governmental

income.

Thus, when military

rule came to an end in 1985, the Liberian government was still as
dependent on payments from foreign companies and concessions as it was
during the early years of the Tubman era, when Firestone alone provided
more than half of total government revenues.
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Another characteristic of Liberia’s foreign policy that was not
significantly changed by the alternation between civilian and military
rule was the inordinate importance of the United States for the
preservation of Liberia’s economic solvency.

As was indicated in

earlier pages, the overriding importance of the U.S. to Liberia stems
from the "special relationship" which has existed between the two
countries since

the founding of Liberia as settlement for freed slaves.

Over the years,

the "special relationship" has come to mean a

responsibility for the United States to provide Liberia with military,
technical, educational, economic and other developmental assistance.
return, Liberia

In

has provided the U.S. with strategic sites for the

location of important facilities.
Although the United States has had a mutual defense pact with
Liberia since 1959, and U.S. training teams have provided training for
the Liberian armed forces, American military aid remained a distant
second to economic aid in terms of its impact upon the Liberian society.
Economic assistance from Washington made it possible for successive
Liberian governments to realize most of their developmental objectives
(e.g., the provision of good roads, drinking water, hospitals, schools
and col leges).
Given the animosity between Americo-Liberians and indigenous
Africans, and the role which the United States played in the
establishment and preservation of the Americo-Liberian aristocracy,

it

was widely speculated that the coup (which instituted indigenous rule in
Liberia) will result in the weakening of Liberian-U.S. ties.

Despite an

initial tilt towards radical and socialist-oriented states (such as
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Libya and Ethiopia), the Doe regime did not in any fashion lessen
Liberia’s ties with the United States.

Quite the contrary, a major

outcome of the coup was that the long standing special relationship
became more intensified during the five years of military rule.
This study does not, therefore, support the hypothesis that a
change in the incumbent political leadership will necessarily lead to a
change in foreign policy.

The evidence also fails to support Sang-Seek

Park’s (1980, 138-43) observation, that a violent leadership change is
more likely to install a new regime whose ideological position is
different from that of the incumbent.
This case study clearly shows that practical, rather than
ideological, considerations were the most important determinant of
public policy under both civilian and military regimes in Liberia.
Given the degree to which the Liberian economy was dependent on external
forces, D o e ’s options when he assumed power were limited.

He needed the

support of the military to stay in power; and pay raises and improved
living conditions for the soldiers had to be provided to keep this
support.

There was also the high expectations of the indigenous

population now that one of its own was in power.
cabinet minister put it:

As one of Doe’s

"The people expect us to deliver.'14

Thus,

Doe had no good reasons to depart from Liberia’s pro-western orientation
in foreign policy.

The survival of Liberia, of the military regime, and

of Doe himself demanded that the new military rulers maintain— and even
intensify— the special relationship with the U.S. and that.they expand,
or at least maintain, the Open Door Policy.
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To be sure, there were instances when the PRC deviated from the
practices of its civilian predecessors.

The quantitative results from

chapter three provide examples of such instances.

For example, total

public expenditure as a proportion of GDP (PSPEND) was significantly
higher under military rule than it was under civilian rule (see Table
5.5).

Similarly government spending on health education and defense was

significantly higher during the Doe regime than it was under the
administrations of Tubman and Tolbert.

However, in large part these

increases in governmental spending were made possible by the substantial
increase in U.S. economic assistance to Liberia during the period of
military rule.

By 1985, U.S. aid accounted for nearly 30 percent of the

Liberian government’s budgetary allocation (see Table 5.9).

As can be

seen in Table 5.5, despite the increases in public expenditure by the
Doe regime, the rate of growth of GDP (CGDP80) was a negative 3 percent
annually during the period of military whereas during the preceding
period of civilian rule GDP grew at annual average rate of 3.2 percent.
In foreign affairs then, the Liberian military regime did not
break with the past.
practices,

But even while retaining old institutions and

it did revitalize some of them (as with Liberian-U.S

relations) and maintain others (as with Liberia’s relations with the
rest of Africa).

Table 5.3
Results of the Simple Country Analysis for Liberia* 1950-1985

VARIABLE

MILITARY(a)

PSPEND
PHEALTH
PEDUC
PDEFEN
PMAN
PAGRIC
CGDP80

0.3686***
0.0361***
0.0559***
0.0349***
0.0758***
0.1559*
-0.0308*

*.05<prob. <. 10
**01<prob.<.05
***prob.<.01

CIVILIAN(a+b)
0.8823
0.0167
0.0899
0.0101
0.0507
0.8016
0.0384

t
-5.4388
-5.9838
-5.7095
-7.6943
-3.0071
1.7383
8.1316

Sig.
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0070
0.0986
0.0463
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Chapter Six
REGIME TYPE AND THE ECONOMY:
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA

As is the case with most nations in sub-Saharan Africa,
agriculture is of critical

importance to the Nigerian economy— as a

provider of employment, the production of food and raw materials, and as
a source of foreign exchange.

Thus, agricultural development has tended

to receive high priority on the policy agendas of successive Nigerian
regimes.

But since Ghana has provided a case study assessing the impact

of regime type on agricultural development, this chapter will be
concerned with a different, but equally important, policy issue area—
the impact of regime type on industrial development.
Like Ghana, Nigeria is ideal for examining the relationship
between regime type and public policy because Nigeria has spent
than

more

two-thirds of its life as an independent nation since 1960 under

military rule.

Both countries have also experienced at least two

alternations between military and civilian regimes.

Finally, Ghana and

Nigeria are two among a handful of sub-Saharan African states for which
updated records and reasonably reliable data are available.

Thus, for

the purpose of the comparative study of regime performance in subSaharan Africa, Nigeria is a suitable focus of attention.
Nigeria is the biggest nation in Africa, with a population of
about 100 million.

This means that one out of every five people in

Africa is a Nigerian.

In terms of size and population, Nigeria offers a

market sufficiently large to enable modern industries to develop.
Furthermore, the nation has a great variety of agricultural and mineral
236
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resources to sustain these industries.

Consequently, successive

Nigerian regimes have placed emphasis on the development of the
manufacturing sector.

Although the manufacturing sector has

consistently ranked a distant third to mining (crude oil in particular)
and to agriculture in terms of its contribution to gross domestic
product (GDP), its importance to the Nigeria economy has increased
considerably since the end of the colonial era.
In the following pages, the accomplishments of alternating
Nigerian regimes as they relate to the development of the manufacturing
industry will be examined.

Following the approach of earlier case

studies an attempt will be made to determine whether it makes a
significant difference for a nation to be governed by civilian or
military leaders.

In the process, the budgetary priorities and the

socioeconomic consequences of the policies of each regime type will be
evaluated.

Historical Background
Before the colonial era, the geographical area known as Nigeria
was made up of a collection of small independent states with different
historical, political and cultural backgrounds.

The major cultural

groups inhabiting the area at the onset of the colonial period were the
Yoruba, Bini and Ibo in the south and the Hausas, Fulani, and Kanuri in
the north (Irukwu 1983, 111-12).

Early British involvement in the

region led to the creation of Lagos Colony and the protectorates of
Northern and Southern Nigeria.
191A.

Nigeria did not become one country until

That was the year when the British protectorates of Northern and

Southern Nigeria— including Lagos Colony— were amalgamated to form the

238
"Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria" (Ostheimer 1973, 14-20; Rinehart
1982, 31).
On October 1, I960, after half a century of British rule, Nigeria
became an independent nation.

Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was

elected Prime Minister in December of 1959 and continued to serve in
that position until January of 1966.

Nigeria became a republic in 1963.

In 1963, the mid-West Region was created, bringing the total number of
regions to four (the other three were the North, West and East).*
Although the Balewa government made some notable improvements in the
Nigerian economy, its performance in the political sphere was not very
impressive.

Nigeria’s first six years of independence was marred by

incessant and often violent political strife.
The first major political disturbance started in the Western
Region, where an ideological rift between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the
leader of the Action Group
deputy leader of the party,

(AG) political party, and S. L. Akintola, the
led to a split within the party, with one

faction supporting Awolowo and the other supporting Akintola.

The

disagreement between the two factions sparked rioting across the region.
(Ostheimer 1973, 48-51; Isichei 1983, 468; Adamolekun 1986, 79).
As events in the region took a turn for the worse, the federal
government intervened by declaring a state of emergency and suspending
the region’s constitution and government.

Following a judicial enquiry

into the affairs of the region, Awolowo and twenty-seven others were
arrested and placed on trial for treason.

Awolowo was found guilty and

sentenced to 10 years imprisonment (Rinehart 1982, 47; Irukwu 1983,
133).

With Awolowo and the other leading party members in jail, the
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Action Group ceased to be an effective national opposition party.

The

removal of the opposition in this fashion marked the end of the effort
to conduct the affairs of the federal parliament on the Westminster
model

(Pedler 1979, 213).
In 1962, another controversy arose over the census figures.

As

soon as the 1962 census figures were announced it was rejected by
northern leaders because it showed a decreased proportion of Nigerians
1iving in the North.
place in 1963.

The census was canceled and another count took

Although political leaders from the southern regions

were unhappy with the new figures, the census was used as the official
basis for any calculations in which population was a relevant factor
(Rinehart 1982, 50; Irukwu 1983, 133-34).

Public displeasure with the

performance of Nigeria’s first civilian rulers was already very high by
the time of the 1964 general elections.
The federal elections of 1964 and the 1965 legislative elections
in the Western region only served to further undermine public confidence
in the ability of Nigeria’s political
of the country.

leaders to administer the affairs

Charges of electoral malpractice were widespread.

Unable to resolve their differences in the polling booths, political
factions fought in the streets.

The fighting was especially violent in

the Western Region where an estimated 2,000 persons died (Rinehart 1982,
52).

On January 14, 1966, with the country on the brink of a major

political debacle, the military intervened, bringing an end to Nigeria’s
First Republic.
The army’s Commander in Chief, Major General Johnson Aguiyi
Ironsi, an Ibo, assumed the leadership of the country as the head of the
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newly formed Federal Military Government (FMG).

The FMG suspended the

constitution, ordered the dissolution of all legislative bodies and
banned all political parties.
visit to the Western Region,
54).

On July 29, 1966, while on an official
Ironsi was assassinated (Rinehart 1982,

The Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from a

small northern ethnic group (the Angas), assumed the leadership of the
FMG.
Gowon received the support of most Nigerians in his efforts to
restore order and stability.

However, the military governor of the

Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, an Ibo, refused to
acknowledge Gowon as supreme commander and asserted that the new federal
government was illegal.
serious problem.

However, the Gowon regime was faced with a more

Thousands of Ibos were killed and their properties

looted and destroyed as fighting broke out in the North (Ostheimer 1973,
64).

An angry Ojukwu summoned all easterners to return to the East and

all non-Easterners (except mid-Western Ibos) to leave the eastern
region.

Perceiving this and other related actions by Ojukwu to be a

prelude to complete secession, Gowon declared a state of emergency.
Using his newly acquired emergency powers, Gowon appointed a
government consisting of both military and civilian commissioners,
abolished the regions, and divided the country into twelve states.
Ojukwu responded to these actions by pulling the Eastern Region out of
Nigeria.

On May 30, 1967, citing the F M G ’s inability to protect the

lives of easterners and suggesting its culpability in genocide, Ojukwu
formerly proclaimed the Eastern Region as the independent Republic of
Biafra (Rinehart 1982, 56; Pedler 1979, 223-25).

Initially the FMG

BM
initiated a "police action" to end the secession.
"police action” turned into a full-scale war.

In July of 1967, the

During the ensuing war,

which lasted for thirty months, there were over a million casualties.
The literature on the Nigerian civil war is rich and its ample coverage
by other studies renders any detailed discussion of it superfluous
here.

?

Having successfully prosecuted the civil war (or the "war of
national unity" as it was labeled by the FMG), and supervised the
peaceful assimilation of easterners into the Nigerian society, the Gowon
regime had to deal with the task of returning the country to civilian
rule.

in a broadcast marking the tenth anniversary of Nigerian

independence, Gowon declared that it would take his government six years
before the country would be readied for a return to civilian rule.

The

reasons for such a protracted period of preparation for civilian rule
were set out in a nine-point program which, according to Gowon, must be
completed "before the government of the country can be handed over with
a full sense of responsibility"

(Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, 4).

program included the following:
1.

The reorganization of

the armed forces.

2.

The implementation of the National Development Plan
and the repair of the damage and neglect of war.

3.

Eradication of corruption in Nigeria’s national

4.

Resolution of the issue of the creation of more
states.

life.

5.

The preparation and adoption of a new constitution.

6.

The introduction of a
allocation.

7.

Conducting a national population census.

new formula for revenue

The
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8.

Organizing of "genuinely national" political parties.

9.

The organization of elections and installing popularly
elected governments in all the states and at the
center (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, A; Irukwu 1983,
186).

The target date for completing this political program and for restoring
the country to civilian rule was 1976.
No assessment of the political performance of the Gowon regime
would be complete without at least a brief examination of its handling
of its nine-point program.

The Second National Development Plan, which

got under way in October of 1970, was aimed primarily at the
reconstruction of facilities damaged or neglected during the war.

By

the time the Gowon regime was toppled in 1975, significant progress had
been made toward fulfilling the FliG’s objective of repairing "the damage
and neglect" of the war.
However, the reorganization of the armed forces was another
matter.

At the end of the civil war, the Nigerian army had grown from a

force of about 11,500 in 1966, to over 850,000 (Europa Yearbook 1967,
953, Legum 1973, B693).

The substantial cost of maintaining such a

large army in peace-time was an enormous financial burden for Nigeria.
However, despite the F M G ’s recognition of the need for extensive
demobilization of soldiers, no meaningful reduction in the size of the
army took place (Irukwu 1983, 187).
The Gowon regime did not make any significant headway in its
attempts to eradicate corruption.

In fact, the FMG under Gowon was

widely perceived to be tolerant of corruption.

Although it issued a

decree in 1973 establishing a special anti-corruption police (the XSquad, whose subsequent investigations revealed that ingenious forms of
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extortion and fraud was rampant in government and other sectors of the
Nigerian society)) the problem of corruption actually got worse during
the Gowon regime (Legum 19739 B686-96; Rinehart 1982s 66).
The most politically sensitive part of the nine-point program was
undertaken in 1973.
population census.

During that year the FMG conducted a national
Despite the elaborate measures taken to ensure a

more accurate count than had been possible in 1963) the 1973 results
once again confounded many Nigerians , as well as informed demographers.
Not only had the national population apparently risen from 55 million to
79 million in ten years5 but the northern states now contained 64
percent of Nigeria’s total population) as compared to 53 percent in
1963) which was believed to be an exaggerated figure even then (Rinehart
1982) 65-66).

The 1973 census5 upon which any future electoral

representations and revenue allocations would be based) revived fears of
ethnic domination.
The other five points in the nine-point program were not realized
during the life of the Gowon regime.

For example) the questions

concerning the creation of more states and the preparation of a new
constitution were ignored; no new formula for revenue allocation was
introduced; the ban on political parties remained in force; and the
promise to hold elections and return the country to a popularly-elected
civilian government in 1976 was abandoned when9 in his 1974 independence
day broadcast to the nation) Gowon declared:
Our own assessment of the situation as of now is that
it will be utterly irresponsible to leave the nation in the
lurch by a precipitate withdrawal which will certainly throw
the nation back into confusion.
Therefore) the Supreme
Military Council) after careful deliberation and full
consultation with the hierarchy of the armed forces and
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police, have decided that the target date of 1976 is in the
circumstances unrealistic and that it would indeed amount to
a betrayal of trust to adhere rigidly to that target date.^
Gowon assured Nigerians that the FMG had not abandoned plans of
returning the country to civilian rule.
when civilian rule will be reinstated.

However, he did not indicate
In the face of rising public

discontent with Gowon’s vacillation on the issue of a return to civilian
rule, his regime was toppled in a bloodless coup on July 29, 1975.
Gowon was succeeded by another northerner, Brigadier Murtala Ramat
Muhammed.

One of the first acts of the new regime was to cancel the

1973 census and replace it with normal population projections from the
baseline of the 1963 census.

On October 1, 1975, Muhammed announced a

five-stage program which he said would culminate in the return to
civilian rule.

The program was to be accomplished as follows:

1.

Appointment of a Constitution Drafting Committee in
October, 1975, to work on a preliminary draft.

2.

Creation of new states by April 1976; completion of
the first draft of the constitution by September,
1976.

3.

Election of members of a Constituent Assembly
October, 1977.

b.

Ratification of the Draft Constitution by the
Constituent Assembly by October 1979, and lifting of
the 1966 ban on political parties.

5.

States and federal elections by October,
1983, 201).

in

1979(Irukwu

Muhammed named October 1, 1979, as the date when the military would hand
the control of government to civilians.

He promised that his regime did

not "intend to stay in office a day longer than is necessary, and
certainly not beyond this date.,ft
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The Muhammed regime had more success with its stated political
objectives than did Gowon’s.

In October of 1975* a 50-man committee to

draft a new constitution was appointed.

On February 3, 1976, the FMG

announced the creation of seven new states, bringing the total number of
states to 19.

The F M G ’s progress toward the realization of its stated

political objectives was briefly interrupted when Muhammed was
assassinated in a failed coup attempt on February 13, 1976.

Muhammed

was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, a westerner of Yoruba
origin.

The change in leadership was accomplished without any

noticeable lapse in the progress toward civilian rule.

The draft

constitution was completed in September of 1976, and in August of 1977,
a Constituent Assembly (CA) was elected.

The CA completed its task in

August of 1978, and a month later a new Constitution, patterned after
that of the United States, was promulgated into law as Decree No. 25.
Soon after the ban on politics was lifted in September of 1978,
many political parties were established.

However, only five of the new

parties met the required criteria for registration.

The five political

parties that were registered by the Federal Electoral Commission
(FEDECO) to contest the 1979 elections were:

the Unity Party of Nigeria

(UPN), the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), the Great Nigerian People’s
Party (GNPP), the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), and the People’s
Redemption Party (PRP).

The legislative and presidential elections were

held in months of July and August respectively.

Alhaji Shehu Shagari of

the NPN won the presidential race and was installed as the President of
Nigeria’s Second Republic on October 1, 1979.
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During the first two years of the Shagari administration, the
affairs of the government progressed very slowly.

For the most part,

this was because the president’s party, the National Party of Nigeria
(NPN), did not have a commanding majority in the National Assembly.
Efforts to sustain a working coalition with the Nigerian People’s Party
(NPP) failed when a shaky alliance between the two parties broke up in
July of 1981.

The slow progress of government was demonstrated by the

fact that, after two years of civi1ian rule, the National Assembly had
passed only 17 bills (Legum 1982, B504).
Furthermore, the Shagari administration had to deal with the
hostilities of opposition party members who accused his ruling NPN of
political victimization and intimidation.

There were also intei— party

conflicts in the various states (Legum 1981, B569; 1982, B507; Falola
and Ihonvbere 1985, 79).

Having survived a problematic first term in

office, Shagari was re-elected president in the 1983 elections.
However, the results of the elections were widely disputed.

There were

c

accusations of electoral fraud by defeated candidates.J

Except for

supporters of the victorious NPN, Nigerians were generally critical of
the conduct and results of the elections (Falola and Ihonvbere, 220-23).
It came as no surprise to most Nigerians when less than four months
after the elections the Shagari regime was toppled in a military coup.
The new FMG was headed by Maj. Gen. Muhammed Buhari, the former
Commissioner for Petroleum in the last military regime (1975-1979).
Upon assuming office, Buhari stated that the elimination of corruption
and the restoration of the nation’s economy were the principal
objectives of the new military rulers.

One of the new regime’s major
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initiative was the introduction of what it called the "War Against
Indiscipline" (WAI).

WAI was aimed at re-educating Nigerians to refrain

from corrupt and non-productive activities.
In an effort to curb the rising incidence of crime, Buhari’s
regime promulgated several decrees which mandated the death penalty for
a number of offenses, including armed robbery, oil smuggling, and drug
trafficking.*5 The execution in April,

1985, of three men for cocaine

smuggling so appalled the people that they called for a change in
policy.

However, the new military leaders were not swayed by popular

demands for milder sentences.
Another cause of public concern was the promulgation of Decree No.
4 (Protection Against False Accusation) on April 17, 1984.

The decree

was supposedly intended to protect government officials from "falsehoods
and inaccuracies of press reports" (Legum 1985, B550).
Nigerians,

However, to most

it represented an attempt by the Buhari regime to curb the

freedom of expression to which they have become accustomed (under both
civilian and military rule).

The initial popularity which the regime

enjoyed soon gave way to fear and disenchantment, as the regime became
rigid and uncompromising in its posture.

After only twenty months in

office, Buhari was ousted by his fellow officers who "could not stay
passively and watch a small group of individuals misuse power to the
detriment of our national aspirations and interest"

(Legum 1985, B545).

Economic Developments
The issue of economic development is one that has loomed quite
large in the affairs of successive Nigerian governments.

Irrespective

of the nature of the regime, successive Nigerian governments have
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advanced policies designed to bring about the rapid development of the
country’s economy.

In the settings of such policies, these regimes have

tended to place the greatest emphasis on the development of the
agricultural and industrial sectors.
areas have received most attention:

Within the industrial sector, two
petroleum and manufacturing.

In

later pages, the performance of alternating Nigerian civilian and
military regimes will be laid out, in an effort to determine how
effective they have been at attaining their objectives.

Since the case

study of Ghana focused on the agriculture sector, and the petroleum
sector was not an important part of the Nigerian economy until the late
1960s, the manufacturing sector has been selected as the focus for a
detailed examination of regime performance in Nigeria.

Economic Developments During the Colonial Era
In the wake of the British control of Nigeria came the development
of a cash economy based mainly on the production of cocoa, palm oil and
kernel, rubber, cotton, and timber, as well as the mining of tin ore and
coal.

The primary concerns of the colonial administration were to

stimulate the production and export of these cash crops and to encourage
the consumption and expand the importation of British manufactured
goods.

The fact that these economic considerations were the major

reasons for the colonization of Nigeria is supported by the observation
of the first British Governor General of Nigeria, Lord Lugard.
According to Lugard, "the partitioning of Africa was, as we all
recognize, due primarily to the economic necessity of increasing the
supplies of raw materials and food to meet the needs of the
industrialized nations of Europe"

(Stavrianos 1981, 278).
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Consequently, the colonial administrators encouraged agricultural and
mining activities, while giving little or no support to manufacturing
activities.

Agriculture

The colonial government established a number of institutions for
the general advancement of agricultural production.

Schools,

plantations and agricultural research stations were established.

These

institutions greatly enhanced the production of major cash crops:
oil and kernels, cocoa, groundnut, cotton and rubber.

palm

These products

made significant contributions to the colonial economy.
Throughout the colonial era, the agricultural sector remained the
most important sector of the Nigerian economy.

By 1960, the sector

accounted for over 75 percent of total export earnings.

The colonial

administrators encouraged the production of cash crops because this not
only met the need for such crops in Britain, but it also provided the
Nigerian farmers the income with which they could pay the head tax that
was the main financial prop of the colonial government.

Mining

A distant second to the agricultural sector in its contribution to
the Nigerian economy was the mining sector.

British colonial rule

resulted in the extensive exploitation of Nigeria’s mineral resources.
The exploitation was particularly severe in the case of tin mining.
Foreign mining of tin was begun by the Champion (Nigeria) Tin Fields
Company around 1909.

By the end of 1910, over fifty companies had taken

up licenses to prospect for tin in Nigeria.

The quantity of tin
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exported rose from 737 tons in 1910 to a high of 15,166 in 19**5
(Ekundare 1973> 179).

Other minerals including columbite, coal and gold

also contributed to export earnings.

Manufacturing
The type of manufacturing establishments that were allowed to
develop in colonial Nigeria were primarily those involved in first-stage
processing of raw materials.

Saw-milling, cotton ginning, groundnut

shelling and groundnut oil extraction, and palm fruit processing
characterized the industrial activity in colonial Nigeria.

Because the

British used their colonies primarily as a source of raw materials and
not as a center for manufacturing, the latter was never given the
necessary impetus to develop in Nigeria.

During the colonial era, some

local industries continued to operate, but at a much reduced capacity.
The increasing importation of foreign goods brought with it new tastes
for better, and sometimes cheaper, industrial goods from Europe.
A notable feature of colonial rule was the decline in the
industrialization of the Nigerian economy.
exist.

Iron smelting ceased to

Salt production declined, surviving only insofar as it catered

to local preferences.
enamel ware.

Local pots were partly displaced by imported

The production of soap and local textiles declined

(Isichei 19B3, **31).

This process of industrial decline was facilitated

by the policies of the colonial administration.

For example, the

Caravan Tax of 1902 added to the cost of Hausa textiles, and the
abolition in 190** of tolls on British textiles gave them a competitive
advantage over those that were manufactured in Nigeria.

Furthermore,

response to the demands of British mining companies, the colonial

in
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government banned the local smelting industry (Isichei 1983, 427-31).
Even as late as 1946, the colonial government foiled plans by the United
Africa Company (UAC) to open a textile factory in Nigeria.

The plans

were well advanced when the company was informed that if its projected
textile factory resulted "in an appreciable diminution in the yield of
import duties on textiles the factory’s products would be made liable to
an equivalent excise duty"

(Pedler 1979, 103).

In the late 1940s and early 1950s the situation began to change as
4

Nigerian nationalists started agitating for more substantial
participation in government.

This led to a series of political

developments that created the conditions under which Nigerians could
become more involved in the determination of the nation’s economic and
political growth.

The most important of these developments was the

promulgation in June, 1951, of a new constitution, the Macpherson
Constitution (named after the incumbent governor, John Macpherson).

The

new constitution marked the beginning of a period of effective transfer
of political authority from British administrators to Nigerians.

It

allowed for regional autonomy, transforming the regions which had been
merely administrative divisions into complete political and governmental
systems, with executive councils and legislative assemblies (Ostheimer
1973, 24-25; Rinehart 1982, 41-42).

The regional governments were given

the responsibility for formulating and implementing policies in several
areas, notably agriculture, education and industry.
Another important development began in 1946 when, under the
stimulus of the scheme for Nigeria contained in the 1945 Colonial
Development and Welfare Act, a ten-year plan for development and welfare

was inaugurated.

The plan allocated funds for a variety of projects

ranging from small community improvements to the construction of major
health, educational and research facilities (Ekundare 1973, 230).
Government policies on economic development during the 1950s were
aimed at encouraging private investment, particularly in manufacturing
and agriculture.

In 1952, the initial steps were taken to encourage

pioneer industries.

Any business venture which satisfied the provisions

of the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance (which were, broadly that,
that the industry must be favorable to Nigeria and in her interest)
might be declared a pioneer industry.

Such industries were relieved

from payment of company or profit tax during the first two years of
their existence.

This ordinance was superseded by the Industrial

Development (Income Tax Relief) Ordinance of 1958, which extended the
period of guaranteed tax relief and also liberalized the procedure for
granting pioneer certificates (Ekundare 1972, 40-41).

Although some

businesses abused the privileges provided by the ordinance (upon making
substantial profits some companies folded up as soon as their pioneer
status expired), the ordinance led to the establishment of many
manufacturing enterprises in Nigeria (Pedler 1979, 105-107).
Another factor that provided an impetus for the growth of
manufacturing industries during the 1950s was the expansion of the
Nigerian market and the increase in the purchasing power of the
population.

During this period the value of imports underwent a

tremendous expansion and it soon became apparent to trading companies
that the Nigerian market will be able to sustain some types of
manufacturing industries.

Consequently, the large trading companies
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channelled some of their profitsj which would ordinarily have been
transferred overseas,

into establishing some light manufacturing

industries in Nigeria (Isichei 1983, 432; Rodney 1974, 171).

Thus, the

trading companies became pioneers of industrialization, but it was not
long before the were joined by others.

Because of a lack of indigenous

capital most of the new industrial establishments were foreign-owned.
For example, the giant UAC (the largest trading company in Nigeria since
the advent of colonial rule), founded the Nigerian Breweries, Ltd. and
many other light manufacturing enterprises; Portland Cement Company
built a cement manufacturing plant; and the makers of Raleigh bicycles
and Bedford lorries (trucks) established plants for assembling their
products in Nigeria (Isichei 1983, 432).

Colonial Policies and Foreign Investment
The domination of the manufacturing industry by foreign firms
became a major concern of the colonial government as Nigeria moved
toward independence.

Although some colonial policies, such as the

Pioneer Industries Ordinance, helped to encourage the development of
indigenous manufacturing enterprises, the incentives provided by the
ordinance proved to be more of a boon for foreign entrepreneurs than for
indigenous ones.

The Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief)

Ordinance, which authorized the repayment of part or all of any duty
paid on imported materials used in the manufacturing sector, was also
more beneficial to foreign-owned enterprises (Ekundare 1972, 41).

In

1956, the concern over foreign domination of the Nigerian economy led to
the creation of a national committee on Nigerianization of business
ventures.

Among other proposals, the committee recommended that aliens
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be barred from distributive trades.

This recommendation was not adopted

until well after Nigeria achieved independence (Whitaker 1982, 142).
Nevertheless, by the time Nigeria attained independence, the
manufacturing sector was expanding rapidly (see Table 6.1) and was
beginning to contribute to the overall growth of the economy.

During

the 1950s, the sector contributed a yearly average of nearly 4.5 percent
to the gross domestic product (GDP).

Economic Development During the Balewa Administration (1960-1966)
During the first six years of independence, significant progress
was made in the areas of commerce and industry.

During the Balewa

administration, Nigeria’s foreign trade continued the upward trend begun
after the Second World War.

The value of exports rose from 327 million

naira in 1959 to 568 million in 1966, while the value of imports rose
from 357 million naira to 512 million naira over the same period.

The

composition of Nigeria’s exports witnessed a significant change during
this period.

In 1959, agricultural products accounted for over 75

percent of total exports, while crude petroleum accounted for only 1.7
percent.

However, by 1965, the contribution of agriculture to Nigeria’s

exports had declined to 51.6 percent, while that of crude petroleum had
risen to 26 percent (Aboyade 1972, 558).

The growth rate of the gross

domestic product (GDP), averaged an impressive 5 percent per year during
the live of the Balewa government

(1960-1965 ).'

Manufacturing, 1960-1966
Like most African leaders, Nigeria’s governing elite were
convinced that the manufacturing industry was the basis of the strength

Table 6.1
Increase of Manufacturing Industry in Nigeria* 1950-1960
(at Constant 1957 Prices in Thousands of Pounds)

Baker ies
Oil Milling
Beer and Soft Drinks
Tobacco (Cigarettes)
Textiles
SOURCE:

1950

1960

19.0
363.6
257.9
1395.B
4.5

316.0
2610.0
2B00.0
2190.0
613.0

Pedler (1979), p. 105.

*/.
Increase
1550
618
911
57
1350
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of Europe and North America, and that its absence was the principal
cause of Africa’s underdevelopment.

Consequently, after Nigeria

achieved independence, the Balewa administration devoted a great deal of
attention to industrial development.
Under the Balewa administration, all sectors of the economy grew
rapidly.

Agriculture remained the dominant sector of the economy in

terms of its contribution to economic growth.

Despite the government’s

attempts to diversify the economy by emphasizing the development of
other sectors (manufacturing in particular), the contribution of the
Agricultural sector to GDP amounted to over 50 percent in 1965 (Tables
6.2 and 6.3).

As can be seen from Table 6.3, the contribution of the

mining sector to GDP increased more than threefold between 1960 and
1965, when as a result of increased production of crude oil, the sector
contributed nearly 5 percent to the GDP.
This period also witnessed a significant increase in the
contribution of the manufacturing sector to the nation’s economy.
During the period 1960 to 1965, this sector grew at an average annual
rate of over 12 percent.

The sector’s contribution to the GDP in real

terms grew from 107.6 million naira in 1960 to 214.6 million in 1965
(Olaloku 1979, 4-5).

The fact that manufacturing was becoming an

important contributor to economic growth in Nigeria can be seen in Table
6.3.

The table shows that the sector’s share of GDP rose from 4.5

percent in 1960 to over 6.4 percent in 1965.

Import substituting

ventures were undertaken on a wide scale, resulting in a significant
decline in the importation of manufactured goods.

The number of

manufacturing establishments in Nigeria grew from 524 in 1962 to 776 in
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Table 6.2
Gross Domestic Product by Kind of Economic Activity* 1960-1985
(in Billion Naira)

YEAR

SDP

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

2.4
2.4
2.5
2.9
3.1
3.4
3.6
2.9
2.9
3.8
5.6
7.1
7.7
10.9
18.8
21.8
27.6
32.5
35.5
43.1
49.7
52.2
55.7
55.2
56.7
65.5

AGRICULTURE
1.41
1.45
1.62
1.67
1.67
1.69
1.84
1.53
1.41
1.71
2.49
2.97
3.00
3.10
3.46
4.05
6.12
7.31
8.05
9.10
10.08
9.86
12.41
12.16

MANUFACTURING
0.11
0.13
0.14
0.16
0.19
0.21
0.22
0.21
0.20
0.28
0.38
0.41
0.51
0.50
0.66
1.17
1.46
1.55
1.78
2.04
2.35
2.65
2.73
2.37

Source: United Nations* National Accounts Statistics:
Aggregates (1979-88).

Analysis of Main
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1965, an increase of over 48 percent (Industrial Statistics Yearbook,
1966-1968).

The most impressive increases occurred in the manufacturing

of textiles* beverages* footwear, printing, soap, cement and cigarettes
(IBRD 1974, 83; Boahen, Ade Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 167).

This growth was

in large part due to the changing role of government with respect to
manufacturing.

Prior to 1950, in its effort to secure and preserve the

Nigerian market for British manufactured goods, the colonial government
deliberately discouraged the development of certain manufacturing
activities.

The transfer of governmental authority to Nigerians, who

were, in general more anxious to attain rapid economic development,

led

to the adoption of policies designed to encourage growth in the
manufacturing sector.
A number of measures were introduced to attract manufacturing
establishments into the country.

For instance, legislation was passed

that gave income-tax-free holidays to those firms engaged in "pioneer"
or favored industries.

In the early 1960s, additional fiscal incentives

were introduced, such as import duties relief on imported materials,
accelerated depreciation allowance on plants and equipment, and tariff
protection.

A number of non-fiscal incentives such as the provision of

industrial estates, with facilities such as roads, drains, water,
electricity and accommodation for workers was also a major inducement to
manufacturers (Pedler 1979,

106).

Industrial and training research

organizations were also established, and loan financing was introduced.
In pursuit of the goal of creating and industrial society in the
shortest possible time, and, in the absence of sufficient domestic
private investment capital, the Balewa administration tried to attract
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Table 6.3
Sectoral Composition of the Gross Domestic Product (in Percentages)

VEAR
1960
1961
1962
1963
196A
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
197A
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

AGRICULTURE

MANUFACTURING

MINING I OTHER
INDUSTRIES

WHOLESALE 5,
RETAIL TRADE

58
61
6A
57
53
50
51
52
A9
AA
AA
A2
39
28
18
19
22
22
23
21
20
19
22
22

A .5
5.0
5.5
5.5
6.0
6.0
6.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
7.0
A.5
3.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
A.3

2
2
3
2
2
5
5
A
3
8
10
15
16
18
33
22
25
2A
2A
28
32
27
2A
22

12
11
11
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
11
10
20
16
20
20
21
20
21
20
22
21
22

TRANSPORTATION

I COMMUNICATION
5
5
A
5
5
5
A
A
5
A
3
2
3
A
3
3
3
3
3
A
A
A
5
A

Source:
United Nationsj National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of Main
Aggregates (New York: United Nations, 1979-88).
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foreign investors.

However* during this period foreign investors were

very cautious and only interested in projects which were guaranteed to
be profitable and did not require substantial

initial investments.

Thus, foreign private investment tended to be concentrated in light
manufacturing industries (such as beverages and textiles).

In the face

of the political pressure for factories at all cost, federal and
regional governments were compelled to become entrepreneurs.

In a

number of cases the governments’ ventures into the manufacturing
industry turned out to be very costly as they invested in many nonviable projects.

For example,

in some factories owned by the government

of the Eastern Region (including a glass factory, a bottling plant, a
brewery, and a ceramic factory), over-staffing, nepotism and other
corrupt practices limited their profitability (Schwarz 1968, 290).
The federal government, for its part, entered into a number of
questionable joint-venture agreements with foreign investors.

Most of

the projects were package deals featuring turnkey projects, with little
local technological participation.

These projects were financed by

suppliers’ credits or "contractor finance."

Under these agreements,

irrespective of the viability of a project, the foreign investor made
substantial profits by selling the machinery which are used in the
projects.

If he had a stake at all, his holding was generally so small

that any loss was far outweighed by the profit on the selling of the
machine.

Early in 1965, outstanding Nigerian debts under these

arrangements totalled 55.3 million pounds (Schwarz 1969, 290).

A senior

Nigerian civil servant with experience in this field complained about;
...guaranteed riskless investments which involve government
guarantees in foreign exchange and in which the government
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has to undertake to meet all obligations falling due if the
investment is not viable.
In such projects the foreign
investor generally contributes five percent of the equity
capital; the rest comes from the government.
The foreign
partner supplies the equipment under suppliers’ credit
terms.
There are known cases where the foreign investor is
the consultant who prepared the feasibility study for the
projectj the financial adviser and the banker who finalized
the credit arrangements, the manufacturer who supplied the
equipment, the technical partner and management agent who
runs the factory under a management agency agreement, with
fees and commissions.
The economic "Mikado" gets a
government guarantee that if the project fails, the
government would from its budgetary resources service the
loan for the equipment (A. Ayida, quoted in Schwarz 1969,

291) .
As the foregoing clearly illustrates, far from serving as a means
for the transmission of capital into the Nigerian economy, this form of
foreign investment actually resulted in a net drain of capital from the
country.

Furthermore, the policies of the Balewa administration also

assured the continued domination of Nigeria’s economy by foreign
enterprises.

Government Policy and Foreign Investment, 1960-1965
Aside from its commitment to a policy of industrialization the
Balewa administration also expressed a commitment to the
"Nigerianization" or indigenization of the economy.

Hence, although his

administration made sustained efforts to attract foreign capital,

it was

equally concerned about encouraging foreign domination of the economy.
Accordingly, Balewa (1964, 33), noted that while his administration was
"anxious to see a large and vigorous private sector developed," it was
"also anxious that our own people should take an increasing part in the
development of that sector."

His administration’s concern was expressed

in the Nigeria’s first National Development Plan (1962-1968),

in which
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it was stated that the government would adopt policies "to enable
Nigerians to participate to an ever increasing extent in the ownership,
direction and management of Nigerian industry and trade" (Akinsaya 1983,
166).
Nigeria’s level of development in the 1960s made it difficult for
the Balewa administration to implement its policies of rapid
industrialization and Nigerianization at the same time.

The lack of

sufficient domestic capital and inadequate technical know-how meant that
the government’s goal of rapid industrialization could not be realized
without substantial foreign participation.

Hence, speaking before

Parliament in 196A, Balewa expressed his concern about the foreign
domination of the country’s economy.

At the same time he stressed his

administration’s intent to maintain an open-door policy toward foreign
investment:
It must be obvious that no Nigerian can be content so long
as any major sector of the economy is controlled by
foreigners.
But we are realists and we say that so long as
there is a dearth of Nigerian capital, so must there be an
opportunity for foreign capital in Nigeria.
We do not seek
the withdrawal of foreign capital from any area of the
economy before Nigerian enterprise is able to replace it.
When the time for withdrawal has come, due notice will be
given (Proehl 1965, 159).
This official liberalism was expressed in practical terms in the
shape of generous incentives for foreign investors.

These included

liberal income tax and import duty relief, accelerated depreciation
allowances and the imposition of protective duties and import quotas.
There were no restrictions on the remission of profits and repatriation
of private salaries (Schwarz 1969, 286).

Aside from these economic

inducements, the regulations relating to foreign investments provided
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for guarantees of fair compensation in the event of nationalization.
The Balewa administration indicated that it had no plans "for
nationalizing industry beyond the extent to which public utilities were
already nationalized"

(Akinsanya 1983, 1^6).

This liberal attitude

toward business, and the absence of a strongly established socialist
element in the nation’s politics? helped to attract more foreign capital
into Nigeria.

As a result? the foreign domination of the economy in

general, and of the manufacturing sector in particular, was maintained
throughout the life of Nigeria’s first civilian regime.

Economic Development from Gowon to Obasanjo (1966-1979)
Economic policy during the civil war period was directed toward
raising sufficient funds to prosecute the war.

During this period

defense expenditure increased more than ten-fold, as public spending in
other areas declined.

Expenditures on defense, which accounted for only

11.3 percent and 16.£ percent of total current and capital expenditures
in 1965, accounted for 50.5 percent and 65.6 percent, respectively,
1971.

in

Conversely, current and capital expenditures for economic

services declined from 11.6 percent and 55.8 percent to £.7 percent and
19.7 percent, respectively, over the same period (Nafziger 1983, 1£737).
The devastation caused by the civil war necessitated the
implementation of a massive program of physical repair and
rehabilitation of the country’s infrastructure.

The successful

execution of the program was made possible by Nigeria’s new-found wealth
from the exploitation and exportation of crude oil.

By the time the war

ended in 1971, crude oil had become Nigeria’s major export, accounting
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for about 60 percent of total exportsj as against 86 percent in 1965.
The dramatic rise in world oil prices in 1974 (when oil accounted for
nearly 98 percent of total exports) resulted in a dramatic increase in
Nigeria’s export earnings.
Spurred by the increase in oil revenue) the FMG embarked on a
spending spree* which included expenditures on a variety of non
productive, grandiose projects.

For example, the FMG spent over 140

million naira for the construction of facilities for the international
Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC), which was originally scheduled
for the end of 1975 (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, 18-13).

Income from

oil revenues was unevenly distributed, as government investment was
concentrated in the urban centers, while the rural areas received very
little attention.

With more public investment going to the cities,

labor was attracted away from the less profitable agricultural sector.
This led to high urban unemployment, as people leaving the agricultural
sector were often unable to secure jobs in the cities.

The inflation

rate rose considerably during this period, reaching a peak of 43 percent
in 1975 (Legum 1975, B750; 1977, B6B3).
With more attention being paid to the petroleum sector,
productivity in the neglected agricultural sector suffered.

Agriculture

which was, for a long time, the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy
(accounting for 75 percent of total exports in 1960 and 55 percent in
1965), accounted for only 4.4 percent of total export earnings in 1975
(Falola and Ihonvbere 1985,

186).

eventually led to food shortages.

Declining agricultural productivity
However, the enormous increase in oil

revenue during this period enabled the country to supplement local food
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production with imported food products.

Subsequently, Nigeria which was

once a major exporter of food* became a net importer of food.
After Gowon was overthrown, the new FMG tried to arrest the
decline in agricultural productivity.

It launched Operation Feed the

Nation (OFN) which aimed to promote increased agricultural productivity
and make the nation self-sufficient in food output.

Despite impressive

increases in budgetary allocation to agriculture, the OFN program did
not alleviate Nigeria’s food problem.

Inflation remained a major

problem, as food prices continued to escalate at a much faster pace than
before (Legum 1979, B753).

The FMG was not helped by the world oil glut

and the subsequent decline in oil prices after 1977.

As the revenue

from oil began to decline, the FMG was forced to borrow funds from
abroad to carry out its development programs.

Consequently, Nigeria’s

external debt, which stood at only 54 million naira in 1975, rose to 364
million in 1979 (Legum 1981, B5B0).

Manufacturing, 1966-1979
The Nigerian government has always been a major investor in the
manufacturing industry.

Thus, the decline in government expenditure on

economic services during the civil war led to a decline in manufacturing
output.

Total manufacturing output declined by over 10 percent between

1966 and 1968.

The number of manufacturing establishments declined from

776 in 1965 to 540 in 1968 before rising to 704 in 1970 (National
Accounts Statistics,

1978-88;

Industrial Statistics Yearbook,

1968-74).

After the war was over the Gowon regime turned its attention to
economic development.

According to the Guideposts for the regime’s

Second National Development Plan (1966, 2-3), one of the most important
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aim of the plan was to promote the rapid industrialization of the
economy.

Toward this end, the Gowon regime placed more emphasis on the

development and expansion of the manufacturing sector.
objectives of the

The major

government’s industrial policy included:

1.

The promotion of even development and the fair
distribution of industries in all parts of the
country.

2.

Ensuring a rapid expansion and diversification of
industrial sector of the economy.

3.

Promoting the establishment of industries which cater
for overseas market in order to earn foreign exchange.

b.

Raising the proportion of indigenous ownership of
industrial investment (Onyejekwe 1981, 158).

the

By the time the Gowon regime was toppled in 1975, nearly all the
manufacturing industries damaged during the war had been reactivated.
The growth rate within the sector was about 10 percent between 1970 and
1975.

The number of manufacturing enterprises rose from 70^ to 12^6

over the same period (Legum 1975* B750; Industrial Statistics Yearbooks
1972-76; Onyejekwe 1981, 159).

Despite the impressive growth rate the

industrial sectors’ contribution to GDP actually declined during this
period, falling from 7 percent of GDP to 5 percent (see Table 6.3).
The Third National Development Plan was launched by Gowon in March
of 1975, but it was implemented by the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime (19751979).

The plan was launched under extremely favorable circumstances;

Nigeria had become the world’s eight largest oil producer; and the 1973
oil crisis which facilitated a substantial

increase in oil prices led to

an increase in Nigeria’s revenue from oil.

Consequently, the third plan

was much more ambitious than its predecessors and aimed at radically
transforming the national economy.

Investment in this new plan period
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was more than twelve times as much as the investment covered by the
second plan (Bailey 1977, 158-59).

Although agriculture had the highest

allocation in the plan, the largest percentage increase over previous
plans was in the allocation to industry.

Apart from expenditures

connected with the oil industry, the biggest single industrial project
in the plan was the establishment of an iron and steel industry (Bailey
1977, 159; Legum 1976, B801-803).
The decline in world demand for oil during the late 1970s,
however, adversely affected the implementation of the third development
plan.

In 1977, due to worsening economic conditions and the drop in the

level of Nigeria’s foreign exchange reserves, the Obasanjo
administration restricted the importation of a variety of goods.
Although this measure was designed in part to protect domestic
manufacturing industries, it actually led to the collapse of a few
businesses.

Stricter foreign exchange controls caused delays in the

importation of raw materials needed in some manufacturing enterprises.
Inadequate supply of raw materials forced others to shut down (Legum
1981, B608-609).

Consequently, by 1978 the total number of

manufacturing establishments in Nigeria was only 1075, compared to 1246
in 1975 and 1418 in 1977 (Industrial Statistics Yearbook,

1976-80).

In

1979, on the eve of the return to civilian rule, the sector’s
contribution to GDP remained relatively low at only 4.7 percent (see
Table 6.3).
An important characteristic of the manufacturing sector was
unaffected by the policies initiated during the period of military rule.
This sector continued to be dominated by light manufacturing enterprises
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(food processings beveragess cigarettes and textiles).
import content of manufactured goods remained very high.

Furthermore, the
On the

averages 3A percent of raw materials used in the sector was imported
(Jakande 1975s 27^-76).

Another important characteristic of this sector

was the level of government participation.

During the thirteen years of

military rule (1966-1979), the government’s participation in
manufacturing enterprises increased substantially.
invested in a variety of projectss

The government

including salts oils petrochemical

and gas refineriess auto assembly plantSs cements glass and beer
factoriess textile mills and many more (Ostheimer 1973s 1A9; Jakande
1975, 276; Olorunsola 1977, 35).
Most of the F M G ’s activities in manufacturing was in partnerships
with foreign companies.

The lack of adequate domestic capital meant

that the more technologically advanced sub-sectors of the manufacturing
industry continued to be dominated by foreign investors.

The FMG’s

concern over the low levels of indigenous participation in manufacturing
sector led to the implementation of a number of measures aimed at
remedying the situation.

Two of these measures was the creation during

the Gowon administration of the Nigerian Bank of Commerce and Industry
and the Agricultural Credit Bank.

It was hoped that these banks would

facilitate the development of private indigenous enterprises by
extending credit facilities to enterprising Nigerian entrepreneurs
(Akinsanya 1983, 160).

Another, and perhaps the most significant

measure, was the promulgation of decrees which were intended to bring
about a reduction in foreign participation in a variety of enterprises
in Nigeria.
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The Indigenization Decrees of 1972 and 1977
Like its civilian predecessor? the FMG acknowledged the need for
foreign capital investment in Nigeria’s drive for rapid
industrialization.

Like its civilian predecessor, the FMG also sought

to reassure foreign investors that their investments would be safe in
Nigeria.

Thus, for example, the Second National Development Plan

included the promise that there will be no program of "indiscriminate
nationalization"

(Ostheimer 1973, 151).

The third development plan also

sought to encourage foreign private investment by promising "to further
open the doors to both indigenous and foreign private investors in most
sectors of manufacturing"

(Jakande 1979, 305).

While trying to attract foreign investment, the FMG also expressed
its concern over the continued foreign domination of the country’s
economy.

Thus, it was stated in the Second National Development Plan

that:
Experience has shown through history, that political
independence without economic independence is but an empty
shell....
The interest of foreign private investors in the
Nigerian economy cannot be expected to coincide at all times
and in every respect with national aspirations...a truly
independent nation cannot allow its objectives and
priorities to be distorted or frustrated by the
manipulations of powerful foreign investors (quoted in
Schatz 1981, 22).
In an effort aimed at attaining some degree of economic
independence, the FMG promulgated the Nigerian Enterprises and Promotion
Decree (Decree No. 4) of 1972.

The decree listed 22 selected industrial

activities (called Schedule I industries) as the exclusive preserve of
Nigerian entrepreneurs.

The industries affected included small,

labor
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intensive manufacturing and local service-related enterprises, many of
which were already Nigerian-owned by 1972.
Enterprises exempted on the basis of their size (i.e., those with
paid-up capital in excess

of A00,000 naira), were required to make

available to the Nigerian

public up to A0 percent of their total

equity.

The businesses in this schedule included construction firms,

some large import substitution industries, and wholesale and retail
distributors.

The largest and most important industries (e.g., tobacco

and textiles), were completely unaffected by the 1972 decree.

The

failure to indigenize these enterprises which were among the most
profitable in the country, caused many Nigerians to call for an
expansion of the number of industries covered by the decree.

The

government responded with the promulgation of a second indigenization
decree in January of 1977.
The second decree added 20 new industries to the list of Schedule
I industries which were to be completely Nigerian-owned.

Thirty-three

new industries were added

to Schedule II, and the mandatory sale of

shares was raised from A0

to 60 percent.

A third schedule was added to

the new decree which listed all remaining industries and required that
they make available A0 percent of their equity to Nigerians (Biersteker
1983, 190).
The various provisions of the first decree were to have been
implemented by the end of 197A, but only about a third of the foreign
business affected had completed the process of indigenizing their
businesses by mid-1975 (Whitaker 1982, 1A3).
similarly only partially effective.

The second decree was

Virtually every foreign firm
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operating in the country found ways to neutralize the indigenization
requirements.

The specific strategy or combination of strategies varied

from firm to firm; however, they were all designed to ensure a minimal
loss of control over operations.

Biersteker (1987, 113-225) identified

the variety of strategies that foreign firms adopted to circumvent the
provisions of the decrees.

Thus, although the decrees facilitated some

structural changes, they failed to alter significantly the composition
of the ownership of businesses in Nigeria.

Economic Development During the Shagari Administration (1979-1983)
Upon return to civilian rule the new government continued with the
economic programs of its military predecessor.

Monetary and fiscal

policies were directed at stimulating domestic production and reducing
inflation.

Rising oil revenues in 1979 and 1980, as well as the

maintenance of the previous military regime’s restrictions on imports
helped to improve Nigeria’s foreign exchange situation (Legum 1981,
B579).

With the improvements in the country’s foreign exchange

situation, the Shagari administration was eventually able to relax the
restrictions on imports.
The new civilian government promised to make the nation selfsufficient in food production by 1984.

Consequently, when the Fourth

National Development Plan (1981-1985) was introduced in March, of 1981,
the highest priority was given to agriculture, which was allocated over
10 percent of total planed expenditure (Legum 1982, B523-24).

The

administration launched a "Green Revolution" program which emphasized
the "revitalization of the small land holders," as well as encouraging
the establishment of privately owned large-scale farms.
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A major portion of the program of the fourth development plan was
to be funded by revenue derived from the exportation of crude oil.
Shagari alluded to this fact when the plan was inaugurated:
The Fourth Plan is being launched at a time when the
country’s production of crude oil, which is the main source
of government revenue and foreign exchange earning, has
virtually stabilized.
A basic strategy of the Fourth Plan
would therefore be the promotion of optional utilization of
resources.
Oil is a wasting asset.
The resources generated
from this sector must therefore be used to promote all-round
expansion in the productive capacity of the economy so as to
ensure self-sustaining growth in the shortest time possible
(Shagari 1981).
The estimates for the plan were based on projection of revenues
derived from sales of crude oil in 1979 and 1980.

The plan envisioned a

production rate of 2.19 million barrels per day at $36 per barrel
(Bienen 1985, 54).
accurate.

Neither of the projections turned out to be

By August of 1981, oil production fell to 650,000 barrels per

day, as world oil prices began to fall.

Revenue from oil underwent a

dramatic decline, from $23.4 billion in 1980 to $10.1 billion in 1983.
As a result of the decline in oil revenues, the Shagari administration
was unable to sustain its commitment to programs in the fourth
development plan.

Therefore, agricultural productivity remained low and

the government was compelled to use scarce foreign exchange to import
food.

The country went heavily into debt.

By the time of the coup in

December, 1983, the country was on the verge of economic collapse.
Between 1981 and 1983, GDP declined by 8.5 percent and consumer prices
rose at an annual average rate of over 20 percent

(Hackett 1988, 767).

Unemployment remained a major problem, particularly among university and
polytechnic graduates (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 83-145).

However, the
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most serious economic problem was the country’s external debt, estimated
at about $20 billion (Legum

B530-32).

Manufacturing, 1979-1983
When it launched the Fourth National Development Plan in 1981, the
Shagari administration indicated that a primary objective of the
programs in the plan was the promotion of self-reliance.

In addition to

agriculture, the plan accorded high priority to increasing industrial
productivity (Legum 1981, B583; Olayiwola 1987, 127).

The plan promised

to encourage "the maximum growth of investment and output so as to
ensure a full realization of the country’s industrial potential in the
shortest possible time."

The plan projected a growth rate of 15 percent

for the manufacturing industry over the plan period (Legum 1982, B52627).
The need to reduce the manufacturing sector’s dependence on
imported raw materials has compelled successive Nigerian governments to
include the establishment of an iron and steel industry as an important
part of their development plans.

Although it was included in the first,

second and third development plans, the project never got off the ground
(Onyejekwe 1981, 161).

Under the Fourth Development Plan, the

establishment of an iron and steel industry was again made a priority of
government.

The government’s commitment to the project was demonstrated

when a minister of cabinet rank was appointed to be "solely responsible
for steel development."

Furthermore, the Shagari administration

allocated over one billion naira to the project in its 1981 capital
budget (Tijjani and Williams 1981, 258-65).
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Yet the administration realized part of its planned objectives,
when three steel-rolling mills and a steel plant (with the capacity to
produce 960,000 tons of steel a year) were opened in 19BE.

The much

larger Ajaokuta steel complex opened its first light section mill in
1983 (Hackett 1988, 771).

To be sure, some of these projects were

inaugurated during the tenure of the Obasanjo administration.
Another sector that witnessed some growth during the early years
of the Second Republic was the automotive industry.
continued to expand with Britain, France,

The industry

Italy, Austria and Germany all

involved in joint ventures with national and state governments for
vehicle assembly.

However, despite the expansion in the domestic

automobile manufacturing, local demand remained well above supply
(Tijjani and Williams 1981, £68; Hackett 1988, 771).
The expansion in steel and automobile industry, however, was not
sustained throughout the tenure of the Shagari administration.

As has

already been noted, because of the decline in oil revenues the Shagari
administration was unable to sustain its commitment to programs in the
fourth development plan.

The decline in oil revenue after 1981 forced

the reduction or stoppage of several planned projects (Hackett 1988,
771).

The introduction of austerity measures,

including restrictions on

imports, resulted in a sharp decline in economic activity.

Most

manufacturing establishments struggled to operate without essential
imported raw materials and spare parts.

In 1983, over 100 of these

establishments were forced to close for some time as nearly 70 percent
of their inputs were imported (Legum 1984, B5E9).

Q
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The manufacturing sector during the Shagari administration
continued to be dominated by light manufacturing industries.

In 1983,

textiles, beverages, cigarette, soaps and detergent accounted for 60
percent of total manufacturing output (Hackett 1988, 771).

The

contribution of the sector to GDP declined slightly, from 4.7 percent in
1979 to 4.3 percent in 1983 (see Table 6.3).

After reaching a record

234S in 1981, the total number of manufacturing establishments declined
to £112 in 1983 (Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1985, 407).

Government Policy and Foreign Investment, 1979-1983
In spite of the indigenization decrees, domestic private
investment in the manufacturing sector remained relatively small
throughout the Second Republic.

Investment in the sector continued to

be dominated by the government and by foreign firms.

Like its

predecessors, the Shagari administration expressed a commitment to the
Nigerianization of the economy.

However, due to deteriorating economic

conditions the administration was unable to diligently enforce the
provisions of the indigenization decrees.

In fact, as part of the plan

to increase industrial and agricultural production, the Shagari
administration liberalized restrictions on foreign equity ownership in
joint ventures in agriculture.
As early as 1980, restrictions on foreign participation in several
industries were eased in order to encourage foreign investment.

Foreign

investors were allowed to have 60 percent participation, against the
previous 40 percent, in the production of metal containers, fertilizers
and cement (Legum 1981, B587).

Legislation was also passed that relaxed

investment restrictions, so that a foreign parent company would be able
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to keep control of new subsidiary companies in Nigeria.

Another action

taken by the Shagari administration to attract foreign investors
included the establishment of two information centers in the United
States) to acquaint prospective investors with available opportunities
in Nigeria.

The administration also signed a "Memorandum of

Understanding" with the Washington, which led to the creation of the
Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC).

The JACC promoted

joint ventures and investments by U.S. firms in the establishment of
q

large-scale farms and food processing companies in Nigeria.

These

efforts by the Shagari administration to attract foreign investment,
however, were not very successful.

A weak economy and an unstable

political climate may have contributed to the reluctance of foreign
investors to come to Nigeria.

Economic Development Under the Buhari Regime (193^-1985)
On the economic front, the Buhari regime did not fare much better
than its civilian predecessors.

In an effort to control inflation and

improve the nation’s foreign exchange situation, the regime introduced
severe austerity measures.

Among other things, foreign exchange for new

students to study abroad was curtailed, severe restrictions were placed
on imports, all imports became subject to import duties, and almost all
goods manufactured in Nigeria was covered by excise duty (Legum 1984,
B532).1*'1 Like Shagari’s civilian administration, Buhari’s military
regime gave priority to improving agricultural productivity.

In the

19B4 and 1985 budgets the sector received 21 percent and IB percent
respectively, of total capital expenditure (Legum 19B5, B 561).

27 7
Despite the regime’s efforts, no noticeable improvements were
recorded.

Even the decision to change the country’s currency (a move

aimed at foiling the operations of currency smugglers), failed to
alleviate the deteriorating economy.

The Buhari regime also failed in

its attempts to reach a loan agreement with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).

Although the regime met most of the conditions set by the

IMF (including imposing import restrictions, reducing of government
expenditure, and giving priority to the agricultural sector), it refused
to accede to two other important conditions:

a 60 percent devaluation

of the naira and an end to subsidies on petroleum products (Novicki
1985, A-9; Legum 1985, B560).

Manufacturing
The FMG under Buhari continued to work within the framework of the
Fourth National Development Plan.

However, because demand and prices of

crude oil continued to sag, a number of projects were abandoned and
funding for others were reduced.

Although a substantial proportion of

government expenditure was devoted to the manufacturing sector (steel
development was allocated 523 million naira), a 15 percent reduction in
total government expenditure meant that the sector received much less in
real terms than it did under earlier administrations (Legum 198A, B532).
A rolling mill for the production of steel wire rods was opened at the
Ajaokuta steel complex.

However, output was sporadic, owing to

shortages of imported billets (Hackett 1988, 771).
Private investment in the manufacturing sector was severely
hampered by the policies of the Buhari regime.

The imposition of import

duties, ranging from 5 to 200 percent, on imported raw materials
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increased the cost of production for most manufacturing activities.
Furthermore, the imposition of excise duty on goods manufactured in
Nigeria added more to the price of locally manufactured goods thus,
robbing them of any competitive advantage they may have had over their
legitimately imported or smuggled competition.

Yet another problem was

the lack of foreign exchange, which made it difficult for manufacturing
establishments to purchase raw materials from abroad.

All of these

factors combined to produce difficult times in the manufacturing sector
during the Buhari regime.

There were dramatic declines in productivity

in nearly all manufacturing industries.

For example, output of all

commercial vehicles declined from 30,000 units in 1981 to 10,000 units
in 1984 as most automotive assembly plants were operating well below
capacity.

The only industry that witnessed an increase in output was

the brewing industry (Hackett 1988, 771).

Government Policy and Foreign Investment (1984-1985)
The generation of domestic investment capital continued to be a
problem during the Buhari regime’s brief tenure in office.

Thus, during

this period, in an effort to encourage foreign private investment in
neglected areas, the provisions of the indigenization decrees were
selectively relaxed.

For example,

in his 1984 Budget speech Buhari

announced that the FMG was considering "a proposal to amend the Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Decree to enable non-Nigerians to own up to 80
percent of large farm projects"

(Olayiwola 1987, 141).
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Conclusion
All of Nigeria’s leaders (civilian and military) since
independence believed that the development of the manufacturing sector
was a necessary precondition for the country’s economic development.
Consequently, they adopted policies which they hoped would lead to the
rapid development of Nigeria’s manufacturing industry.

However,

irrespective of the type of regime in power, the outcomes of these
policies were negligible.
Throughout the period under review, the manufacturing industry
continued to be dominated by light manufacturing enterprises that were
technologically simple.

The sector remained heavily dependent on

imported raw materials.

According to the Manufacturers’ Association of

Nigeria (MAN), up to 60 percent of all raw materials that local industry
used in 1985 were imported.

Furthermore, the contribution of this

sector to the GDP remained relatively low throughout the period under
review.

At no time did the sector contribute more than 7 percent to

GDP; and in fact the sector’s contribution to GDP actually declined
during the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 6.3).

These tendencies indicated

that after twenty-five years of independence, and in spite of the
commitment of successive Nigerian regimes to increasing productivity in
manufacturing, this sector remained underdeveloped.
Another important concern of successive Nigerian governments was
the low level of indigenous participation in the nation’s economy.
Although the Balewa administration recognized the need to initiate
policies which would promote more indigenous participation in
manufacturing,

it was unable to achieve this goal because of

the
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shortage of domestic investment capital.

It was left to the succeeding

military administration to promulgate an indigenization decree.
However, contrary to some assertions (Iwayemi 1979, 63), the
promulgation of the 1972 and 1977 indigenization decrees had more to do
with Nigeria’s improving economic status than with the type of regime in
power.

The massive increase in oil revenue after the 1973 oil crisis

meant that the government could embark on its industrial development
projects without the aid of much foreign investment.

However, as soon

as oil revenues began to fall in the 1980s, both the civilian regime of
Shehu Shagari and the Military regime of Muhammed Buhari were compelled
to relax the provisions of the decrees.
The results of the quantitative analysis from chapter three
support the general conclusion that regime type was not a significant
determinant of public economic policy in Nigeria.

Whatever difference

may have existed between the two regime types was negligible.

The

results of the simple country analysis for Nigeria (which is reproduced
in Table 6.^) also indicated that there were no significant differences
in the budgetary priorities of both regime types.

As might be expected,

defense spending was significantly higher under military rule than when
civilians were in power.

However, budgetary allocations for health and

education, as well as output in the agricultural sector, were
insensitive to regime type.

More importantly, the results show the

regime type had no impact on output in the manufacturing sector.

The

sector contributed an annual average of 5.7 percent (PMAN = 0.0569) to
the GDP during periods of military rule and 5.2 percent (PMAN = 0.0523)
during periods of civilian rule.
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lable 6.4
Results of Simple Country Analysis for Nigeria* 1960-1985

VARIABLE
PSPh'ND
PHEALTH
PEDUC
PDEFEN
PMAN
PAGRIC
CGDP80
*.05<prob.< .10
*?01 <prob.< .05
***
i_ - /->,
prob.<
.01

MILITARY(a )
0.1625
0.0069
0.0226
0.035"/**
0.0569
0.3396
0.0566

CIVILIAN<a+b)
0.1589
0.0078
0.0215
0.0121
0.0523
0.4278
0.0152

t
-0.1699
0.8103
-0.3401
-4.5103
-1.1630
1.3385
-0.8946

Sig.
0.8667
0.4268
0.7372
0.0002
0.2573
0.1944
0.3803
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The lack of any meaningful difference in the performance of
civilian and military regimes in Nigeria can be attributed to a variety
of factors.

Among the most pertinent are:

ineffective planning; the

reliance of both regime types on the same bureaucratic structures for
the implementation of public policies; inefficient and corrupt political
institutions and societal cleavages which inhibit the ability government
to promulgate universally beneficial policies.

Although some of these

factors will be discussed at considerable length in the concluding
chapter, at this point a brief statement about them is in order.
Perhaps the most important consideration when developing public
policy in Nigeria is how it will be perceived by members of the numerous
ethnic groups in the country.

It was implied in Chapter Two that

because of their corporate solidarity military rulers will have a
significant advantage over civilian ones in governing ethnically
fragmented societies.
not always the case.

The Nigerian experience has proved that this is
For example, a few weeks after the inauguration of

the first military regime ethnically motivated rioting broke out in
various parts of the country.

This was followed a few months later by

one of the most violent civil wars in the annals of African history.
Military rulers did not only fail to contain ethnic disturbances in the
country, but like their civilian counterparts they allowed ethnic
considerations to effect the implementation of important developmental
programs.
Although successive regimes since independence recognized the need
to build an iron and steel complex, and made provisions for the
construction of such a complex in their National Development Plans,

nothing came of it until the late 1970s.

The primary reason for this

delay in the implementation of a project which many observers considered
to be of paramount importance to the nations industrial development was
the inability of civilian and military leaders to decide on an
appropriate site for the project.

The major regionally-based? ethnic

groups clamored to have the complex built in their region.

Not wanting

to incur the wrath of any of the major ethnic groups? the nation’s
leaders deferred the implementation of the project.

It was not until

late in the life of the Obasanjo administration that a site was finally
selected for the project.

Ajaokuta? the site selected for the complex

was close to the center of Nigeria in a region not dominated by any of
the major ethnic groups.

The need to please the various groups in

Nigeria or at least not to offend any one of them has equally hindered
the performance of both civilian and military regimes.
As was the case in Ghana? successive civilian and military regimes
in Nigeria were handicapped in their efforts to accomplish their stated
objectives because they were not able to develop effective development
plans.

Plan objectives under both regimes were often designed to

accommodate the demands of the various groups in the country.
Consequently? these plans were rarely consistent with the government’s
ability to fund them.

Furthermore? development plans in Nigeria were

often based upon inaccurate and unrealistic projections of expected
revenues.

This was the case with the Third National Development Plan

which was launched during the Gowon regime and partially implemented
during Obasanjo administration (Bailey 1977? 158-59? Legum 1976? B801803).

The Fourth National Development Plan which was launched during
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the Shagari administration was also overly ambitious and based on faulty
projection of revenues from crude oil sales (Bienen 1985, 5**).
Under both civilian and military regimes, the Nigerian bureaucracy
played a major role as architect and executor of national development
plans.

Since the bureaucracy was the only governmental institution that

remained relatively unchanged throughout successive periods of civilian
and military rule, the tendency therefore, was for public policies to
remain relatively constant from one regime type to the other.
The prevalence of corruption in governmental institutions have
proved to be a major handicap to regime performance under both civilian
and military rule.

The amount of money which was discovered in the

possession of some Nigerian political leaders after the 1983 coup would
have been sufficient to enable the country meet its immediate financial
obligations.

For example, the minister of transport under the Shagari

administration was reported to have misappropriated over six billion
dollars, through what was described as a series of "fraudulent
practices" (Momoh and Agbabiaka 1985, 1800-1801).^
Gowon regime in Nigeria was notoriously corrupt.

Similarly, the

After the regime was

toppled in 1975, properties and other assets valued in the billions of
dollars, reportedly acquired improperly, were confiscated from former
is

officials of the regime.
When public policies are susceptible to the same procedural and
institutional constraints it becomes more likely that policy outputs and
outcomes under different regime types will be less clearly
differentiated.
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Chapter Seven
CONCLUSION:

CONSTRAINTS ON REGIME PERFORMANCE

To what extent can policy outputs and outcomes in sub-Saharan
Africa be explained by the type of regime in power?

Does it "make a

difference" for a sub-Saharan African state to be governed by civilians
or military officers?

And which regime type (if any), will be most

effective in dealing with the developmental problems of the countries in
this region?

The preceding four chapters have focused on the

performance of civilian and military regimes in a number of sub-Saharan
African countries in an effort to provide answers to these questions.
This chapter attempts to draw together the findings of the
preceding four chapters as they relate to regime performance.

Using the

four hypothesis which were specified in Chapter Two as guidelinesj the
nature of

the impact of regime type on public policy will be analyzed.

More importantly) an attempt will be made to provide

explanations for

the correlation of policy outputs and outcomes with regime type.
recapitulate) the four guiding hypotheses are:
H j:

Defense expenditure should be higher in countries
where the military controls the policy-making
institutions than in those where they do not.

Hg:

Military rule will be negatively correlated with
variables indicating budgetary allocations to economic
and social sectors) whereas civilian rule will have
the opposite effect.

Hg:

Within any given African country, changes in regime
type should be associated with shifts in the pattern
of spending priorities exhibited by that country.

H^:

Socioeconomic development in the emerging nations of
sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to occur under
military led regimes that are predisposed to
£86
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modernization than under regimes headed by civilians
who are similarly predisposed.
Of the four hypotheses, only HI is supported by the findings in
the preceding chapters.

Even on occasions when the economic situation

called for increases in the budgetary allocations to the more productive
sectors of the economy, military regimes never felt compelled to reduce
defence spending.
While defense spending was rarely affected by austerity budgets
under military regimes, under civilian regimes defense spending was not
spared.

For example, when declining cocoa revenue forced the Ghanaian

civilian regimes of Nkrumah and Busia to introduce austerity budgets,
defense spending was one of the major items to be cut (Afrifa 1966, 109;
Rothchild 1980, 968).

However, when Ghanaian military rulers were

confronted with a similar situation, they actually increased the
budgetary allocation to defense.

For example, between 1972 and 1975, a

time when Ghana’s economic survival was still uncertain, the Ghanaian
military government reduced public expenditure in agriculture from 6 to
5 percent, but increased spending on defense from 8 to 9 percent
(Rothchild 1980, 972).
regime,

Similarly, in 1981, the Liberian military

in compliance with an austerity program, removed a $9 million

subsidy on rice prices, but instituted a threefold increase in defense
spending

(Dunn and Tarr 1988, 96).'

Surprisingly, however,

increases in defence spending under

military regimes were seldom associated with decreases in budgetary
allocations to economic and social programs.

This may be due to the

fact that substantial savings were realized when some political
institutions are abolished after the military assumes power.

The
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salaries that are paid to African elected officials (including
presidents, prime ministers, ministers, congressmen or members of
parliament), as well as the cost of maintaining their residences and
places of work

(e.g., executive mansions, houses of assembly), often

account for considerable portions of government expenditure in subsaharan African states.

In some countries, like Nigeria and the Sudan,

the cost of maintaining and staffing regional executive offices and
assemblies can be quite substantial.

The suspension of these

institutions following a coup can result in substantial savings, which
may sometimes even be sufficient to offset the increases in defense
spending.
It is also noteworthy that defense spending in most African
countries is usually for small items, such as uniforms, barracks
facilities, wages and small armaments.

The governments of most African

countries do not need, and cannot make a good case for purchasing, the
sort of advanced and expensive weapons systems which are often
associated with exorbitant defense spending in the more advanced
nations.

Not only do African nations not have the kind of adversaries

that demand the use of sophisticated weaponry, they also lack qualified
personnel to man advanced weapons systems.
Because defense expenditures in African countries are often on
small items, it is possible for military regimes to increase defense
spending without reducing the budgetary allocations to the social and
economic sectors of the economy.

This was the case in Liberia where

most of the increases in defense expenditure during the period of
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military rule went toward the construction of houses for members of the
army (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1982).
Ghana was the one notable case in which an increase in military
spending was associated with a reduction in government spending on other
sectors of the economy (mainly agriculture and industry).

However> even

in this instance the increase in military spending was to make up for
the conspicuous neglect of the military by a previous civilian
administration.

For example,

in referring to the past neglect of the

armed forces by the Nkrumah administration. Brigadier A.A. Afrifa wrote
about Ghanaian soldiers without boots and in "tattered and ragged"
uniforms (Afrifa 1966, 104).

Thus the increase in defense spending went

to finance improvements in pay and conditions (Omari 1972, 164; Bayham
1988, 229).

Apart from Ghana, it would seem that military regimes in

other sub-Saharan countries have been able to finance the increases in
defense spending with the savings accrued from payments which once went
to defunct political institutions from the preceding civilian eras.
Another reason why increases in defence spending under military
regimes were seldom associated with decreases in budgetary allocations
to economic and social programs may be due to the fact that African
countries are glaringly underdeveloped.

In the types of underdeveloped

societies found in Africa, social and economic facilities (such as
education, health, transport and communications network) are still at
very rudimentary stages of development.

It does not require any special

talent to recognize the critical need for substantial improvements in
these areas.

Consequently, no matter what type of regime is in power,

African governments have always felt an obligation to allocate
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substantial portions of total public expenditure to these important
growth sectors.

In most African states, the agricultural sector often

receives the largest share of budgetary expenditure under both regime
types.

Most of the funds going to the sector are in form of subsidies.

Efforts by the World Bank to get African governments to reduce such
subsidies have met with strong resistance from both civilian and
military regimes.

These regimes recognize that their very survival

is

dependent upon their ability to provide the basic necessities such as
food, shelter, medicine and education.

The inability of some African

regimes to provide these things has precipitated their unceremonious
removal from office.

Even the use of guns and other instruments of

coercion has not guaranteed the survival of military governments which
have failed to provide these basic needs.

For example, when the

military ruler of the Sudan, Gaafar El Nimeiry, tried to comply with the
demands of the World Bank and removed the subsidy on bread, he was
promptly overthrown (Clark 1985).
It would appear that at certain stages of development, the type of
regime in control of a nation’s government may not have any significant
effect on the levels of government expenditure.

This may suggest why

(except for defense spending), there were no significant differences in
the budgetary priorities of African civilian and military regimes.
Thus, the more important question may be, how successful has a regime
been in achieving its stated objectives?
Without exception, the primary goals of African civilian and
military regimes has been to formulate and implement policies in an
effort to promote accelerated socioeconomic development.

Both regime
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types have invariably emphasized increased productivity in the
agricultural and/or industrial sectors as the path to achieving their
primary objective.

This fact is borne out by the various National

Development Plans.

The last hypothesis (H^) suggests that military

regimes should perform better than civilian ones in their respective
efforts to attain a sustainable rate of rapid economic development.
Theoretically, there are some good reasons (explained more fully in
Chapter Two), to expect military rulers to perform better than their
civilian counterparts.

Yet the material presented in the three case

studies (Liberia, Ghana, and Nigeria) show that this was clearly not the
case.
Many of the planning experiences of both regime types were
characterized by a wide gap between aspirations and achievement.

The

poor overall performance of Ghana’s second military regime, as well as
the indifferent records of Liberian and Nigerian military rulers, for
example, clearly indicate that African military regimes do not have a
markedly superior capacity to promote economic development.

This

observation is consistent with the findings of R.D. McKinlay and A.S.
Cohan (1975) and Robert Jackman (1975).
Based on available evidence including the quantitative results in
Chapter Three, there is no reason to believe that the conclusion reached
thus far would be different for other sub-Saharan African state.

The

quantitative results in Chapter Three also indicated that no one regime
type has a superior ability in attaining its developmental objectives.
The results showed that productivity in the two most important sectors
of the economies of several African states (agriculture and industry),
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were rarely responsive to regime type.

Similarly the overall

performance of the economies of African states as measured by changes in
GDP was not sensitive to regime type.
The overall conclusion, therefore, is that regime types have had
no pronounced effect on public policy outcomes in sub-Saharan African
countries.

The results also demonstrate that military regimes in sub-

Saharan Africa are not a homogeneous group which can be clearly
differentiated from civilian ones.

In fact, under both kinds of

regimes, the economies of African countries have continued to
deteriorate since the end of colonial rule; and both regime types have
been equally unsuccessful in their efforts to reverse this trend.

A

military coup, then, in the perceptive conclusion of Ruth First (1970,
22), is "a method of change that changes little."
reasons for this impasse.
headings:

There are several

The reasons can be grouped under two broad

institutional constraints and international constraints.

Institutional Constraints on Regime Performance
Perhaps the major reason for the ineffectiveness of both African
regime types is the notable absence of modern political structures and
procedures.

Both regimes exhibit what Huntington has referred to as

"political decay" (Huntington 1968, 1-92).
The post-independent political structures in most sub-Saharan
African nations were built around bureaucracies which were established
by the colonial powers.

Upon attaining independence, successor

politicians to the colonial rulers inherited bureaucracies which were,
in most cases, largely Africanized.

Although the role of the bureaucrat

underwent some significant changes after independence, the civilian

293
political leaders who led African nations into independence continued to
rely on them for advice and implementation of public policies (Schaffer
1969* 199; O ’Connell 1980, 62).

Similarly,

in those states where

civilian leaders were ousted by military coups, the new military leaders
were unable do without the services of established civil servants.
Unlike the other organizations connected with a deposed regime,
African bureaucracies tended to emerge from a military coup relatively
unscathed.

In fact military regimes tended to engender more powerful

bureaucracies.

African bureaucracies became more politicized as

military officers, unschooled in the art of government, brought in top
bureaucrats to assist them in efforts to realize the regime’s planned
objectives (if it had any to begin with).

As noted in earlier chapters,

there were some instances in which the military had intervened without
any clear idea of what it would do upon assuming control of government
(Bebler 1973, 38; Baynham 1988, 220).

In such instances, the new

military leaders relied on the bureaucracy for the formulation, as well
as the implementation, of public policies.
Such was the case in Ghana where, followinq the 1966 overthrow of
Nkrumah’s civilian regime,

the military-led National Liberation Council

(NLC), brought in top civil servants to formulate critical economic
decisions.

According to reports in the Ghanaian press during the early

period of military rule, committees consisting primarily of civil
servants were "wielding effective executive power in the country"
1969, 290).

Similarly,

(Dowse

in Nigeria following the 1966 coup civil

servants were not only involved in the formulation and implementation of
public policy, but they also became intimately involved in the
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determination of fundamental political questions (such, for example, as
the efforts aimed at devising a strategy for maintaining national unity
during the civil war period).

The power of the Nigerian bureaucrats

during periods of military rule was well expressed by Nigeria’s former
President, Shehu Shagari, who as commissioner for finance during the
period of military rule, was well placed to observe their behavior.
According to Shagari:
In a military regime, actually the policies are formulated
by the civil servants themselves, not by the military, not
by the commissioners.
It is the civil servants themselves
who formulate policies and execute those policies.
That is
the position in a military regime....
Under military rule,
when a commissioner and his permanent secretary were in
disharmony, it was the commissioner who was removed (quoted
in Adamolekun 1986, 118).
Accordingly, an important consequence of military rule has been
the expansion of bureaucratic power.

To be sure, the expansion of the

civil service has not been limited to military regimes.

Civilian

regimes have also encouraged the expansion of the bureaucracy by relying
on it for the formulation and implementation of development plans, which
became very popular in post-independent Africa.

Thus, an important

characteristic of sub-Saharan African states is that civil servants
acquired primary responsibility for policy advice— and oftentimes policy
formulation, as well— and the implementation of settled policies under
successive regime types (Adamolekun 1986, 178).
Since both regime types rely on the same institution for the
formulation and implementation of public policy,

it logically follows

that policies under both regimes will be subject to the same
environmental constraints associated with the African bureaucratic
institution.

Because of the characteristic demands of bureaucratic
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organizations it became unlikely that strategies adopted to achieve
planned national objectives will vary significantly from one regime type
to another*

Some of the relevant constraining characteristics of the

traditional bureaucracy include the following:

routinization;

functional specialization; and organizational hierarchy.
Routinization means that within a specific bureaucratic
organizations particular patterns tend to be reiterated.
rules which guide the behavior of its civil servants.
cases are used as precedents to determine present ones.
tend to be derived from established parameters.
tolerated.

There are set

For examples past
Policy choices

Arbitrariness is rarely

As a consequence of this bureaucratic tendency toward

repetitions and aversion for innovations strategies for the
implementation of stated policy objectives tend to be limited.

The

result is thats within the same country5 where the policy objectives of
civilian or military regime types are similars the strategies adopted
for pursuing that objective will also tend to be the same.

Even when a

military regime comes to power with all the instruments of coercion at
its disposals

it often finds that bureaucrats are not easily swayed from

their set patterns of behavior.

For examples NLC members criticized the

inefficiency and deliberateness of Ghanaian civil servants in
implementing policies.

General E.K. Kotoka deplored the lack of a sense

of urgency on the part of the bureaucracy and he complained that "things
d o n ’t go as expected" (Pinkney 1972s 51-52).
Bernard Schaffer (1969s 188-89) has suggested that while the
modern bureaucratic style of administration (including the emphasis on
functional specialization and on adaptive rather than innovative ways of
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attaining policy goals), may be adequate for advanced polities,

it

serves as a barrier to socioeconomic development in less developed
polities.

According to Schaffer

(1969, 198), "if we consider

bureaucracy as a particular kind of solution for the various
requirements of administration, we see that it is particularly difficult
to afford in less developed societies where rapidly induced change is
being sought."

He noted that colonial bureaucratic administrations were

excusable "in so far as they were providing what has-been called good
government rather than development"

(1969, 199).
□

To be sure, the modern bureaucratic style of administration,
which sub-Saharan African countries inherited from their former colonial
masters was partly responsible for the inability of both civilian and
military regimes to achieve their policy objectives fully.

However, a

more significant constraint on African regime performance was perhaps
due to the deviation of African bureaucracies from the Weberian precepts
of the bureaucratic style.

It has been observed that in most developing

societies, bureaucratic traditions which were inherited from the period
of colonial rule exist alongside new traditions which were developed
following the attainment of independence (Eisenstadt 1968, 286-93).
Unlike the colonial bureaucracies which were highly apolitical, the
"new" civil service in independent Africa was highly politicized.

For

example, the upper echelons of the civil service in post-independent
Ghana were staffed by members of Nkrumah’s governing Convention’s
People’s Party (CPP).

Even lower level civil servants were pressured

into joining the CPP (Kraus 1971, 59).

Similarly, the top bureaucrats

in the Liberian civil service during Tubman and Tolbert administrations
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belonged to the True Whig Party (Liebenow 1987s 107).

According to S.N.

Eisenstadt <1968» £88-89):
These party bureaucracies have been oriented more to the
political manipulation of groups of population and to the
provision of political support and loyalty to the new regime
than to the upholding of universalistic legal normsj the
development of public services) or the creation of new
public administrative service.
Even in a nation such as Nigeria) where no one major political
party was able to dominate political affairs at the national level) the
politicized civil service also became a feature of the post-independence
bureaucratic tradition.

In Nigeria) as well as in the many other

culturally pluralistic societies of sub-Saharan Africa) the bureaucrat
saw himself as fulfilling chiefly partisan functions) either as
implementing political goals) or as representing) articulating) and
regulating the political interests and activities of different groups
and social strata.
Nowhere is the politicization of the African bureaucracy more
clearly manifested than in its role as architect and executor of
national development plans.

Since in most African countries the

government is often the dominant economic actor5 civil servants have
come to exert a great influence on the direction of economic development
(Eisenstadt 1968) £86-93).

As was observed earlier5 the level of such

bureaucratic influence is not significantly altered by changes in regime
type.

Conseguently) economic policy initiatives in most sub-Saharan

African countries) which have had both civilian and military regimes)
have tended to remain the same under alternating regime types.

Despite

the post independence changes within the African bureaucracy) the average
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civil servant was still predisposed to performing tasks according to
predetermined standard operating procedures.
The significant impact of the postindependence bureaucratic style
is foundj therefore, in the performance of different regime types with
regard to achieving planned goals.

The politicization of the "new"

African bureaucracy necessarily had its chief impact on the ability of
the government to achieve major political, social and economic goals.
Among the more important consequences of the new orientation of African
bureaucracies, the following have been especially noteworthy:
lack of qualified personnel
skills);

(1) the

(leading to a decline in technocratic

(2) the limited extent of functional specialization, and the

consequent overlapping between different echelons and departments;

(3)

inadequate communication between different levels and departments;

(4)

over-centralization, poor coordination,

inadequate delegation of

authority, and lack of autonomy and initiative of junior civil servants;
and (5) a high incidence of corruption.
After independence,

it became common practice in most African

countries for the recruitment of civil servants to be based on ethnic
origins, familial connections, political orientation and other non
performance related criteria.

This inevitably led to the prevalence of

inadequately staffed bureaucracies, with very low technocratic
capacities.

When civilian and military leaders delegate the

responsibilities for the formulation and implementation of development
plans to such bureaucracies, the attainment of planned objectives is put
out of reach from the very beginning.

There is little doubt that the

existence of incompetence within the African civil service has been a
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major contributing factor leading to the perennial problem of under
implementation of national development plans (O’Connell 19B0j 53-71;
Adedeji 1980, 72-77).
The emergence of effective African bureaucracies has also been
hindered by the lack of adequate departmental specialization.

The

problem of overlapping jurisdictions and conflicting sets of
responsibilities among government departments and agencies have
adversely affected several African development plans.

Military rulers,

coming from organizations where the clear definition of areas of
operational responsibility is the norm, are generally very discouraged
by this bureaucratic confusion.

For example, General A.K. Ocran of NLC

blamed the performance failures of the military regime on the
disappointing performance of Ghanaian civil servants.

He complained

that in his ministries, unlike the army, "the line of authority was illdefined and diffuse, the civil servants often did not know who was
responsible for what" (Pinkney 1972, 52).•
The lack of appropriate communication among different bureaucratic
organs also has often made it difficult for the policy objectives of
African regimes to be formulated and implemented constructively.

For

example, Professor Gordon Idang (I960, 3A-52) has suggested that a major
deficiency in Nigeria’s economic development planning was the inadequate
provision for communication and coordination among relevant departments
and agencies.

The development plans of African regimes is further

hindered by the high level of ovei— centralization of authority.

Because

responsibility is not sufficiently delegated and independent initiative
is often discouraged, some people who may posses the particular talent
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or skill to facilitate the realization of planned objective are often
undei— uti1ized.
Like most institutions in sub-Saharan Africa? the bureaucracy is
beset with corruption.

This is a problem which has been openly and

officially recognized in most African countries by the appointment of
advisory commissions on the suppression of corruption in the civil
service.

At times? the level of bureaucratic corruption has reached

such monumental proportions that some governments now maintain anti
corruption agencies.

The problem of bureaucratic corruption extends

from the high-ranking civil servants who embezzle millions of dollars in
state funds? to those at the lower levels? who extort a "dash" or a
bribe for the simplest service.
The relative importance of these constraining factors naturally
has varied from one country to another.

However?

it is also significant

that the professional shortcomings of the bureaucracy within individual
African states has remained essentially unchanged under successive
regime types (Adamolekun 1986? 179).

Furthermore? the cumulative effect

of these problems were the same across countries and regime types:

they

resulted in the under-achievement of policy priorities and development
plans and? consequently?

led to the perpetuation of African

underdevelopment.
Evidently? bureaucracies were not the only institutional
constraints on regime performance in sub-Saharan Africa.

Civilian and

military leaders alike were equally to blame for the unimpressive
outcomes of their policy initiatives.

A great deal of public criticism

of African regimes arises because of the considerable gaps between

301
promise and fulfillment.

While bureaucrats who draw up the plans share

some of the blame for these discrepancies] the shortcomings are,
however* frequently the result of a regime’s attempt to please
everybody.

John Kenneth Galbraith (1964, 73) described the situation

thus:
To be outside the plan is to have a nasty sense of exclusion
with practical financial consequences as well.
The desire
not to be accused of overlooking something is also strong.
So there is a tendency for the plan to become not a plan but
a list of all the things that should be done, that everyone
would like to have done, or that anyone believes ought to be
done or which might be a cause of criticism if overlooked.
Specification of the things of strategic urgency is lost.
In culturally differentiated African societies, pressures from
various sectors of the society have tended to force some government
leaders to include far too many projects in their development plans.

As

the earlier case studies focusing upon Ghana and Nigeria demonstrated,
civilian and military regimes were equally subject to these pressures.
In both countries, each regime type responded by approving plans that
were beyond the reach of available resources.
Although they control the instruments of coercion, African
military elites have found that force alone (where they have attempted
to use it), is not sufficient to insure success.

Such measures as the

suspension of the constitution and the banning of political parties have
failed to ensure immunity from the same problems which civilian leaders
faced.

For example, in Ghana the NLC found that it could dismantle only

part of the extensive state intervention and welfare systems erected by
the CCP.

Furthermore, even when individual measures for reprivatization

of the state sector and selling unprofitable enterprises to foreign
capital seemed the most economically expedient thing to do, the NLC ran
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into vehement domestic opposition and had to modify its stand (Bebler
1973, 41).
Perhaps the single most important constraint on regime performance
in sub-Saharan Africa is the endemic nature of corruption among both
civilian and military leaders of government.

All too often, the rulers

of sub-Saharan Africa have behaved as if public goods were their private
property.

Friends, relatives, and clients have received appointments,

favors, and high salaries, to the detriment of the common good.

The

negative impact of corruption on a nation’s economic development has
been demonstrated in several sub-Saharan African countries,

including

Ghana and Nigeria where the national treasuries were plundered by the
very people in whose custody it was placed.
Corruption among civilian leaders has often been a favorite reason
given by soldiers staging a military coup.

However, the experience of

several African states has shown that, despite such rationalizations,
military intervention is not an effective remedy for corruption.
Mention has already been made (in Chapter Six) of the corruption
existing under civilian and military rulers in Nigeria.

Similarly,

corruption in Ghana has not been a uniquely civilian phenomenon.
Charges of corruption and elitism, which were leveled at Nkrumah, were
also leveled at the military regimes that succeeded him.

The corruption

or "kalabule" of Acheampong’s military regime, for example, has stood
out as the extreme example of immorality; it ranged from overcharging
for goods and services, to "a system whereby top officials issued chits
(giving loans or import licenses) to young women who paraded the
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corridors of power offering themselves for libidinal pleasures in return
for favours"

(Oquaye 1980* 17; Jeffries 1982, 314).

The frugality that is (in the Western minds at least) supposedly
associated with the military has not been confirmed by the performance
of African military rulers.

When they are in power, African military

rulers have frequently indulged in all sorts of extravagances (sumptuous
living quarters, high salaries,

lavish receptions, frequent trips

abroad, and the like), fully as much as their civilian predecessors and
successors.

For example, not long after they assumed power in Liberia,

Doe and his colleagues began adopting the same style of life formerly
identified with the deposed TWP leadership.

Doe soon gave up his modest

apartment and moved into the executive mansion previously occupied by
Tolbert.

His wife took over Victoria Tolbert’s Mercedes and demanded

police escorts for her trips to the supermarket (Liebenow 1987, SOI).
The corrupt practices and the extravagant lifestyles of some civilian
and military rulers have accelerated the depletion of the national
treasuries of some African nations.
Another institutional constraint is related to the brief duration
of African regimes.

The sort of development programs which many African

regimes were undertaking stand a much better chance of being realized if
they can be sustained over time.

Too often the military intervenes

before a policy has been given sufficient time to work.
does not exist in which to implement policies,
such policies will be effective.

When ample time

it is not likely that

Under these circumstances,

in which no

single regime type has been afforded the opportunity to govern for an
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extended period of time, it is not likely that public policies
promulgated by either regime type will solve a nation’s problems.
Another important institutional constraint is directly related to
military rule.

In general military rule tends to destroy fledgling

democratic institutions in Africa, as elsewhere.

Nigeria’s First and

Second Republics, as well as Ghana’s Second and Third Republics, were
not given enough time to be properly established.

Military rule,

contributed to a decline in the political skills of future civilian
leaders.

Extensive periods of military rule encourages the

underutilization and underdevelopment of important political skills
(e.g., bargaining skills), which are necessary to insure political
stability.

This fact may partially explain why, in the few cases where

military governments have been succeeded by civilian democracies (Ghana,
Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda), the new civilian rulers were unable to
perform up to the expectations of their citizens.

International Constraints on Regime Performance
Domestic institutional factors were by no means the only ones
responsible for the failed policies of regimes in sub-Saharan Africa.
In the modern world, virtually no nation lives in isolation from the
world community.

Great powers such as the United States and the Soviet

Union, as well as lesser powers such as China, France, Germany, Great
Britain and even Cuba, adopt explicit policies of military and economic
aid that can affect the ability of an African regime to promote and
implement stated national objectives.
Similarly, the approval

(or lack of it) of economic assistance by

the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can be the
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primary determinant of the success or failure of a development plan.
Most African development plans rely heavily on foreign aid.

For

example* successive development plans in Nigeria have relied on foreign
sources for substantial portions of planned capital expenditure (Idang
1980, <*2).

In Liberia, more than 80 percent of total capital investment

is financed from abroad, and up to 30 percent of total budgetary
expenditure comes from the United States alone (van der Kraaij 1983,
228).4

The notion of neocolonialism is thus

a

very important factor in

the determination of public policy in sub-Saharan Africa (Stravianos
1981, 665-80).5
Another important international constraint is the world market
economy.

Most African states are dependent on earnings from exports of

raw materials (cash crops, such as cocoa, coffee, tea and tobacco), for
revenue to fund their budgetary expenditures and development plans.
However, cash crops as well as metals and oil which provide most of the
foreign exchange for African states, are all commodities susceptible to
the vagaries of the international marketplace.

The dismal economic

record of many African regimes is often due to the fact that their
countries’ economies are extremely sensitive to changes in world
patterns and terms of trade for their major exports and imports.

Thus

in the mid 1970s, as oil prices rose and the world price for cocoa fell,
the Ghanaian economy suffered accordingly.
Ghana’s economic fate has been inextricably tied to fluctuations
in the international cocoa market (Pel low and Chazan 1986).

Attempts to

lessen the nation’s vulnerability by diversifying the economy through
industrialization has thus far proved unsuccessful.

Since most of the
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raw materials used in the new industrial establishments had to be
imported, industrial productivity in Ghana became vulnerable to
fluctuations in the market for industrial raw materials (Dowse 1969,
237; Woronoff 1972, 178).
Similarly, the excessive dependence of successive Nigerian regimes
on revenues from oil exports to finance their economic policy objectives
has proved to be detrimental to the nation’s economic development.

The

sharp drop in world demand for oil during the 1980s led to a complete
reappraisal of Nigeria’s national development plan.

Certainly,

it was

the special misfortune of the Shagari administration that its tenure
coincided in time with a protracted period of oil glut and falling
prices.

It is most doubtful that a military regime would have fared any

better under the same circumstances.
It is widely recognized that international factors have a major
impact on the ability of African states to develop (Andreski 1969;
Rodney 1974; Amin 1976).

However, the impact of international factors

on regime performance would be less severe if policy makers took certain
necessary precautions.

Experience from the three nations examined in

this study has demonstrated that failure to realize planned objectives
was often the result of the incapacity of the regime in power to make
the reguired adjustments in time and to enforce austerity measures after
these have been introduced.

For example, African governments

contributed to the decline of their economies by a failure to diversify
and manage the economy in the wake of wasteful, sometimes willful,
dissipation of existing resources.

Moreover, the neglect of important

sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, has led to a situation in

30 7
which most African countries can no longer feed themselves.
Consequently, the very survival of large population groups throughout
Africa has been put in jeopardy, as the continuing need to import food
increases the vulnerability of these nations to the vagaries of the
international market economy.
It is clear from the foregoing that both civilian and military
regimes in sub-Saharan Africa were equally inefficient and ineffective
in their efforts to realize specific socioeconomic objectives.

Yet, the

similarities between the two regime types does not represent the entire
story.

A look at the performance of both regime types with respect to

intrinsically desirable political objectives will reveal some important
differences between African civilian and military regimes.
The performance of military regimes has been even more dismal

in

the sphere of political development than in the sphere of economic
development.

Military regimes have tended to accentuate the problems of

political development with which their civilian predecessors were
initially faced.

Upon assuming power, African military rulers severely

restrict the free flow of the political process and force civilian
politicians into long periods of hibernation, depriving them of the
opportunity to acquire much needed political skills, thus perpetuating
the chain of political underdevelopment (Maniruzzaman 1987, 12).
Although civilian rulers in Africa have not done much to develop
the political institutions of the continent, they have, nonetheless,
provided channels for some form of participation by the people.

On the

other hand, military rulers have often failed to develop legitimate
political institutions and to ensure meaningful participation by the
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people in the political process.

In Nigeria, for instance, the process

of political disintegration started after the coup of January 15, 1966,
when some junior officers led by Major Nzeogwu launched a ruthless
attack on prominent military and political figures in Nigeria.

As

Talukder Maniruzzaman (1987, 7) rightly observed, periods of military
rule is usually a total waste as far as the development of political
skills is concerned.
Even more important than their detrimental impact on the
development of political

institutions, is the military’s assault on

democracy and abuses of human rights.

Having banned political parties,

and often lacking the ability to establish new and viable parties, the
African military is not well placed to promote democracy.

The

incompatibility of military rule and the democratic ethic is clearly
manifested in the very decision of the soldiers to seize power in
situations where institutionalized non-violent procedures exist for
changing the rulers.
An important difference between African civilian and military
regimes is concerned with the issue of violations of human rights.
Although some African civilian leaders are on occasion inclined to
resort to the use of force to settle disputes, they are often more
likely resort to bargaining.

The African military regime, when

confronted with a problem promptly resorts to the its specialization—
effective utilization of force.

As Claude Welch (1971, 226) noted;

"Devised to use force in the most efficient manner, armies have a
natural proclivity to turn to violence rather than palaver, to
repression rather than compromise."
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African military regimes, desirous of pursuing their stated
socioeconomic objectives in an orderly environment, have often adopted
policies of systematic repression, starvation, and mass murder.
continents most reviled tyrants have come from the military.

The

Uganda

under Idi Amin (1970-1979), the Central African Republic under Jean
Bedel Bokassa (1966-1979), and Liberia under Samuel Doe (1980-1985) were
consistently targeted as major violators of human rights.

Other

military-led regimes were also widely criticized for abuses of human
rights:

Ethiopia during the "Red Terror"

(1977-1978) and Zaire since

the mid-1970s (Mazrui 1989; Amnesty International
537).

1986; Young 1988,

Based on the level of political brutality and the violent

sanctions that they bring to bear against offenders it is clear that,

in

terms of governance, military regimes are on the average, as Robert
Jackman (1986, 888) notes,

"more repressive than non-military ones."

It would be hazardous to make a general

judgment relating to all

African military or civilian regimes, since their effectiveness has not
everywhere been the same.

In some states the military elites have

proved to be much bolder and more imaginative in attacking national
problems than in others, where a more conservative approach to national
problems has prevailed.

Moreover, the particular challenges confronting

military and civilian regimes in no two eras or nations are the same.
In Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta),

in recent years, for example,

the military saw their major task as essentially one of putting the
nation’s finances in order.

In Benin (formerly Dahomey), it was acting

as arbiter among the nation’s guarrelsome politicians, each of whom
commanded loyalty in a different part of the country.

In the Central
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African Republic the challenge was mainly saving the nation from the
Chinese Communist peril

(Du Bois 1969, 9).

Thus in each of these states, the military’s justification for
exercising governmental power is significantly different.

Obviously,

in

all African societies, the military must contend with common problems,
such as the maintenance of public order, the administration of
governmental services, and the imposition and collection of taxes.
However, it is important to note that a fundamental question of
priorities is involved.

If the military accords top priority to solving

what is seen as a central problem (such as eliminating corruption)

in

their country, then these other functions will necessarily receive only
secondary, or even no more than incidental, attention.

However, as the

case studies of Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria have shown, in practice there
is a tendency for military and civilian regimes to accord top priority
to the same set of socioeconomic tasks.
Whatever a regime’s priorities may be, what matters in the end is
whether a regime’s tenure in power has brought about any positive
changes within the society.

For example, has a regime performed better

than its predecessor, by reversing negative economic trends, such as
reducing inflation, unemployment, the national debt or increasing
agricultural and industrial productivity?

A basic conclusion of this

study is that no single regime type in Africa exhibited a consistent
ability to achieve its stated objectives, and none appeared to possess a
unique capacity for dealing effectively with dominant issues of national
concern.
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As pointed out in an earlier chapter, available data on African
systems lack the reliability needed to permit the establishment of
cause-and-effect relationships with great confidence.

Consequently, the

outcome of contemporary empirical research undertakings that employ
these data,

including this effort, should be interpreted with particular

caution.
Whether the available data are reliable or not, predictions about
Africa are much more risky than normal.

The rapid pace of change on the

continent and great diversity among African states combine to invalidate
most generalizations and projections as soon as they are made.
Nonetheless, it seems save to predict that the present trends of inept
leadership performance by both military and civilian regimes in Africa
will continue well into the foreseeable future.

The inescapable outcome

of recent tendencies is that the increasing frequency of successful and
abortive coup attempts to overthrow military and civilian regimes in
Africa will result in a shortage of people with good leadership
qualities.

As early as 1976, for example, Lt. Ben. T.Y. Danjuma noted

that the shortage of experienced officers had become an extremely
serious problem within the Nigerian army (Legum 1977, B671-72).

In some

African states the shortage of senior and experienced officers has
resulted in situations in which soldiers with little or no executive
ability have assumed power after a successful coup.

Liberia and Burkina

Faso, where a master sergeant and a captain, respectively, became heads
of governments, are two recent examples of this phenomenon.
In the future, with the increasing tendency of coup leaders to
eliminate potential opposition by executing them, the administration of
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African nations by governments headed by incompetent soldiers from the
lower ranks of the military will become commonplace.

Furthermore, since

coups have become the common means of effecting leadership change in
Africaj more qualified individuals, cognizant of the high personal cost
of failure, will refrain from seeking political office.

Under these

anticipated circumstances, the similarities in regime performance noted
in this study is likely to be more pronounced, as African civilian and
military regimes lapse into mediocrity.
In most cases military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa has
created a vicious circle that has perpetuated the conditions of economic
and political underdevelopment that initially brought about military
rule.

The consequent decline in the quality and efficiency of

government throughout Africa foretells a lamentable future for African
nations,

irrespective of the regime in power.
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Endnotes

1.

Africa Report; Nov./Dec.

2.

The term modern
sense developed
186) summarized

3.

bureaucratic style is used here in
by Max Weber.
Rod Hague andMartin
Weber’s analysis as follows:

thetechnical
Harrop <1982,

1.

Bureaucracy
division of
rules.

2.

Authority
is impersonal, vested
in the rules
which govern official business.
Decisions are
reached by the methodical application of the
rules to particular cases and not on the basis
of any private motive.

3.

People are recruited to serve in the bureaucracy
on the basis
of potential
or demonstrated
competence.

*♦.

Officials who perform
their duties competently
are secure
in both salary
and employment.
Competent
officials
can
expect
promotion
according to seniority or merit.

5.

The bureaucracy is a disciplined hierarchy in
which subordinate officials are subject to the
authority of their superiors.

involves
a
carefully
defined
tasks and operates according to set

Leoon Observer, 17 February 1967.
Africa Report, Nov./Dec.

5.

1981, E7.

1985, 39.

In its simplest form the notion of neocolonialism
suggest that
Europe,
through the slave trade and colonialism, imposed upon
Africa a framework of unequal exchange.
Through its incorporation
into the world capitalist economic system, Africa is seen as being
drained of its resources.
External constraints and influences
intrude upon the trade patterns, political process and choice of
policy in African states.
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